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INTRODUCTION

Antitrust seems like a brief for the uselessness of international
law. The imperative for international cooperation is obvious.'
Lowered trade barriers increase the relative significance of private
restraints on competition,2 even as heightened international trade
undermines the ability of individual nations to achieve antitrust
objectives by themselves.3 Meanwhile, the phenomenal proliferation
1. For recent expressions, see Report on the Internationalizationof Competition Law
Rules: Coordinationand Convergence, 1999 A.B.A. SEC. OF ANTITRUST L. & INT'L L. & PRAC.
60 [hereinafterABA Report],availableat http-/Aww.abanet.org/ftplpub/antitrust/convjrpt.
doc; INTL COMPETITIONPOLICYADVISORYCOMM.,U.S. DEI'TOFJUSTICEFINALREPORTannex
1-C (2000) [hereinafter ICPAC FINAL REPORT], available at http'//www.usdoj.gov/atr/
icpac/lc.pdf; A. Douglas Melamed, InternationalCooperationinCompetitionLaw andPolicy:
What Canbe Achieved at the Bilateral,Regional, andMultilateralLevels, 2 J. INT'LECON. L.
423, 423-24 (1999), available at http//www3.oup.co.uk/jielaw/hdb/Volume_02/Issue_03/
pdfI020423.pd; Robert Pitofsky, Competition Policy in a Global Economy-Today and
Tomorrow, 2 J. INVL ECON. L. 403, 403-04 (1999), available at http://www3.oup.co.uk/
jielawhdb/Volume02I Issue_03/ pdf/020403.pdf; Daniel K Tarullo, CompetitionPolicy for
Global Markets, 2 J. INT'L ECON. L. 445, 447-50 (1999) [hereinafter Tarullo, Competition
Policy],availableathttp//www3. oup.co.uk/jielaw/hdbVolume-02/Issue_03/pdf/020445.pdf;
Daniel K Tarullo, Norms and Institutionsin Global CompetitionPolicy, 94 AM. J. INTL L.
478 (2000) [hereinafter Tarullo, Norms and Institutions].
2. Sir Leon Brittan, The Need for a Multilateral Framework of Competition Rules,
Address Before the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD)
Conference on Trade and Competition (June 29-30, 1999) (noting that "as government
restrictions to trade are progressively reduced, there is increased concern that the benefits
... could be denied through anticompetitive business practices with market foreclosure
effects"), availableat http://wwwl.oecd.orgdafclpftrade- competition/conference/sirBrittan.
htm; Jonathan Faull, Why Do We Need More Cooperation in the Field of Competition
Policy?, Address Before the Third European Union-Japan Competition Policy Seminar (Nov.
22,1995) (same), availableathttp//europa.eiLintcommcompetition/speeches/text/spl995052.en.html; see alsoABAReport, supranote 1, at 13; JoelDavidow,AntitrustIssuesArising
Out Of Actual Or PotentialEnforcement Of Trade Laws, 2 J. INVL ECON. L. 681 (1999)
(describing potential tensions between trade remedies and self-help and antitrust law),
available at http:/www3.oup.co.ukjielaw/hdbfVolume02/Issue_04/pdf/020681.pdf. Some
argue that there is no proofthat private restrictions have mushroomed. Joanna R. Shelton,
CompetitionPolicy:What Chancefor InternationalRules?, OECDJ. COMP. L. &POLy 37-54,
61(1999); OrganisationforEconomic Cooperation andDevelopment (OECD), Aide-Memoire
42 (June 29-30, 1999) (remarks of Diane Wood), available at http-l/wwwl.oecd.orgtdaflclp/
trade-competition/conference/aidleme-e.pdf. But even if new restrictions have not been
encouraged, the relative significance of existing restrictions have increased due to the erosion
of other barriers.
3. Tarullo, Norms and Institutions,supra note 1, at 479-80 (focusing on international
cartels and possible emergence ofglobal oligopolies or monopolies); see also Joel I. Klein, The
WarAgainstInternationalCartels:Lessonsfrom the Battlefront,1999 ANN. PROC. FORDHAM
CORP. L. INT. CONF.: INTIL ANTITRUST L. & POLY 13, 18 (Barry E. Hawk ed., 1999) ("TIhe
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of antitrust codes4 demonstrates not only the possibility of a new
consensus on antitrust, but also the need for it, given the huge
potential for regulatory overlap. Numerous antitrust regimes
impose inconsistent requirements and substantial compliance
costs, especially for the growing number of mergers requiring
approval in multiple jurisdictions.5 Particularly given the highly
active antitrust authorities in the United States and the European
Union, some think that "anti-trust has been an accident waiting to
happen in transatlantic relations."' Tempers in fact were sorely
tested in the Boeing/McDonnell Douglas merger 7 and the attempted
conspirators are working globally, so antitrust enforcers must do so as well."), availableat
http:www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/speeches/3747/htm.
4. Klein, supranote 3, at 19 ("Over 80 countries now have antitrust laws -most of them
enacted during the past five or ten years - and nearly 25 other countries are in the process
ofdrafting such laws."); accord ICPAC FINALREPORT, supranote 1, at 33. Seegenerally Mark
R.A. Palim, The Worldwide Growth of Competition Law: An Empirical Analysis, 43
ANTrTRUST BULL. 105 (1998).
5. ICPAC FINAL REPORT, supra note 1, at 52-53 (describing potential for divergent
analyses and results in multijurisdictional mergers); id. at 90-98 (describing unnecessary
transaction costs imposed by multiple review processes); Douglas H. Ginsburg & Scott H.
Angstreich, MultinationalMergerReview:Lessons from OurFederalism,68 ANTITRUSTL.J.
219,220 (2000) (same). Even mergers involving companies from the same country may pose
international issues. Alan Cowell, Seeking a Common Rule Book for InternationalMergers,
N.Y. TIMEs, Jan. 28,2001, at C4 (noting one transaction in which the merging parties sought
approval from over forty jurisdictions, and another failed attempt requiring the services of
thirty-five law firms, filing in sixteen jurisdictions and eight languages); William J.Kolasky,
Jr. & William F. Adkinson, Jr., Report Your Merger to FTC, DOJ, EC, Etc., LEGAL TIMES,
Nov. 2,1998, at 44 ("Most major mergers today, even those involving firms whose homes are
in the same country, have a multinational dimension: MCI/WorldCom, Guinness/Grand
Metropolitan, Price Waterhouse/Coopers & Lybrand, Daimler BenzChrysler, and British
Petroleum/Amoco are just a few of the most prominent examples."). Professor Tarullo has
expressed mild skepticism about the burdens of multiple reviews, citing a lack of business
interest in an OECD proposal for a common premerger form, see Tarullo, Norms and
Institutions,supra note 1, at 482, and the occasional reluctance of businesses to facilitate
review by sharing confidential information, see Tarullo, CompetitionPolicy,supranote 1, at
449-50. But it seems fairer to conclude that this reveals concerns about the alternatives, such
as the feasibility of multinational merger processes or the competitive significance of
confidential information.
6. John Van Oudenaren, E Pluribus Confusio: Living With the EU's Structural
Incoherence,THE NATIONAL INTEREST, Oct. 1, 2001, availableat 2001 WL 18477244.
7. Boeing's acquisition of another U.S. corporation, McDonnell Douglas, won easy
clearance from the U.S. Federal Trade Commission (FTC). But the European Commission
wound up challenging the transaction, requiring substantial concessions, notwithstanding
attempts by U.S. politicians, including then-President Clinton, to intervene with their
Commission counterparts. While many European observers supposed that the absence of
any U.S. challenge reflected national biases, U.S. commentators were highly critical of the
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GE/Honeywell merger.' Small wonder, then, that the obsession
with adapting American antitrust to contemporary economics
has taken a backseat to rationalizing the more discrepant impulses
of international antitrust-the focus, as evidenced in weekly
headlines, being more on Brussels, Paris, or Geneva than Chicago?
The question for many, in consequence, is why greater international cooperation has not transpired, or if it ever can;' the
role Airbus, a European competitor of Boeing's, played in the Commission proceedings, and
the mutual recriminations were sharp and rancorous. For discussion, see ICPAC FINAL
REPORT, supranote 1, at 55-56; Thomas L. Boeder, The Boeing-McDonnellDouglasMerger,
in ANTITRUST GOES GLOBAL: WHAT FUTURE FOR TRANSATLANTIC COOPERATION? 139 (Simon

J. Evenett et al. eds., 2000); Eleanor M. Fox, Lessons From Boeing: A Modest Proposalto
Keep Politics Out of Antitrust, ANTITRUST REP., Nov. 1997, at 19; William E. Kovacic,
Transatlantic Turbulence: The Boeing-McDonnell Douglas Merger and International
CompetitionPolicy, 68 ANTIRUST L.J. 805 (2001); Tarullo, Norms and Institutions,supra
note 1, at 481.
8. This past summer, the European Commission announced that it would prohibit the
proposed acquisition by General Electric of Honeywell International, marking the first time
(as counsel for Honeywell put it) that "a transaction involving two U.S. companies has been
blocked by the EC after receiving approval from antitrust authorities in the United States."
Neal R. Stoll & Shepard Goldfein, A Tale of Two Regulators,N.Y. L.J., July 17, 2001, at 3.
Whether or not the Commission set a real precedent-the transaction was blocked in part
because the parties could not agree to concessions that might have permitted a highly
conditioned approval, see Andrew Hill, GE, Honeywell FallOut Over Deal, FIN. TIMS, June
30/July 1, 2001, at 1, and the decision has been appealed to the European Court of First
Instance, Francesco Guerrera, GE-Honeywell Decision Challenged, FIN. TIMES, Sept. 13,
2001, at 17-it prompted President Bush to indicate that he was "concerned" about the
merger's rejection, and the Commission decision was characterized by Secretary of the
Treasury Paul O'Neill as "offthe wall" and by Assistant Attorney General Charles James as
"reflect[ing] a significant point of divergence" with "[cilear and longstanding U.S. antitrust
policy." Michael Elliott, How Jack Fell Down, TIME, July 16,2001, at 40; Press Release, U.S.
Dep't of Justice, Statement by Assistant Attorney General Charles A. James on the EU's
Decision Regarding the GE/Honeywell Acquisition (No. 01-303) (July 3, 2001), availableat
http'/www.usdoj.gov/atr/publictpress~releases/2001/8510.htm.
For some of the many
contemporary criticisms of the Commission's decision, see Gary S. Becker, What U.S. Courts
Could TeachEurope'sTrustbusters,BUS.WK, Aug. 6,2001, at 20; JeffreyE. Garton, The GEHoneywellFiasco:Where to Go FromHere, BUS. W., July 23, 2001, at 28; Lester C. Thurow,
IrreconcilableDifferences, BOSTON GLOBE, July 10, 2001, at D4.
9. E.g., Charles James, International Antitrust in the 21st Century: Cooperation and
Convergence, Address before the OECD Global Forum on Competition (Oct. 17, 2001)
(discussing need to address international differences concerning portfolio or range effects
analyses in bilateral relations with the European Community, in multilateral form such as
the OECD, and the newly created Global Competition Network (as it was then named)),
availableat http:J/www.usdoj.gov/atr/publictspeechesI9330.htm.
10. E.g.,Andrew T. Guzman, IsInternationalAntitrustPossible?,
73 N.Y.U.L. REv. 1501
(1998); Diane P. Wood, The Impossible Dream:Real InternationalAntitrust, 1992 U. CHI.
LEGAL F. 277, 277 (1992).
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predicate, in any case, is that international law has failed to provide
any sort of solution. Justice Holmes once suggested that U.S.
antitrust legislation was limited by international principles,"
but the Permanent Court of International Justice subsequently
professed ignorance as to what those principles were.' 2 There has
been little progress since. Attempts to establish a comprehensive
international antitrust regime have repeatedly failed, and many
believe they will continue to do so."s
Customary international law 4 (or its kissing cousin, comity")
has been left to fill the breach, without much effect. For one,
international law objections to U.S. extraterritoriality have faded
as more and more nations assert like authority themselves, and
cooperate with the United States either informally or through
bilateral agreements. 6 Meanwhile, attempts by U.S. courts to
practice jurisdictional self-restraint-in the form of a multifactored
reasonableness test based substantially on custom' 7-- fell off the
8 in which the
wagon in HartfordFire Insurance Co. v. California,"
Supreme Court held that effects jurisdiction under the Sherman Act
should be truncated only where foreign law compelled a defendant's
11. American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347, 355-56 (1909).
12. S.S. Lotus (Fr. v. Turk.), 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A.) No. 20, at 35 (Sept. 7):
Far from laying down a general prohibition to the effect that States may not
extend the application of their laws and the jurisdiction of their courts to
persons, property and acts outside their territory, [international law] leaves
them in this respect a wide measure of discretion which is only limited in
certain cases by prohibitive rules; as regards other cases, every State remains
free to adopt the principles which it regards as best and most suitable.
This discretion left to States by international law explains the great variety of
rules which they have been able to adopt without objections or complaints on
the part of other States ....
... [AlU that can be required of a State is that it should not overstep the limits
which international law places upon its jurisdiction; within these limits, its title
to exercise jurisdiction rests in its sovereignty.
13. See infra text accompanying notes 144-52.
14. For ease of reference, "custom."
15. As considered more fully below, understandings of what comity entails, and how it
differs from international law, vary greatly, but it is often used to connote more of an ideal
than an obligation. See infra text accompanying notes 244-49, 387-91, 428-29.
16. See infra text accompanying notes 60-66.
17. E.g., RESTATEMENT (THRD) OFFOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OFTHEUNTED STATES § 403

(1987) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT (THIRD)].
18. 509 U.S. 764 (1993).
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antitrust violation. 9 HartfordFirerelied on a patent misreading of
the Restatement (Third)of ForeignRelations, but many contend
that the Court's mistakes were venial: customary international law
has not yet dictated, and perhaps may never properly dictate, any
judicially enforceable restrictions on the exercise of antitrust
jurisdiction. 0
The antitrust experience, indeed, has been cited as a compelling
indictment of customary international law in general. 21 The
reasonableness test was bottomed substantially on judicial and
academic fiat, rather than state practice, thus typifying a
19. Id. at 798-99.
20. E.g., Joseph P. Griffin, Foreign Governmental Reactions to U.S. Assertions of
ExtraterritorialJurisdiction,6 GEO. MASON L. REV. 505, 506 (1998) ("Apart from laws
enacted by governing members of the European Union, there is no international law of
antitrust. No internationally agreed-upon rules ofprescriptive jurisdiction have emerged in
antitrust cases.').
21. E.g., J. Patrick Kelly, The Twilight ofCustomary InternationalLaw, 40 VA. J. INTL
L. 449,481-82 (2000) (citing reasonableness limits on extraterritoriality as exemplaryfailing
of customary international law); Phillip R. Trimble, A Revisionist View of Customary
InternationalLaw, 33 UCLA L. REV. 665, 696-707 (1986) (same). Professors Bradley and
Goldsmith, two leading critics of customary international law's standing in U.S. courts, also
indirectly challenge extraterritoriality, which they appear to regard as a marginal type of
traditional norm. Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, I, The CurrentIllegitimacy of
InternationalHuman Rights Litigation,66 FORDHAM L. REV. 319,354 n.195 (1997) (noting
"the purported CIL limits on the extraterritorial application of state law"). But see Curtis A.
Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, FederalCourts and the IncorporationofInternationalLaw,
111HARV. L. REV. 2260,2272-73 (1998) (approvingthe use of"CIL-related canons," including
"that ambiguous statutes be construed not to violate international law, the presumption
against extraterritoriality, and international comity"). Even defenders of customary
international law, while critical of attempts to marginalize extraterritoriality and other
traditional doctrines, offer only vague or half-hearted defenses of such limits on national
authority. Gerald L. Neuman, Sense andNonsense About Customary InternationalLaw: A
Reply to ProfessorsBradley and Goldsmith, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 371, 391-92 (1997) (noting
inattention to "controversial and complicated example ... of customary international law
limits onthe exercise ofextraterritorialprescriptive jurisdiction," and assumingthatin some
cases "customary international law forbids [extraterritorial] application"); see also Harold
Hongju Koh, Is InternationalLaw Really State Law?, 111 HARV. L. REV. 1824, 1856 (1998)
(arguing that "[ijnternational comity represents a principle with roots in both common law
and international law, which now may be evolving into a rule ofcustomary international law.
Whether viewed as a rule of statutory construction or justiciability, or a principle of
reasonableness, international comity clearly should be treated as a doctrine of federal law,
capable ofrevision by Congress, the executive branch, or the federal courts, as circumstances
demand."). For an important exception, see Lea Brilmayer, InternationalLaw in American
Courts:A Modest Proposal,100 YALE L.J. 2277, 2287-88, 2311-12 (1991) (arguing that the
rejection of reasonableness as a jurisdictional restriction questions a particular conception
of international law, not its relevance).
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methodology that custom's critics find particularly unsavory. To
be sure, nations have tried to avoid conflict and coordinate their
antitrust affairs, but such practices look like political or regulatory alternatives to custom,' and offer little support for the
distinctive balancing exercise they are supposed to have adopted.
Reasonableness thus illustrates custom's familiar paradox: if the
norm is genuinely patterned on what nations do, it verges on
redundancy; if, on the other hand, it imposes a higher standard, it
is not custom at all, and illegitimately interferes with ostensibly
adequate political alternatives.'
But such criticisms mistakenly accept the dominant discourse of
custom on its own terms. As this Article explains, reasonableness
may be unpersuasive, but that does not mean no custom exists-it
just means that we have been looking for it in all the wrong places.
Critics of antitrust custom,.'like its advocates, overlook the
potential for what I describe as "local international law:" that is,
international law that may be limited in the number of adherents,
subject matter, and depth, but which is well adapted to application
among certain nations and within their municipal legal environment. Local international law thus offers an intermediate
alternative to claims for a universal international law, on the one
hand,2 and arguments that would require treaty making or
domestic legislation in order to create international obligations, on
the other.'

22. E.g., Joel R. Paul, Comity in InternationalLaw, 32 HARV. INT'L L.J. 1 (1991); cf.
Harold G. Maier, The Authoritative Sources of Customary InternationalLaw in the United
States, 10 MICH. J. INT'L L. 450, 465-70 (1989) (criticizing the draft and, to a lesser extent,

final versions of Restatement (Third)section 403 on grounds that it exemplified attempts to
present international law, detached from U.S. political authority, as an authoritative source
of decisions in U.S. courts).
23. Cf Jack L. Goldsmith & Eric A. Posner, Understandingthe Resemblance Between
Modern and TraditionalCustomary InternationalLaw, 40 VA. J. INVL L. 639, 641 (2000)
(proposing rational choice analysis ofcustomary internationallaw that suggests it "has little
if any effect on national behavior"); Jack L. Goldsmith & Eric A. Posner, A Theory of
Customary InternationalLaw, 66 U. CHI. L. REv. 1113 (1999) (same).
24. E.g., Jonathan Charney, UniversalInternationalLaw, 87 AM. J. INT'L L. 529 (1993)
(arguing that international legal norms may sometimes be promulgated outside of treaty-

making process, notwithstanding state dissent).
25. E.g., Phillip R. Trimble, InternationalLaw, World Order,and CriticalLegal Studies,
42 STAN. L. REV. 811,834-45 (1990) (review essay).
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Local international law also affords a fresh opportunity to
address the awkward relationship between custom and constitutional federalism. Global antitrust is federal in two important
senses: first, as more commonly observed, in respecting the
function of national differences within the international legal
environment; second, in the continuing relevance of the American
states to antitrust enforcement even at the international level.2 "
Local international law insists on examining the connection
between these planes. To take a contemporary example, Microsoft's
chief antagonist to date has been the U.S. Department of
Justice, 28 but various state attorneys general have played a
significant (and arguably disruptive) role. at times,29 and the
26. E.g., Eleanor M. Fox, Antitrust and Regulatory Federalism:Races Up, Down, and
Sideways, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1781 (2000); Andrew T. Guzman, Antitrust and International
Regulatory Federalism,76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1142 (2001).

27. E.g., Hannah L. Buxbaum, The PrivateAttorney General in a Global Age: Public
Interests inPrivateInternationalAntitrustLitigation,
26 YALEJ. INVLL. 219,252-53 (2001);

Guzman, supranote 10, at 1541; Lionel Kestenbaum & James W. Olson, FederalAmicus
Intervention in PrivateAntitrust LitigationRaising Issues of Extraterritoriality:A Modest
Proposal,16 INV' L. 587 (1982); Diane P. Wood, United States Antitrust Law in the Global
Market, 1 ID. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 409,416 (1994).
28. In 1994, the Justice Department filed a complaint alleging that Microsoft had
maintained an illegal monopoly in the operating-systems market through anticompetitive
provisions in its licensing and software development agreements. The case was initially
resolved with a consent decree, United States v. Microsoft, 56 F.3d 1448 (D.C. Cir. 1995),
which the Department later charged-ultimately unsuccessfiflly-Microsoft had breached,
United States v. Microsoft, 147 F.3d 935 (D.C. Cir. 1998). Just prior to the resolution of that
case, the Department initiated separate proceedings alleging multiple violations of sections
1 and 2 of the Sherman Act, and after a highly publicized trial, won a sweeping remedy
including a court-ordered breakup of Microsoft. The D.C. Circuit later upheld most, but not
all, of the district court findings, and ordered reconsideration of the remedial order. United
States v. Microsoft, 253 F.3d 34 (D.C. Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 122 S. Ct. 350 (2001).
While the matter was pending before the Supreme Court and the district court, the
Department announced that it would no longer pursue its tying claim against Microsoft, and
that it would seek conduct-related remedies only, in lieu of the breakup it had initially
achieved. Press Release, U.S. Dep't ofJustice, Justice Department Informs Microsoft of Plans
for Further Proceedings in the District Court (Sept. 6, 2001) (No. 01-447), available at
http'J/www.usdoj.gov/atr/publicpress-releases/2001/8981.htm. Microsoft and the Justice
Department later negotiated a proposed settlement, then revised its terms in order to secure
the concurrence of nine state plaintiffs. See Stipulation and Revised Proposed Final
Judgment, United States v. Microsoft, Nos. 98-1232 & 98-1233 (D.D.C. Nov. 6, 2001),
availableat http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/cases/f9400/9495.htm.
29. Nineteen U.S. states filed suit against Microsoft, in proceedings eventually
consolidated with the suit filed by the Justice Department. Although the states have played
a secondary role in the judicial proceedings, they were widely reported to have frustrated

636

WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 43:627

European Commission's newly expanded interest in Microsoft's
software integration practices may wind up influencing both the
products it markets outside Europe and pending or future U.S.
antitrust proceedings.3 0 The solution to the potential conflict, I
argue, lies less in quarreling over the administration of already
earlier efforts at a mediated settlement. Ken Auletta, What Kept Microsoft from Settling its
Case?, THE NEW YORKER, Jan. 15, 2001, at 40 (describing participation in settlement
process); Steven Levy & Jared Sandberg, The MicrosoftMess, NEWSWEEK., Apr. 10, 2000, at
30 (citing statement by Microsoft Chairman Bill Gates that consent decree discussions broke
down because of "extreme" and "radical" demands by state attorneys general that were
inconsistent with Justice Department positions). The states joined the Justice Department
in waiving further proceedings concerning the tying claim and forswearing a breakup. See
Joint Status Report, United States v. Microsoft, Nos. 98-1232 & 98-1233 (D.D.C. Sept. 20,
2001). But they were unable to agree to the settlement terms originally agreed to by
Microsoft and the Justice Department, and after intensive negotiations attempted to secure
their agreement, only nine of the states agreed to a revised settlement. See supra note 28.
The remaining nine state plaintiffs (plus the District of Columbia) withheld their consent,
and barring any progress in further negotiations, may pursue their case in further hearings
to be held next year. Jonathan Erim & Ariana Eunjung Chu, 9 States, D.C. Reject Microsoft
Settlement, WASH. POsT, Nov. 7, 2001, at El.
30. Like the Justice Department, and with its cooperation, the European Commission
investigated Microsoft's licensing practices in the mid-1990s and obtained the equivalent of
a consent decree restricting Microsoft's conduct. Press Release, European Commission,
Following An Undertaking By Microsoft To Change Its Licensing Practices, The European
Commission Suspends Its Action For Breach Of The Competition Rules, IP/94/653 (July
17, 1994), available at httpJ/europa.eu.int/rapid/start/cgi/guesten.ksh?p-action.gettxt
=gt&doc=IP/94/653101AGED&lg=EN&display=. That did not end its interest. The
Commission recently expanded its pending proceeding regarding the market for low-end
server operating systems-a concern substantially distinct from any targeted in the U.S.
litigation-by issuing a statement of objections alleging that Microsoft is illegally tying its
Media Player product into the Windows operating system for personal computers. Press
Release, European Commission, Commission Initiates Additional Proceedings Against
Microsoft , IP/01/1232 (Aug. 30, 2001), available at http'J/europa.eu.int/rapid/start/cgi/
guesten.ksh?p action.gettxt=gt&doc=IP/01/1232101RAPID&lg=EN&display=.
Conversely, in its recent proposed settlement with Microsoft, the Justice Department
pressed (with minimal success) for terms that would protect the U.S. market for corporate
servers, addressing some of the interoperability issues that had been the subject of the
Commission's original investigation. John Wilke,NegotiatingAllNight, TenaciousMicrosoft
Won,Many Loopholes, WALL ST. J., Nov. 9,2001, at Al.
Both foreign and domestic private parties have also filed antitrust claims against Microsoft
in U.S. courts, but those cases have run into serious standing difficulties. In re Microsoft
Antitrust Litigation, 127 F. Supp. 2d 702 (D. Md. 2001); see Note, A Most PrivateRemedy:
PartySuitsand the U.S.AntitrustLaws,114 HARV.L.REV. 2122 (2001) (criticizing treatment
accorded foreign antitrust claims). More than one hundred class actions remain, mainly on
the basis of state law claims, but Microsoft has proposed to settle most of them. See Steve
Lohr,MicrosoftAims to Settle Suits by Equipping12,500 Schools, N.Y. TIMES,Nov. 21,2001,
at Cl.
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articulated custom in a federal system, and more in a nuanced
understanding of what custom demands in the first place.
Part I of this Article orients the discussion by briefly describing
the emergence of international antitrust, including the turn to
regulatory comity among antitrust authorities as a means of
resolving potential conflicts. As this Part explains, both existing
bilateral agreements and the failure to date of multilateral efforts
reflect certain recurring limits to cooperation, including a vestigial
respect for sovereign authority over antitrust enforcement and the
commonality of interests among a limited number of nations.
Part II then traces the rise and fall of the reasonableness
standard, culminating in HartfordFire,before examining whether
that standard has ever corresponded with international law. The
reasonableness standard not only lacks evidence that would satisfy
conventional criteria for customary international law-a point I try
not to belabor-but also unnecessarily invites criticism through
three missteps that characterize much of customary law discourse.
First, reasonableness states a theory of near-universal application,
without regard to potential distinctions among subject matter or
constituents. Second, it conflates evidence of norms with their
realization, and fails to account for how the two might be mediated.
Third, and finally, it attempts the undifferentiated application of
the norm to all agents of antitrust, notwithstanding substantial
evidence that the law is precisely to the contrary.
Part HI builds on these criticisms by developing a general
methodology for local international law. Localizing international
law is an analytic process for evaluating proposed norms of custom,
one beginning with the norm's potential application to particular
members and subject matter within the international community,
and its articulation, adaptation, and enforcement in domestic
circumstances. Such law may be local in any of three senses: (1) it
exists among a subset ofthe international community, with respect
to a particular subject matter; (2) it is enforced as an interpretive
canon with respect to national law, and defers to the national
understanding of custom in marginal cases and with respect to
emerging custom; or (3) its norms require careful distinction among
the domestic parties potentially subject to its strictures.
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Part IV applies this methodology to antitrust, in keeping with the
methodology's emphasis on grounding international law theory in
context. Against the great weight of contemporary analysis, I
conclude that there is a local international law of antitrust, even
after HartfordFire.Antitrust comity consists of a set of procedural
principles, potentially binding only members of the Organis ation for
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), that require
national antitrust authorities to consider the legitimate interests of
other adherents in enforcing municipal antitrust laws. This doctrine
of comity is enforceable by American courts against U.S. antitrust
authorities, albeit in highly limited circumstances.
Antitrust comity also pertains, however, to the activities of
private and state attorneys general in international matters.3 '
Each type of action has a significant effect on the nation's ability to
comply with its international obligations, and either may warrant
legislative or judicial intervention. But the local law of antitrust
comity requires distinguishing the two cases. While private
litigants are at best penumbral participants in norms arising from
intergovernmental relations, state attorneys general are constitutionally restricted in their ability to attend to international duties
incumbent on the United States as a whole. The best solution, I
contend, is to simulate antitrust comity on the local level by
developing a cooperative federal-state protocol that respects
domestic and global conceptions of sovereignty.
Several caveats are in order. For one, although this Article describes a new methodology for identifying customary international
law, it substantially accepts the conventional view of custom's
prerequisites. 2 Similarly, it largely accepts the conventional (or
31. As explored more fully below, I construe "international" broadly for purposes of
examining potential conflicts, thus including cases involving foreign conduct, mergers
involving non-U.S. parties, discovery or remedies that reach abroad, or cases in which
foreign regulators are actively or potentially involved.
32. There is no universally approved statement ofthe criteria for custom. RESTATEMENT
(THIRD), supra note 17, §102, reporters' note 2; IAN BROWNuE, PRINCIPLS OF PUBLIC
INTERNATIONAL LAW 3-11 (5th ed. 1998). But the present account tries to avoid the
controversies attending, for example, arguments for dismissing the relevance of practice or
opinio juris et necessitas or for placing higher demands on either factor. E.g., Maurice
Mendelson, The Subjective Element in CustomaryInternationalLaw, 66 BRIT. Y.B. INTL L.
177, 202-08 (1995) (concluding that opinio juris is unnecessary in the event of sufficient
practice); cf International Law Ass'n, Comm. on Formation of Customary (General)
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"modern," depending on one's point of view) account of custom's
place in American courts--though the mechanism for enforcement, the interpretation of federal statutes, is one with which even
advocates of custom's "domestication" should agree.34 In keeping
with those principles, the theory of local international law should
not be read to suggest that municipal behavior invariably conditions
international law. Deciding whether conduct contributes to (or
detracts from) the formation of custom, dissents from a developing
norm in a way that exempts a particular nation, or simply violates
a norm is difficult. But even dualist systems contemplate that the
local legality of an actor's conduct-say, by virtue of unambiguous
legislation-does not absolve the nation of its obligations under
international law. 5
A final caveat concerns scope. Extraterritoriality issues arise in
a variety of contexts, and one of this Article's messages is that they
may be entirely differentiable. Accordingly, a theory of antitrust
comity may not work in other contexts in which comity issues arise;
even within antitrust, my primary focus is on legislative or
prescriptive jurisdiction, rather than the discrete issues relating to
the enforceability of U.S. discovery orders or judgments abroad.3"
As to these problems, the methodology of local international law,
and its more universal alternatives, may suggest very different
solutions, or no solutions at all.

International Law, Final Report: Statement and Principles Applicable to the Formation of
General Customary International Law 32-38 (2000) (proposing idea that opiniojuris is not
invariably required for rules of customary international law), available at http/www.ilahq.org.pdf (2000 Conference Report).
33. See supra text accompanying notes 21-23 (noting emerging controversy).
34. E.g., Curtis A. Bradley, Chevron Deference and ForeignAffairs, 86 VA. L. REV. 649,
653 (2000) (adverting to the "domestication" approach); i& at 685-90 (describing the
CharmingBetsy canon applied in Murrayv. SchoonerCharmingBetsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64,
118 (1804)). See generallyCurtis A. Bradley, The Charming Betsy Canon and Separationof
Powers: Rethinking the Interpretive Role of International Law, 86 GEo. L.J. 479 (1998)
(defending version of canon).
35. E.g., Pigeon River Improvement, Slide & Broom Co. v. Charles W. Cox, Ltd., 291 U.S.
138, 160 (1933) (noting that later statute supersedes domestic effect of treaty, even in the
event ofconflict with international obligations).
36. See William S. Dodge, Antitrust and the DraftHague Convention, 32 LAW & POL
INTL BUS. 363 (2001) (discussing prospective international norms relating to personal
jurisdiction and the enforcement of foreign antitrust judgments).
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I. THE LOCAL LIMITS TO ANTITRUST AGREEMENTS

Although lawyers and politicians have tried repeatedly and with
considerable ingenuity, there is very little international antitrust
law to speak of. Aside from a few recent efforts at picking lowhanging fruit, 7 attempts to harmonize national antitrust laws have

failed, leaving convergence largely in the independent discretion
of national authorities-with the result that important policy
differences persist, as evidenced most strikingly in the recent
Boeing/McDonnell Douglas and GE/Honeywell cases."8 This has
placed a premium on coordinating national efforts, or at least
avoiding disputes. After briefly explaining the prehistory of
cooperation, this section suggests that existing bilateral agreements
and ongoing efforts at securing multilateral agreement share an
unarticulated vision of the potential reach of international
cooperation which augurs poorly for the reasonableness norm, and
should inform any successor.

37. It has been relatively easy to reach consensus on the illegality ofpractices like price
fixing. OECD, Recommendation of the Council Concerning Effective Action Against Hard
Core Cartels (Apr. 27-28,1998), available at http//wwwl.oecd.org/daf/clp/Recommendations/
Rec9com.htm. Even here, the multilateral is overshadowed by the unilateral, and the formal
by the informal. Harry First, The Vitamins Case: CartelProsecutionsand the Coming of
InternationalCompetitionLaw, 68 ANTITRUST L.J. 711, 712 (2001) (describing U.S. civil and
criminal prosecution ofcartels as the "leading edge" of an evolving "system of international
competition law .... [biased on implicit consensus and explicit, effective (and virtually
unilateral) enforcement").
38. After the smoke cleared, most serious commentary on BoeingfMcDonnell Douglas
concluded that the real differences between the FTC and the European Commission stemmed
from substantive differences between U.S. and EC law. E.g., Fox, supra note 7, at 19;
Kovacic, supra note 7, at 852-63, 872-73. This same pattern is likely to emerge in the
GE/Honeywell case. Brian M. Carney, Blame the EU'sAntitrustRules-NotMonti,WALL ST.
J., July 6, 2001, at A8; William J. Kolasky & Leon B. Greenfield, A View to a Kill: The Lost
GE/Honeywell Deal Reveals a Trans-Atlantic Clash of Essentials, LEGAL TIMES, July 30,
2001, at 28; Statement by Assistant Attorney General Charles A. James, supra note 8
(describing doctrinal disagreement as "a significant point of divergence").
Mergers, unfortunately, may be an area ofrelative convergence. CompareJames S. Venit
& William J. Kolasky, Substantive Convergence and Procedural Dissonance in Merger
Review, in ANTITRUST GOES GLOBAL, supra note 7, at 79 (concluding that substantive
differences in merger policy are narrowing, but procedural differences remain), with Philip
Marsden, The Divide on Verticals, in ANTITRUST GOES GLOBAL, supra note 7, at 117
(describing enduring differences in vertical restraint policies as threatening viability of
cooperation).
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A. The Prehistoryof Cooperation
Global cooperation in antitrust enforcement developed in the
wake of the aggressive pursuit by nations of their independent
interests, with the United States in the vanguard. 9 The United
States was not always so forward. Justice Holmes, no ardent
admirer of the Sherman Act, thought it "surprising" to hear it
argued in American Banana that the Act might apply extraterritorially.' ° In his view,
the general and almost universal rule is that the character of an
act as lawful or unlawful must be determined wholly by the law
of the country where the act is done .... For another jurisdiction,
if it should happen to lay hold of the actor, to treat him
according to its own notions rather than those of the place where
he did the acts, not only would be unjust, but would be an
interference with the authority of another sovereign, contrary
to the comity of nations, which the other state concerned justly
might resent. 4 '
American Bananainvolved a private suit, and the Supreme Court
almost immediately began chipping away at it in a series of
government enforcement actions that focused more acutely on the
domestic effects of foreign acts. 4'2 These decisions eventually freed
Judge Learned Hand to assert in Alcoa that it was "settled law ...
that any state may impose liabilities, even upon persons not within
its allegiance, for conduct outside its borders that has consequences

39. Some conclude, indeed, that unilateralism ought to be furtheredin order to create the
friction necessary to yield genuine cooperation. William S. Dodge, Extraterritorialityand
Conflict-of-Laws Theory: An Argument for JudicialUnilateralism,39 HARV. INTL L.J. 101,
152-67 (1998); Thomas W. Dunfee & Aryeh S. Friedman, The Extra-TerritorialApplication
of United States Antitrust Laws: A Proposalfor an Interim Solution, 45 OHIO ST. L.J. 883
(1984).
40. American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347,355 (1909).
41. Id. at 356.
42. Thomsen v. Cayser, 243 U.S. 66 (1917); United States v. Pacific & Arctic Ry. & Nay.
Co., 228 U.S. 87 (1913)); PHLLIPAREEDA & LOUI KAPLOW, ANTITRUSTANALYSIS 140 (5th ed.
1997) (citing United States v. Sisal Sales Corp., 274 U.S. 268 (1927)); 1 BARRY E. HAWK,
UNITED STATES, COMMON MARK= AND INTERNATIONAL ANTrrRusT. A COMPARATIVE GUIDE

104-106.1 (2d ed. 1985 & Supp. 1996) (same).
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within its borders which the state reprehends."" Even this "effects"
test required both intent and effects, lest the Act apply to an
unanticipated amount of foreign conduct; as Judge Hand explained,
"when one considers the international complications likely to arise
from an effort in this country to treat such agreements as unlawful,
it is safe to assume that Congress certainly did not intend the Act
to cover them."" Courts gradually deemphasized intent,4 5 but came
to require that any effects be substantial and direct, 46 again partly
to deflect criticisms that the effects test defied congressional intent
by unnecessarily courting international conflict.4 7 The executive
branch48 and Congress 49 supported effects tests too, and by the time
43. United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416,443 (2d Cir. 1945) (citing cases).
The authority of Alcoa itself was enhanced-and its tension with American Banana
ameliorated-because the Second Circuit was empowered to act as the court of last resort
due to the lack of a quorum in the Supreme Court. American Tobacco Co. v. United States,
328 U.S. 781, 811-12 (1946).
44. Aluminum Co. ofAm., 148 F.2d at 443. Hand also assumed arguendo that the intent
to affect American exports or imports would not be actionable absent tangible effects. Id. at
443-44.
45. HAWK, supra note 42, at 113-14; 1 SPENCER WEBBER WALLER, ANTITRUST AND
AMERICAN BUSINESS ABROAD § 6.6 (3d ed. 1997).
46. WILBUR L. FUGATE, FOREIGN COMMERCE AND THE ANTITRUST LAWS § 2.12, at 53-58
(5th ed. 1996) (noting various statements of rule); see also HAWK, supra note 42, at 112-13
& n.231; 1 WALLER, supra note 45, § 6.7.
47. Accord 1955 ATrY GEN. NAT'L COmm. TO STUDY THE ANTITRUST LAWS 76; see also
ASS'N OF THE BAR OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK, SPECIAL COMM.ON ANTITRUST AND FOREIGN
TRADE, Preliminary Rep. 15 (1957) (noting that "it is difficult tojustify jurisdiction over these
foreign activities where the effect on United States commerce, which is the basis for such
jurisdiction, is only incidental"). Compare KINGMAN BREWSTER, Jl, ANTITRUST AND
AMERICANBUSINESSABROAD 298-301 (1958) (describingreservations with the potential reach
of Alcoa), with FUGATE, supra note 46, § 2.12, at 54-55 ("ITihe question of the power of the
United States over acts abroad affecting its commerce must now be taken to be settled, as
is also the intent of Congress under the Sherman Act to exercise this jurisdiction. The only
question remaining, apart from an actual conflict of foreign law, is how much effect is
necessary. The answer appears to be any substantialeffect.").
48. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM., Antitrust Enforcement Guidelinesfor
InternationalOperations,4 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) 13,107 (1995), 68 Antitrust & Trade
Reg. Rep. (BNA) supp. 1 (1995) [hereinafter 1995 International Guidelines]; see also U.S.
DEP'T OF JUSTICE, April 3 Statement ofEnforcement Policy, 62 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep.
(BNA) 483 (Apr. 9, 1992); U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, Antitrust Enforcement Guidelines for
InternationalOperations, 4 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) 1 13,109.10 (1988) [hereinafter 1988
International Guidelines]; ANTITRUST DIV., U.S. DEPT OF JUSTICE, Antitrust Guidelinesfor
InternationalOperations,[Jan. - June] Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 799, at E-1,
E-3 (Jan. 16, 1977) hereinafter 1977 International Guidelines].
49. The Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvement Act of 1982 (FTAIA) exempted conduct
relating to nonimport trade from Sherman Act coverage unless "such conduct has a direct,
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0
the Supreme Court gave its official imprimatur in HartfordFire,"
the effects test had long been ensconced as a threshold for the
exercise of American antitrust jurisdiction.
Application of the effects doctrine, if not necessarily the concept
itself, was regarded with great hostility abroad. 5 ' The federal
government tempered itself on occasion, as when foreign policy considerations led Presidents Truman and Eisenhower to direct that
the Justice Department pursue civil antitrust actions, rather than
criminal, against oil cartels.5 2 Full-blooded conflicts, however, were

substantial, and reasonably foreseeable effect" on U.S. domestic commerce or on U.S. export
trade. 15 U.S.C. § 6a(1) (2000); see also 15 U.S.C. § 45(a) (2000) (similarly amending Federal
Trade Commission Act). Precisely what is encompassed within the FTAIA's term "trade or
commerce (other than import trade or import commerce)" is not self-evident, but it appears
to include both export trade and purely foreign conduct. H.R. REP. No. 97-686, at 9-10 (1982),
reprintedin Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 1076, at 308 (Aug. 5, 1982); see also
FUGATE, supra note 46, § 2.14, at 60-61 (describing purposes of Act); HAWK, supranote 42,
at 149. Congress was focused on relieving the burden of U.S. antitrust policies on U.S.
exporters, rather than limiting its burden on foreign parties. H.R. REP. No. 97-686, supra,
at 7-8. As such, the Act "has no effect on the kind of activity by foreign firms that U.S.
litigants are most likely to challenge and that is most likely to trigger international
tensions," such as foreign cartel activities. EleanorM. Fox,Extraterritoriality,
Antitrust,and
the New Restatement: Is 'Reasonableness" the Answer?, N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 565, 580
(1987); e.g., In re Insurance Antitrust Litigation, 723 F. Supp. 464 (N.D. Cal. 1989)
(concluding that case involved "import trade), affd, 938 F.2d 919 (9th Cir. 1991), affd in
part and rev'd in part, Hartford Fire Ins. v. California, 509 U.S. 764, 796 n.23 (1993)
(assuming, without deciding, that FTAIA standard was met).
50. Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764,795-96 (1993) (citing authorities);
Larry Kramer, ExtraterritorialApplicationof American Law After the InsuranceAntitrust
Case: A Reply to Professors Lowenfeld and Trimble, 89 AM. J. INT'L L. 750, 752 (1995)
(concluding that "Hartfordis thus the first Supreme Court case actually to apply the
Sherman Act to conduct outside the United States based solely on its intended effects here);
id. at 751-52 (discussing prior cases); see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supranote 17, § 415;
1A PHiimP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW I 272c, at 351-52 (2d ed.
2000).
51. 1 HAWK, supra note 42, at 111; Karl M. Meessen, Antitrust JurisdictionUnder
Customary InternationalLaw, 78 AM. J. INT'L L. 783, 791 (1984). Among commentators
abroad, see R&Y. Jennings, ExtraterritorialJurisdictionand the United States Antitrust
Laws, 33 BRIT.Y.B. INVLL. 146,165 (1957) (describingAlcoa as a"startling projection ofthe
objective test ofterritoriality"); FA. Mann, The DoctrineofJurisdictioninInternationalLaw,
111 RECUEILDES COURS 102-06 (1964) (describingAlcoa as incompatible with international
law); id. at 102 & n.206 (citing critics, and alluding to "numerous other writers whom it is
impossible to enumerate").
52. David H. Small,ManagingExtraterritorialJurisdictionProblems:
The UnitedStates
Government Approach, 50 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 283, 284 (1987) (citing 1 JAMES R.
ATWOOD & KINGMAN BREWSTER, ANTITRUSTAND AMERICAN BUSINESS ABROAD § 2.24 (2d ed.
1981)).
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frequent. Two years after Alcoa, U.S. attempts to gather Canadian
evidence in price fixing proceedings against U.S. and Canadian
paper firms led to the adoption in Ontario and Quebec of "blocking"
statutes designed to frustrate discovery. 3 A steady stream of
controversies followed," even after U.S. courts began limiting the
effects doctrine by taking international comity into account. 55
56
Important trading partners enacted other blocking statutes,
required their courts to refuse recognition to multiple damages
awards,5" and even adopted "clawback" statutes that permitted
defendants sanctioned under U.S. law to recover that money at
home.5 8 As of 1981, one U.S. official claimed that "there have been
53. In re Grand Jury Subpoenas Duces TecumAddressed to Canadian Intl Paper Co., 72
F. Supp. 1013 (S.D.N.Y. 1947); Griffin, supra note 20, at 505 n.3; Meessen, supranote 51, at
791.
54. For a sensitive discussion ofthese conflicts, beginning with the early American cases
involving the bulb, nylon, petroleum, shipping conference, and Swiss watches, and
progressing to conflicts derived from other nations' investigations, see Meessen, supranote
51, at 791-94; see also RESTATEMENT (THIED), supra note 17, § 403 reporters' note 1.
55. E.g., Mannington Mills, Inc. v. Congoleum Corp., 595 F.2d 1287 (3rd Cir. 1979);
Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of America Nat'l Trust & Sav. Ass'n, 549 F.2d 597 (9th Cir.
1976). But see, e.g., Laker Airways Ltd. v. Sabena, Belgian World Airlines, 731 F.2d 909 (D.C.
Cir. 1984); In re Uranium Antitrust Litigation, 617 F.2d 1248 (7th Cir. 1980); In re Ocean
Shipping Antitrust Litigation, 500 F. Supp. 1235 (S.D.N.Y. 1980).
56. Canada and other countries subsequently abreacted to attempts by Westinghouse to
obtain documents relating to an alleged uranium cartel Seung Wha Chang, Extraterritorial
Application Of U.S. Antitrust Laws To Other Pacific Countries: Proposed Bilateral
Agreements For Resolving International Conflicts Within The Pacific Community, 16
HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REv. 295, 298 (1993); Note, Reassessment of International
Application ofAntitrustLaws: Blocking Statutes,Balancing Tests, and Treble Damages, 50
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 197,204(1987); cf UraniumAntitrust Litig., 617 F.2d at 1253-56
(rejecting submissions by Australia, Canada, South Africa and the United Kingdom, in
upholding jurisdiction under effects doctrine). In 1980, the Philippines enacted a blocking
statute in response to a suit involving U.S. coconut oil sales by American subsidiaries of
Philippine parent companies. Chang, supra at 301; see also id. at 300-01 (further describing
Australian blocking statute); Derek Devgun, Crossborder Joint Ventures: A Survey of
InternationalAntitrust Considerations,21 WM. MITCHELL L. REv. 681, 702-03 (1996)
(describing U.K. statute).
57. Chang, supra note 56, at 298-303 (describing nonenforcement schemes adopted by
Canada, Australia, the Republic of the Philippines, Japan, and Korea); Devgun, supranote
56, at 704-05 (describing U.K. scheme); Griffin, supra note 20, at 505 n.5 (citing Canadian
and Australian statutes).
58. Chang, supra note 56, at 298, 301 (describing Canadian and Australian clawback
schemes); Devguf, supra note 56, at 704 (describing U.K. scheme); Joseph E. Neuhaus,
Power to Reverse Foreign Judgments: The British Clawback Statute Under International
Law, 81 COLUM. L. REV. 1097 (1981) (same); e.g., Protection of Trading Interests Act, 1980,
c. 11, 5-6 (Eng.), as amended; Foreign Extraterritorial Measures Act, R.S.C., ch. F-29, 8-9
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five diplomatic protests of U.S. antitrust cases for every instance of
express diplomatic support, and three blocking statutes for every
cooperation agreement."59
While foreign governments continued to protest particular
invocations of U.S. jurisdiction, and noted qualms about the
doctrine's full implications, they increasingly construed their
own laws to permit jurisdiction over foreign conduct.60 Canada, an
inveterate opponent of U.S. extraterritoriality,6 began pursuing
foreign mergers with vigor.6 2 In its Wood Pulpjudgment, likewise,
the European Court ofJustice resisted the Commission's arguments
in favor of U.S.-style effects jurisdiction," but held that thenarticle 85 of the EC Treaty6 4 permitted jurisdiction over foreign
agreements if they were implemented through sales to EU
purchasers.6 5 By the end of the century it appeared as though the
(1984) (Can.), as amended; Foreign Proceedings (Excess of Jurisdiction) Act, 1984, No. 3, cl.
10 (Austl.), as amended.
59. Joel Davidow, ExtraterritorialAntitrust and the Concept of Comity, 15 J. WORLD
TRADE L. 500, 502 (1981).
60. These positions were not necessarily conflicting. As Advocate General Darmon
observed in the Wood Pulp proceedings, many of those favoring effects jurisdiction
distinguished between the jurisdiction to prescribe, which entailed the power to lay down
general or individual rules, and the jurisdiction to enforce, which involved the power to
implement those rules in a particular instance. Accordingly, he reasoned, the fact that some
twenty countries had adopted blocking statutes did not mean that they rejected the effects
doctrine. Opinion of the Advocate General, Cases 89, 104, 114, 116, 117 & 125-29/85, A.
Ahlstrom Osakeyhito v. Commission, 1988 E.C.R. 5193, [1988] 4 C.M.L.R. 901, 920-24
(1988), 4 Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 1 14,491(1988) [hereinafter Wood Pulp (concluding that
the power to impose fines was inherent within the power to prescribe).
61. See supra text accompanying notes 53-59. In HartfordFire, Canada's amicus brief
contendedthat under customaryinternationallaw, and consistentwith the ShermanAct and
judicial precedent construing it, "a state should not apply its economic law to regulate
conduct by persons located in a foreign territory where doing so directly conflicts with and
undermines the law of the foreign territorial sovereign--and further opined that a foreign
government's submission should be conclusive as to the presence ofa jurisdictional conflict.
Brief ofthe Government of Canada as Amicus Curiae in Support of Certain Petitioners at 5,
Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764 (1993) (Nos. 91-1111, 91-1128).
62. Meessen, supra note 51, at 792.
63. In re Wood Pulp Cartel, 1985 O.J. (L 85) 1, [1985] 3 C.M.L.R. 474 (1985); see also
Wood Pulp, supranote 60 (reporting Commission arguments in favor of effects doctrine).
64. TREATYESTABLiSHNGTHEEUROPEANECONOMC COMMUNITY, Mar. 25,1957, art. 2,
298 U.N.T.S. 11, amended by TREATY ESTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN COmmuNiTY, Feb. 7,
1992, 1992 O.J. (C 224) 1, [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. 573 (1992) [hereinafter EC TREATY]. Article 85,
which has since been renumbered as article 91 without substantive change, is the European
equivalent of section 1 of the Sherman Act.
65. Wood Pulp, supra note 60. There is considerable debate about whether there are
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jurisdictional theory everywhere rejected had become nearly
universal among active antitrust authorities.66 This meant, of
course, that U.S. firms-sometimes insulated from U.S. antitrust
actions for their foreign activities--were increasingly subjected to
foreign laws. Something had to be done.
B. Cooperative Bilateralismand its Limitations
While the gravitation toward the effects doctrine was reciprocal
in the broadest sense, U.S. and foreign antitrust authorities also
set about trying to forge more formal arrangements. Following the
development of a cooperative scheme between U.S. and Canadian
authorities, the OECD recommended in 1967 that its member
countries consider limiting their enforcement actions in light of
legitimate foreign interests6 --known as "traditional" or "negative"
differences between the U.S. and EU approaches. Compare 1995 International Guidelines,
supranote 48, 1 3.1 n.51 ("FIlnternational recognition of the 'effects doctrine' ofjurisdiction
has become more widespread. In the context of import trade, the 'implementation' test
adopted in the European Court ofJustice usually produces the same outcome as the 'effects'
test employed in the United States.") (citing Wood Pulp), and Dodge, supranote 39, at 139
n.243 (arguing that WoodPulp adopted effects test), with Griffin, supranote 20, at 512 n.40,
513 (citing authorities insisting on distinction and noting differences).
66. 1995 International Guidelines, supra note 48, 1 3.1 n.51 (ascribing jurisdictional
approaches similar to effects doctrine to "Itihe merger laws of the European Union, Canada,
Germany, France, Australia, and the Czech and Slovak Republics, among others");
RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 17, § 403 reporters' note 3 (arguing that Germany and
"[m]ost other states of Western Europe, including Austria, Denmark, Finland, France,
Greece, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, and Switzerland, as well as Canada and Japan
(but not the United Kingdom or the Netherlands) have accepted the effects doctrine as
applied to economic effects, either in their legislation or in political decisions, though with
varying interpretations of the doctrine"). This is not to deny disagreement as to particular
doctrinal questions. For example, there remains widespread dissatisfaction with the U.S.
theory that it may assert jurisdiction over foreign conduct that affects its exporters, but not
its consumers. OECD COMMITEE ON COMPETITION LAW AND POLICY (CLP), MAKING
INTERNATIONAL MARKETS MORE EFFICIENT THROUGH "PosITIVE COMITY" IN COMPETITION

LAW ENFORCEMENT 1 11 (DAFFE/CLP(99)19) (June 1999) [hereinafter OECD REPORT ON
PosIrrTE COMIrY].

67. Webb-Pomerene Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 61-66 (2000) (providing limited exception from the
Sherman Act for associations engaged solely in export trade).
68. Recommendation ofthe Council Concerning Co-operation Between Member Countries
on Restrictive Business Practices Affecting International Trade, OECD Doc. C(67)53/final
(Oct. 5, 1967) [hereinafter 1967 Cooperation Recommendation], revised by OECD Doc.
C(79)154/final (Sept. 25, 1979) [hereinafter 1979 Cooperation Recommendation], revised by
OECD Doc. C(86)44/fmal (May 21, 1986), revised by OECD Doc. C(95)130/flnal (July 27-28,
1995), reprintedin 35 I.L.M. 1314 (1996) [hereinafter Revised OECD Recommendation]
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comity. Since 1973 the OECD has harped on the need for "positive"
comity, which involves a duty to consider pursuing enforcement
action at another member's prompting.69
Cooperation really began to hit its stride in the 1980s and 1990s,
when the United States began forging agreements with many of the
countries that had earlier retaliated against the invocation of U.S.
jurisdiction. 7' By mid-2000, the United States had
entered
into
75
74
3
agreements with Germany,71 Australia,2 Canada,7 Brazil Israel,
(recommending notification, exchange of information, and coordination of enforcement
actions among OECD members); see also OECD REPORToN PosITIVE CoMITY, supranote 66,
at 8-9 (describing evolution of provisions); 1995 International Guidelines, supra note 48, §
2.9 (noting U.S. obligations under OECD recommendations). The OECD was not the only,
or first, institution to encourage cooperation, merely the most effective. See infra note 147
(discussing early General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade [GATT] initiatives).
69. Recommendation Concerning a Consultation and Conciliation Procedure on
Restrictive Business Practices Affecting InternationalTrade, OECD Doc. C(73)99/final (July
3, 1973), revised by OECD Doc. C(79)154/flnal (Sept. 25, 1979), revised by Revised OECD
Recommendation, supra note 68.
70. The sequence ofthese developments was sometimes odd, and frustrates attempts to
draw a clear connection between unilateralism and subsequent efforts at cooperation. See
supranote 39. For example, after Australia enacted the Foreign Proceedings (Prohibition of
Certain Evidence) Act of 1976 and the Foreign Antitrust Judgments (Restriction of
Enforcement) Act of 1979, it signed a mutual assistance agreement with the United States
in 1982. Two years later, though, it enacted a far-reaching clawback provision. Chang, supra
note 56, at 300-01.
71. AgreementRelatingtoMutual CooperationRegardingRestrictive Business Practices,
June 23, 1976, U.S.-F.R.G., 27 U.S.T. 1956 [hereinafter U.SJF.R.G. Agreement], reprinted
in 4 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) 13,501 (2000), and availableat http:J/www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/
international/docs/germany.us.txt.
72. AgreementRelatingto Cooperation on Antitrust Matters, June 29,1982, U.S.-Austl.
34 U.S.T. 388, [hereinafter 1982 U.SJAustralia Agreement], reprintedin 4 Trade Reg. Rep.
(CCH)
13,502 (1999), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/intemational/docs/
austral.us.txt; Agreement on MutualAntitrust Enforcement Assistance, Apr. 27,1999, U.S.Austl., [hereinafter 1999 U.SJAustralia Agreement], available at http://www/usdoj.gov/
atr/publicfintemationaIdocs/usaus7.htm.
73. Agreement Regarding the Application of Competition and Deceptive Marketing
Practices Laws, Aug. 3, 1995, U.S.-Can., reprintedin 4 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) 13,503
(1997) [hereinafter 1995 U.SJCanadaAgreement],and availableat http:J/www.usdoj.gov/atr/
public/international/uscan721.pdf.
74. Agreement Regarding Cooperation Between Competition Authorities in the
Enforcement of Competition Laws, Oct. 26, 1999, U.S.-Braz. [hereinafter U.SJBrazil
Agreement], reprinted in 4 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) '1 13,508 (1999),and available at
http://www. usdoj.gov/atr/publictintemational/3376.pdf.
75. Agreement Regarding the Application of Competition Laws, Mar. 15,1999, U.S.-Isr.
[hereinafter U.SJIsrael Agreement], reprintedin 4 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) 13,506 (1999),
and available at http'/www.usdoj.gov/atr/publictintemational/2296.htm.
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Japan,7 6 Mexico,7 7 and the European Union.75 Though less
promiscuous than the United States, other countries and regional
organizations-in particular, the European Union-negotiated

agreements with third countries on substantially similar terms.7 9
These agreements differ in some respects, reflecting the variety of
parties and the divergent times at which they were negotiated.80 At
a high level of generality, however, they take similar approaches
81
and suffer from similar limitations.
76. Agreement Concerning Cooperation onAnticompetitive Activities, Oct. 7,1999, U.S.Japan [hereinafter U.SiJapan Agreement], reprintedin 4 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) 1 13,507
(1999), and availableat http'l/www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/international/docs/3740.pdf.
77. Agreement Regardingthe Application ofCompetition Laws [hereinafterU.SJMexico
Agreement], July 11, 2000, U.S.-Mex., availableat http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/icpac/5145.pdf.
78. Agreement Between the Government of the United States of American and the
European Communities on the Application of Positive Comity Principles in the Enforcement
oftheir Competition Laws, Mar. 6-Apr. 6,1998, E.C.-U.S., art. II, 37 .L.M. 1070 [hereinafter
1998 U.SJE.C. Positive Comity Agreement], available at http:J/www.usdoj.gov/atr/
public/internationaldocs/1781.htm; Agreement Regarding the Application of Competition
Laws, Sept. 23,1991, U.S.-E.C. [hereinafter 1991 U.SdE.C. Agreement], reprintedin 4 Trade
Reg. Rep. (CCH) 13,504 (1998), 1991 O.J. (L 95) 45 corrected at 1995 O.J. (L 131) 38,
availableat http-/lwww.usdoj.gov/atr/publiclrmternational/docs/ec.htm
79. The European Union is a party to bilateral agreements with a number of the same
countries, including Australia and Canada, as well as with a number ofcountries aspiring
to Community membership. See http'/europa.eu.intcomm/competition/international/
bilateral/. The European Union and Japan have also reach agreement in principle. Press
Release, European Commission, EU and Japan Reach Mutual Understanding on Substantial
Elements ofan Envisaged Co-operation Agreement in the Competition Field, IP/00/739 (July
19,2000). Within Europe, France and Germany have a longstanding agreement. Agreement
Concerning Cooperation on Restrictive Business Practices, May 28, 1984, Fr.-F.R.G., 26
I.L.M. 531 (1987).
A number of other countries have followed the U.S. and European lead. Australia and New
Zealand, for example, have harmonizedtheir antitrust laws and pledged mutual enforcement
assistance, see SpencerW. Waller, The InternationalizationofAntitrust Enforcement,77 B.U.
L. R v. 343,355-56 (1997), as well as enteringinto cooperation agreements with Canada and
Taiwan, United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) Secretariat,
Experiences Gained So Far on InternationalCooperationon CompetitionPolicy Issues and
the Mechanisms Used, at 5, U.N. Doc. TD/B/Com.2ICLP/21 (May 8, 2000) [hereinafter
UNCTAD] (reviewing range of existing bilateral agreements), available at http'//www.
unctad.orgen/docslc2clp2l.en.pdf.
80. Thus, for example, the early U.S. agreement with Germany assumes substantially
common interests and focuses on cooperation in enforcement, while the earlier U.S.
agreements with Canada and Australia are more oriented toward dispute resolution. The
recent agreement with Brazil contains a provision for technical cooperation in order to help
a relatively fledgling antitrust authority. ICPAC FINAL REPORT, supranote 1, annex 1-C, at
iv-vii.
81. Agency Officials Relate Practical Application of International Agreements, 77
Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) 583 (Nov. 25, 1999) (quoting remark by Randolph W.
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1. The Nature of Bilateral Cooperation
One of the biggest challenges to international enforcement of
national antitrust continues to be the difficulty of obtaining
evidence from foreign parties. Generic tools, like judicial orders and
letters rogatory, have not proven terribly effective, other than in
inspiring protective legislation.12 A principal objective of bilateral
Tritell, Assistant Director of the FTC's Bureau ofCompetition in charge ofthe International
Antitrust Division, that "modern bilateral agreements are 'generally highly consistent with
each other. Even differences that exist rarely affect how we approach individual
jurisdictions."). For helpful surveys of U.S. efforts by administration officials, see Melamed,
supranote 1; John J. Parisi, Enforcement CooperationAmong AntitrustAuthorities, 1999
EUR. COMP.L.REV. 133; Nina L. Hachigian, InternationalAntitrustEnforcement, ANTrrRUST,
Fall 1997, at 22.
82. Report on the Proposed InternationalAntitrust Enforcement Assistance Act, 1994
A.B.A. SEC. ANTITRusT L. & SEC. INTl L. & PRAC. 3 (citing Anne IL Bingaman, Address
Before the World Trade Center Chicago Seminar (May 16, 1994)) (The traditional
mechanisms for obtaining foreign-located antitrust evidence are not sufficient to meet the
needs of modem antitrust enforcement. For example, an attempt to obtain information
through a letter rogatory procedure could conceivably involve disclosure of sensitive facts to
several layers of bureaucracy within the requested country, months of deliberation, and no
results."); Anne K. Bingaman, International Cooperation and the Future of U.S. Antitrust
Enforcement, Address before the American Law Institute (May 16, 1996) ("[N]o strong
institutional relationship is created by the letters rogatory process, and that process, which
is usually slow and quite unpredictable in result, is a very imperfect tool for cooperation."),
availableat http/lwww.usdoj.gov/atr/publicspeeches/96-05-16.ali.
Mutual legal assistance treaties (MLATs) may be harnessed in criminal antitrust
investigations, but only where antitrust falls within the scope of the treaty, and cooperation
may be limited further by the requirement that both countries consider the relevant conduct
to be criminal in nature. The MLAT between the United States and Canada is exceptional
in this regard because it not only expressly includes criminal antitrust investigations, but
also omits any dual criminalityrequirement. Treaty on Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal
Matters, Mar. 18,1985, U.S.-Can., Annex, 24 I.L.M. 1092,1099 (1985); Melamed, supra note
1, at 427; Bingaman, International Cooperation, supra ("MLATs, while very useful, apply
only to criminal matters, and only the Canadian MLAT specifically includes antitrust
crimes."). Even the Canadian treaty, however, permits the parties to refuse assistance on
grounds of national interest. Treaty on Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters, supra,
art. V(1), 24 I.L.M. at 1094. See generally Lawson A. W. Hunter & Susan M. Hutton, Where
There Is a Will, There Is a Way: Cooperationin Canada-U.S.Antitrust Relations, 20 CAN.U.S. L.J. 101, 107-08 (1994); Waller, supra note 79, at 366-67; Laurie N. Freeman, Note,
U.S.-CanadianlnformationSharingandthelnternationalAntitrustEnforcementAssistance
Act of 1994, 84 GEO. L.J. 339, 353-54 (1995).
Letters rogatory and MLATs have proven more successful in anticartel cases, where the
alleged offenses are more universal and the claims to confidentiality weakest. Joel I. Klein,
The Internationalization ofAntitrust: Bilateral and Multilateral Responses, Address Before
the European University Institute Conference on Competition (June 13, 1997), availableat
http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/speeches/1580.htm. But the failure of U.S. attempts to
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agreements, accordingly, has been to promote the discovery and
exchange of information between antitrust authorities." Because
such agreements do not purport to change domestic law, however,
they exclude confidential information-that is, information compulsorily produced by companies that is regarded by those companies
as confidential-thus substantially restricting their effectiveness."
In 1994, Congress enacted the International Antitrust Enforcement
Assistance Act (IAEAA) in order to permit the negotiation of
reciprocal arrangements to overcome this limitation,85 but only
Australia has taken the opportunity,8 6 and other prospects are
enforce antitrust laws against the DeBeers diamond syndicate shows that the inability of
U.S. prosecutors to obtain evidence from abroad may still prove fatal. United States v.
General Electric Co., 869 F. Supp. 1285, 1300 (S.D. Ohio 1994); see also Spencer W. Waller,
Twilight of Comity, 38 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 563, 573 (2000). But cf Gary R. Spratling,
Criminal Antitrust Enforcement Against International Cartels, Address at the Advanced
Criminal Antitrust Workshop (Feb. 21, 1997) ("[WMe also are beginning to invoke other
MLATs, as well as making increasingly successful use ofthe more traditionalletters rogatory
procedure in countries where we have no MLATs."), availableat http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/
public/speeches/grs97221.htm.
83. The types of information exchanged include public information, confidential agency
information concerning internal agency proceedings (as opposed to confidential business
information), and information forwhich awaiver ofconfidentiality has been provided. Parisi,
supra note 81, at 137-38. This allows antitrust authorities to discuss issues of product and
geographic market definition, competitive assessments, issues offoreign law, and remedies.
E.g., Commission Report to the Council and the European Parliament on the Application of
the Agreement between the European Communities and the Government of the United
States of America Regarding the Application of their Competition Laws 1 4.2 (1998),
reprinted in XXVIIITH REPORT ON COMPETITION POLICY 313 (1998)

[hereinafter 1998

Commission Report], available at http:/europa.eu.int/conm/competition/international/
97346_en.html.
84. E.g., Shelton, supra note 2, at 68 ("All bilateral agreements, especially the most
recent ones incorporating elements of positive comity, have come up against an important
roadblock-namely difficulties agencies have in sharing confidential data.").
85. The IAEAA envisions agreements permitting either signatory's antitrust authority,
upon the other's request, to share the confidential information it possesses or to employ
compulsory processes to gather the information on the requesting authority's behalf. 15
U.S.C. § 6204 (2000); id. §§ 6201-6203,6205-6212 (1994). The Attorney General and the FTC
may provide investigatory assistance without regard to whether the investigated conduct
would violate U.S. antitrust law, id. § 6202(c), but cooperation is not compulsory. Id. §
6207(a)(3) (limiting use of agreements to cases in which the U.S. Attorney General or the
FTC, as appropriate, determine that "conducting such investigation, applying for such order,
or providing the requested antitrust evidence, as the case may be, is consistent with the
public interest of the United States"); id. § 6208(a) (providing that determinations under
section 6207(a)(1) and (3) are not subject to judicial review).
86. AgreementonMutualAntitrustEnforcementAssistance, April27,1999, U.S.-Austl,
39 I.L.M. 1501, availableat httpd/www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/international/docs/usaus7.htm.
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limited.8 7 Even IAEAA agreements do not extend to information
provided in connection with merger filings, 8 an area with the

gravest need for international cooperation. In practice, confidential
information shared among antitrust authorities is most commonly
volunteered by parties eager to facilitate the onerous and timeconsuming process of multinational review. 9
The more significant impact of cooperation agreements has
been to improve the coordination of enforcement activities.
Consistent with the OECD recommendations,' the standard U.S.
bilateral agreement provides for the parties to notify one another
when an enforcement activity of one might affect important
interests of the other. 9' The parties may then coordinate their
87. Potential partners have been reluctant to authorize the necessary derogations from
their domestic laws. See Joel I. Klein, Anticipating the Millennium: International Antitrust
Enforcement at the End of the Twentieth Century, Address Before the 24th Annual
Conference on International Antitrust Law and Policy 7 (Oct. 16-17, 1997), availableat
http:/www.usdoj.gov/atr/publiclspeeches/1233.htm; Waller, supranote 79, at 373-74 (noting
change of heart by Canada). Potential partners may, moreover, have alternatives that
require little or no reciprocity on their parts. Id. at 378 (noting availability of letters rogatory
and letters of request and arguing that "[t]he only incentive for another nation to enter into
an agreement under the IAEAA might be the incremental value ofUnited States assistance
through the grand jury or civil investigative demand process"). Under the IAEAA, in
contrast, reciprocity is anintrinsic part ofqualifying agreements. 15 U.S.C. § 6211(2) (2000).
88. 15 U.S.C. § 6204 (2000). U.S. investigations must also respect legally applicable
rights and privileges, id. § 6202(d), and any agreement must contain assurances that the
antitrust authority will respect and preserve confidentiality, i&. § 6211(2)(B), (C) (2000).
89. Commission Report to the Council and the European Parliament on the application
of the Agreement between the European Communities and the Government of the United
States ofAmerica regarding the application of their competition laws [ 2.2.3 (July 1,1996 Dec. 31,1996), reprintedinXXVITHREPORTONCOMPETITIONPOLICY 312 (1996) [hereinafter
1996 Commission Report] (noting limited waiver in Commission and FTC review of
Sandoz/Ciba-Geigy merger); ic. 12.2.4 (noting waiver in U.S. and EU investigations of A.C.
Nielsen Company); Thomas Lampert, International Co-operation Among Competition
Authorities, 1999 EUr. COMP. L. REV. 214,218 (notingwaivers in, for example, the Kimberly
Clark/ScottPaper, Boeing/McDonnell Douglas, and airline alliance matters). Waiverrequests
from the agencies are now routine, and administrative and time constraints, combined with
a fear of adverse inferences, create substantial pressure to comply. 1998 Commission Report,
supranote 83, 4.2. Disclosure to one authority, of course, will often spur another authority
to request like treatment. See Parisi, supranote 81, at 138-40.
90. See supratext accompanying notes 68-69 (noting agreements).
91. See U.SJMexico Agreement, supranote 77, art. H; U.SJBrazil Agreement, suprante
74, art. II; U.SJJapan Agreement, supranote 76, art. II; U.SAsrael Agreement, supranote
75, art. II; 1995 U.SJCanada Agreement, supranote 73, art. II; 1991 U.SJE.C. Agreement,
supra note 78, art.II. In the 1991 U.S.IE.C. Agreement, for example, these interests include
matters that: (a) are relevant to enforcement activities of the other Party; (b) "[i]nvolve
anticompetitive activities (other than a merger or acquisition) carried out in significant part
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activities,92 but in any event are expected to take one another's
important interests into account. Traditional comity contemplates
that an antitrust authority consider the other party's interests in
deciding whether to initiate an investigation or proceeding,3
determining its scope, and electing which remedies to pursue.1
Beginning with the 1991 agreement between the United States and
the European Community, 94 U.S. agreements also contain"positive"
in the other Party's territory"; (c) involve a merger or acquisition in which at least one of the
transacting companies or its parents is within the other Party's territory; (d) "[ilnvolve
conduct believed to have been required, encouraged or approved by the other Party"; or (e)
"[i]nvolve remedies that would, in significant respects, require or prohibit conduct in the
other Party's territory." Id.; see also U.SJBrazil Agreement, supra note 74, art. 11(2)
(similarly defining '[einforcement activities to be notified"); U.SJCanada Agreement, supra
note 73, art. 11(2) (similarly defining "[e]nforcement activities that may affect important
interests of the other Party"); U.SiMexico Agreement, supranote 77, art. 11(2) (same).
92. E.g., U.SlMexico Agreement, supranote 77, art. IV; U.SJBrazil Agreement, supra
note 74, art. V; U.S./Japan Agreement, supranote 76, art. IV; U.SAsrael Agreement, supra
note 75, art. IV; 1995 U.SJCanada Agreement, supra note 73, art. IV; 1991 U.SJE.C.
Agreement, supra note 78, art. IV.
93. E.g., 1991 U.SJE.C. Agreement, supranote 78, art. IV. Nearly identical terms are
included in other agreements. U.SiMexico Agreement, supranote 77, art. VI(1); U.SJBrazil
Agreement, supra note 74, art. VI(1); U.SJJapan Agreement, supra note 76, art. VI(l);
U.SAsrael Agreement, supranote 75, art. VI(1); 1995 U.SJCanada Agreement, supranote
73, art. VI(1). The older agreement with Australia contains a somewhat different
consultation procedure, but with conflict-avoidance principles that are roughly consistent
with the more recent agreements. 1982 U.SJAustralia Agreement, supra note 72, art. 11(4),
(6). Typical factors include the relative weight of the anticompetitive conduct in each
territory, the conducts intended target, the relative significance of the anticompetitive
activities to the authorities' respective interests, conflict or consistency with the respective
authorities' laws, other reasonable expectations, and the relationship to other enforcement
activities undertaken with respect to the same parties. E.g.,. U.SJMexico Agreement, supra
note 77, art. VI(5); U.SJJapan Agreement, supranote 76, art. VI(3); U.SAsrael Agreement,
supranote 75, art. VI(5); 1991 U.SJE.C. Agreement, supranote 78, art. VI(3). Substantially
similar considerations are detailed in the 1995 U.SICanada Agreement, supranote 73, art.
VI(3). The older agreement with Australia is again more limited, see 1982 U.SJAustralia
Agreement, supranote 72, art. 11(4), (6), and the agreement with Brazil omits any discussion
of the relevant factors, see U.SJBrazil Agreement, supra note 74, art. VI.
94. The principle had been indirectly reflected in bilateral cooperation agreements since
1954, and in OECD policies since 1973, though in neither case to much apparent effect. See
ICPAC FINAL REPORT, supra note 1, at 227-28; OECD REPORT ON POSITIVE COMITY, supra
note 66, 11 4-5, 27-35.
As the OECD cautioned, the term positive comity has been used inconsistently. OECD
REPORT ON POSITIVE COMITY, supra note 66, 11 19-21. For the most part, I follow its
exhortation to use the term relatively rigidly: that is, distinguishing not only negative
comity, but also investigatory assistance (as opposed to making enforcement decisions) and
situations where one nation's enforcement action causes another nation to refrain from
acting, but without the latter having requested the former's assistance. "Informal" positive
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comity provisions, whereby one authority may request the other to
investigate anticompetitive activities occurring within its territory
that affect the requesting authority's important interests.9 5 Many
of the agreements are quite young, but the relative rarity to date of
formal requests for either traditional 96 or positive comity 7 is still
comity, in this sense, simply refers to "informal processes for making and considering

positive comity requests." Id.
95. E.g., 1991 U.SJE.C. Agreement, supra note 78, art. V(2) ("If a Party believes that
anti-competitive activities carried out on the territory of the other Party are adversely
affecting its important interests, the first Party may notify the other Party and may request
that the other Party's competition authorities initiate appropriate enforcement activities.
The notification shall be as specific as possible about the nature of the anti-competitive
activities and their effects on the interests of the notifying Party, and shall include an offer
of such further information and other cooperation as the notifying Party is able to provide.");
see also U.S./Mexico Agreement, supra note 77, art.V; U.SJBrazil Agreement, supranote 74,
art IV; U.SJJapan Agreement, supranote 76, art. V; U.S./Israel Agreement, supranote 75,
art. V; 1995 U.SJCanada Agreement, supranote 73, art. V.
The 1998 agreementwith the European Community elaborates onthis principle. First, the
agreement makes clear that requests for assistance may be made regardless ofwhether the
activities also violate the re4uesting authority's own competition laws. Agreement Regarding
the Application ofCompetition Laws, Sept. 23, 1991, U.S.-E.C., art. III, reprintedin 4 Trade
Reg. Rep. (CCH) I 13,504A (1998). Accordingly, it is also irrelevant whether the requesting
authority is even contemplating taking enforcement action on its own. Second, the 1998
agreement establishes a presumption, subject to certain exceptions, that the requesting
authority will refrain from pursuing its own enforcement while it is being
assisted-providing, in theory, a means of "handing off" enforcement to the authority to
whom the request is made. Id. art. IV.
96. The Boeing/McDonnell Douglas merger is the only cited example. 1998 Commission
Report, supranote 83, 2.1 (reporting as an instance of traditional comity the Commission's
request, and the FTC's immediate agreement, that the FTC take into account Europe's
interests).
97. As of mid-2000, the only example of a positive comity request was the April 1997
request by the Justice Department for the Commission's help in investigating allegations
that U.S. companies had suffered discrimination in the operation of the Amadeus
computerized reservation system operated by Lufthansa, Air France, and Iberia. This
experience was not wholly satisfactory. The Commission issued its Statement of Objections
over two years after the Justice Department made its formal request, and targeted only Air
France. ICPAC FINAL REPORT, supranote 1, at 232-34; Lampert, supranote 89, at 216. The
Commission later fined Lufthansa for violating its new Code of Conduct for Computer
Reservation Systems through Amadeus-related conduct, and noted that its decision followed
the investigation initiated at the behest of Sabre. EUFinesLufthansafor CRS Offenses, 77
Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) 122-23 (July 22, 1999). As the ICPAC reported, delays
of this kind may in fact be a serious risk, absent refinement. ICPAC FINAL REPORT, supra
note 1, at 238-39; see also OECD REPORT ON POSITIVE COMITY, supranote 66, 1 59 ("At this
point, perhaps the most that can be said is that the voluntary use of positive comity in
specific cases presents no apparent risks and has clear potential benefits in a limited number
of situations.").
The Justice Department and the Commission also regard the latter's investigation of AC
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quite striking, and seems to have caused some officials to backpedal
from rosier assessments. 98
2. The Local Limits to Bilateralism
These limits on bilateral cooperation help define a distinctive,
truncated style of international cooperation. For want of
inspiration, I identify these features as "local": first, the recognition
that antitrust represents a distinctive problem area, one that may
be substantially addressed within a limited group of nations;
second, the conscious decision to permit the adaptation of
international cooperation to national legal orders; and third, the
less deliberate failure to address distinctive aspects of the U.S. legal
order. As will become clear in Parts III and IV, these local limits to
cooperation help inspire an approach to identifying the
international law of antitrust. For the moment, it suffices to explain
how they establish evident limits to the bilateral approach.
a. Local Consent
Though the rapid propagation of bilateral agreements in recent
years has been impressive, the drawbacks to proceeding pairwise
Nielsen, a U.S. firm, as an example of informal positive comity. 1996 Commission Report,
supra note 89, 1 2.2.4; Klein, supranote 87, at 14-15; Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice,
Justice Department Closes Investigation Into the Way AC Nielsen Co. Contracts Its Services
forTrackingRetail Sales (Dec. 3,1996), auailableathttp'J/www.usdoj.gov/opa/pr/1996/Dec96/
576at.htm; see also ICPACFINALREPORT, supranote 1, at 234. That characterization is open
to dispute. Both authorities were interested in Nielsen's marketing practices, mostly in
Europe, that may have had as one of their effects a diminution in market opportunity for
U.S. exporters. Press Release 96-576, supra. The Justice Department apparently let the
Commission take the lead, given the relative weight of European conduct and anticompetitive impact, and terminated its investigation when the Commission and Nielsen
settled on terms satisfactory to the Justice Department. Id The Justice Department's
deferral to the Commission, and its wait-and-see approach to the matter ofremedy, make the
agencies' decisions seem essentially independent. As then-ActingAssistantAttorney General
Klein characterized the episode, "[wlhenitbecame clearto us that the European Commission
had a firm intention to act, we decided to let our colleagues at the Commission take the lead."
Id
98. The ICPACFinalReportcontains a good reprise ofofficial comments illustrating how
expectations have gradually been lowered. ICPAC FINAL REPORT, supra note 1, at 235-36
(citing officials); see also Hachigian, supranote 81, at 24 (elaborating why "itis unlikely that
[the 1991 U.SJE.C. Agreement] will be invoked frequently").
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are equally apparent. Advocates of multilateral proceedings in the
World Trade Organization (WTO), for example, point to the
painfully incremental nature of proceeding through bilateral
negotiation, as well as the difficulties of administering a potentially
enormous number of relationships." But the decision to address
first the relationships among mature and like-minded antitrust
regimes, including those with a proven propensity for conflict,
hardly seems arbitrary.'0 0 If nothing else, having done so,
participating authorities can rightly claim that some of the proven
flash points have been addressed, arguably diminishing the need to
proliferate these norms on a global basis.' 0 '
It is less remarked, but perhaps equally significant, that recent
efforts at cooperation have been almost entirely antitrust-specific,
in marked contrast to earlier, ineffectual efforts to develop antitrust
cooperation under general Treaties of Friendship, Commerce, and
Navigation."0 2 Dedicated agreements may have been warranted
because of the newly detailed nature of that cooperation, or in order
99. See infra text accompanying note 159.
100. WTO Report (1999) of the Working Group on the Interaction between Trade and
Competition Policy, WT/WGTCP/3 (Oct. 11, 1999) at 14 (observing that "this type of
cooperation tended to take place among countries economically interdependent and sharing
a similar level of experience in competition law enforcement, or countries that shared the
available at
of competition policy"),
the field
same ideas in
http-//docsonline.wto.orgDDFDocuments/t/WT/WGTCP/3.DOC. The U.S. agreements with
Brazil, Mexico, and Israel do not fit this description; the motivation in these cases instead
seems to have been to provide assistance and to facilitate influence with budding antitrust
regimes.
101. Submission fromtheUnited States to the Working Group on the Interaction Between
Trade and Competition Policy, WT/WGTCP/WI48 (Nov. 24, 1997) (describing success of
agreements with Canada, Australia, and European Community in avoiding disputes),
available at http-J/docsonline.wto.org/DDFDocuments/t/WT/WGTCP/W48.WPF. Former
Assistant Attorney General Joel Klein routinely replied to promptings for a WTO antitrust
program by declaring- "Ifit ain't broke, don't fix it." Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, CompetitionOriented Refdrms of the WTO World Trade System-Proposals and Policy Options, in
TOwARDsWTOCOMPETITION RULEs:KEYISSUESAND COMMENTS ONTHE WTO REPORT (1998)
ON TRADE AND COMPETITION 43, 62 (Roger Zach ed., 1999) (quoting, and criticizing, Klein's
position).
inlnternationalAntitrustEnforement,
102. Nina Hachigian,EssentialMutualAssistane
29 INTL LAWYER 117, 138 & n.135 (1995) (claiming that antitrust cooperation provisions of
Friendship, Commerce and Navigation Treaties have never, or almost never, been invoked)
(citing ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC COOPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, COMPETITION LAW
ENFORCEMENT. INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION IN THE COLLECTION OF INFORMATION 65
(1984)); accordUNCTAD supranote 79, at 16 ("There is no evidence that FCN treaties have
been utilized as vehicles for cooperation.") (footnote omitted).
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to begin anew. But the focused nature of the agreements, and the
elaboration of relatively distinctive tools like positive comity,
suggest an intent to forge a distinctive working order of antitrust.
As elaborated below, that may caution against conflating the
antitrust experience with putative legal principles of a more
universal nature.
b. Local Law
Agreements negotiated outside the IAEAA take the form of
executive agreements designed to create international obligations
without displacing existing national law. l"' This limitation affects
the potential for cooperation in a variety of ways.' Indeed, as
U.S. officials admit, the agreements do not permit any greater
cooperation than might be had in their absence,0 5 or that private
103. Parisi,supranote 81, at 135 (describing agreements as "formal, bindinginternational
agreements, that contain commitments on the exercise of discretionary authority ... [but]
because they are not treaties ... these agreements therefore do not override any provisions
of U.S. law with which they may be inconsistent"). For sake of clarity, a number of U.S.
agreements make it plain that they are intended to affect neither sovereign's laws.
U.S./Brazil Agreement, supranote 74, art. Y, 1995 U.SJCanada Agreement, supranote 73,
art. XI; 1991 U.SJE.C. Agreement, supra note 78, art. IX; 1998 U.SJE.C. Positive Comity
Agreement, supranote 78, art. VII; U.SJJapanAgreement, supranote 76, art. XI; U.SAsrael
Agreement, supra note 75, art. X; U.SJMexico Agreement, supra note 77, art. XI; see also
1998 Commission Report, supra note 83, 1 5.
104. Positive comity requests, for example, require that the conduct in question be illegal
in the requested country (potentially excluding, for example, inquiries into foreign export
cartels). OECD REPORT ON PosITIVE COMITY, supra note 66,
51, 61. The degree to which
such requests depend on confidence in the requested authority's commitment and resources
is also increased by confidentiality restrictions, which limit the requesting authority's ability
to jump-start the other's investigation and its ability to examine the fruits ofthat authority's
additional investigation in order to superintend its performance. Id. 52, 53.
105. Joel Klein, The War Against International Cartels: Lessons from the Battlefront,
Address Before the 26th Annual Conference on International Antitrust Law and Policy 8
(Oct. 14, 1999) ("But you don't need a formal agreement to pick up the telephone and share
public information about cases on a bilateral basis, to ensure that one agency's investigation
does not unnecessarily get in another agency's way. You don't need a formal agreement to
talk about the pros and cons of particular investigatory tools or the efficacy of particular
penalties."), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/speeches/3747.htm; see also
Approaches to Promoting Cooperation and Communication Among Members Including in the
Field ofTechnical Cooperation, Communication from the United States to the WTO Working
Group on the Interaction Between Trade and Competition Policy, WTIWGTCP/W/116 (Apr.
15, 1999), at 2 (describing "informal bilateral contacts occurring outside the context of any
formal agreement or legislation"), available at http-J/docsonline.wto.orgDDFDocuments/
tIWT/WGTCP/W116.doc; accordUNCTAD, supranote 79, at 20. For example, the United
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parties could broker by themselves."°6
The result, not incidentally, preserves sovereignty over every
ultimate decision."' The duty to provide notice of enforcement
activities typically turns on the notifying party's perception of the
other's "important interests," encourages cooperation to the extent
of the "common interest," and, subject to the "important interests"
of each, and asks them only to "consider" (or, at most, "carefully
consider") coordinating related matters and complying with
requests for comity, subject in every case to the authority's
discretion."0 ' As the Commission noted in seeking Council approval
of the 1998 U.S./E.C. Positive Comity Agreement, there is "no risk
that a [requested country] would be obliged to investigate a case
where it was not within its interests to do so."0 9 There is likewise
States and the European Commission cooperated in their parallel investigations ofMicrosoft
even though their agreement was suspended during the relevant period due to a flaw in the
European authorization. Waller, supranote 79, at 370.
106. This is most obvious in merger actions, where the strict statutory deadlines that
prevent much official coordination have encouraged many parties to take matters into their
own hands-for example, by purposefully notifying U.S. authorities first, on the basis of a
letter of intent, so as to get a head start bef6re initiating the more rigid (and foreshortened)
European procedure. Hachigian, supra note 81, at 24-25. The parties will not, of course, be
able to effectuate by themselves the sharing of agency-confidential information.
107. Much the same may be said ofcomityunder IAEAA agreements. Christine A. Varney,
Cooperation Between Enforcement Agencies: Building Upon the Past, Remarks Before the
APEC Committee onTrade and Investment Conference on Competition Policy andLaw (July
25, 1995) ("[M~e are prepared to enter into IAEAA agreements even if there is only a
relatively small number of situations in which a country would be likely to cooperate with
us.... [This] mak[es] it easy to decline cooperation in particular cases."), available at
http-/www.ftc.gov/speeches/varney/newz.htm. Consequently, it may be argued that
cooperation increases national power by expanding the potential reach of national law
without requiring any corresponding sacrifices. Waller, supra note 79, at 378.
108. E.g., U.SJMexico Agreement, supranote 77, arts. H-VI. The strongest requirements,
typically, concern notification, with some variation among the agreements. Compare, e.g.,
U.SAsrael Agreement, supra note 75, art. 11(2) (describing "[e]nforcement activities to be
notified"), and U.SJBrazil Agreement, supra note 74, art. 11(2) (same), and U.SJJapan
Agreement, supranote 76, art. 11(2) (describing "[e]nforcement activities that may affect the
important interests of the other Party"), with 1991 U.SJE.C. Agreement, supranote 78, art.
II(2) (describing "[elnforcement activities as to which notification ordinarily will be
appropriate") (emphasis added), and 1995 U.SlCanada Agreement, supranote 73, art. 11(2)
(describing "[e]nforcement activities that may affect the important interests of the other
party and therefore ordinarily require notification) (emphasis added), and U.SiMexico
Agreement, supra,art. 11(2) (same).
109. Communication from the Commission to the Council Concerning the Agreement
Between the European Communities and the Government of the United States on the
Application of Positive Comity Principles in the Enforcement of Their Competition
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little risk that a country would be required to refrain from
investigating if that were contrary to its interests, even in positive
comity cases where forbearance may be a condition for assistance.1 0
This means that cooperation agreements will leave some
important and contentious matters unresolved. The greatest payoff
to positive comity lies with cases that the requested authority
would not otherwise pursue,1'1 and some of the most suitable
candidates for referral-such as market access cases-are among

Laws 4, COMY97/0233 final (June 18, 1997) [hereinafter Commission Positive Comity
Communication].
110. Then-Chairman Pitofsky was explicit about this:
The key point about positive comity that I think sometimes is missed is that the
requesting nation ... does not wash its hands with respect to a practice by
seeking investigation by a foreign nation. Each country retains the right, if it
is not satisfied with the speed or quality of investigation, to initiate or
reinstitute its own enforcement activities. Indeed, I expect there will be
instances where positive comity is only a preliminary-a practical and comityconscious preliminary-to old-fashioned extraterritorial enforcement.
Pitofsky, supra note 1, at 409. Even the 1998 U.SIE.C. Agreement, which contains a
relatively strong presumption that the requesting party should cease or defer any
investigations on its own part, leaves the matter in the hands of the enforcing authority. See
UNCTAD, supra note 79, at 6 (noting that "although the United States federal enforcement
agencies are bound by this agreement, the courts are not'). But see OECD REPORT ON
POSITIVE COICTY, supranote 66, 56 (disputing claims that the agreement lacks the means
to ensure restraint, given its terms and the self-enforcing nature of the obligation).
111. As one commentator put it, "it is 'a fact of life that countries tend not to take any
action against any [anticompetitive] conduct that merely affects other countries.' OECD
REPORTONPOSITIVE COMITY, supranote 66, 155 (quoting Allan Fels, Trade andCompetition
in the Asia PacificRegion, Economic Society of Australia, 24th Conference of Economists,
Adelaide at 6 (Sept. 28, 1995)); see also James R. Atwood, Positive Comity-Is it a Positive
Step?, in 1992 ANN. PROC. FORDHAM CORP. L. INST. CONF.: INT'LANTITRUSTL. &POLY 79,83
(Barry E. Hawk ed., 1992) (arguing that it is "not realistic to expect one government to
prosecute its citizens solely for the benefit of another"); id. at 88 (arguing that positive comity
cannot overcome the fundamental "proposition that laws are written and enforced to protect
national interests").
The OECD Report argues that such criticisms are inapposite given that the requested
party's law must have been broken, OECD REPORTON POSITVE COb=T, supranote 66, 1 55,
but positive comity is of course relevant only in cases in which the law was broken and the
authority was not otherwise disposed to prosecute. The report also quotes, byway of reply,
the Commission's assertion that "very often it will be in the Requested Party's interest to
bring an end to anticompetitive behaviour occurring on its territory and it may be extremely
beneficial to have such behaviour brought to its attention." Commission Positive Comity
Communication, supranote 109, at 4, quoted in OECD REPORT ON POSITIVE CMITY, supra
note 66, 55. If ignorance is the only difficulty, of course, positive comity amounts to nothing
more than the exchange of information.
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the least likely to appeal to the requested authority." Where
requests are accepted, it may be primarily as a means of wresting
control,11 and authority will continue to be bifurcated in cases of
substantial interest to both authorities. 4 Traditional comity, for its
part, will continue to be invoked (perhaps for the first time) at the
remedies phase, when a case has been undertaken and proven, and
the requested party's enforcement interests are presumably least
open to compromise.' In the event of genuine discord, a party may
always withdraw from the agreements on relatively short notice."6
None of this means that existing agreements are irrelevant." 7
Cooperation offers important opportunities for building confidence
and developing relationships between antitrust authorities,"'
and surely may improve enforcement-when, for example, two
authorities are persuaded to impose consistent and complementary
remedies, or when positive comity enables the timely and effective
pursuit of evidence and prosecution of activities." Indeed, the
occasional exaggeration by officials of comity's scope and
implications may stem from their belief that the agreements will
112. OECD REPORT ON POSITIVE COMITY, supra note 66, 60.
113. As the Commission reported,
It is clearly preferable, from the European Community's point of view, that the
United States avail of the principle of positive comity when considering
anticompetitive behaviourtakingplace withinthe European Community rather
than seeking to apply US competition laws. Through positive comity the
Commission can retain control, where it so wishes, of enforcement procedures
addressing such behaviour.
Commission Positive Comity Communication, supra note 109, at 3.
114. See supra text accompanying notes 90-98.
115. This is acknowledged in the agreements themselves. E.g., U.SJMexico Agreement,
supra note 77, art. VI(4); U.SJJapan Agreement, supra note 76, art. VI(2); U.SAsrael
Agreement, supra note 75, art.VI(4); 1995 U.SJCanadaAgreement,supra note 73, art.VI(4);
1991 U.SJE.C. Agreement, supra note 73, art. VI(2).
116. The U.S. agreements typically provide for six months notice, though the IAEAA
agreement with Australia is somewhat more complicated. 1999 U.SlAustralia Agreement,
supranote 72, art. XIII(C) (permitting immediate termination at a party's discretion, after
consultation, in the event ofunauthorized or illegal disclosure or use ofconfidential antitrust
evidence confided to it); id., art. XIII(E) (providing for termination upon 30 days' notice in
other circumstances).
117. But see Guzman, supra note 10, at 1535 n.89 (noting the existence of agreements
permitting the sharing of information).
118. E.g., Melamed, supra note 1, at 426. The ICPAC Final Report seems to take
promoting confidence in positive comity mechanisms as virtually an end in itself. ICPAC
FINAL REPORT, supranote 1, at 238-39.
119. E.g., ICPAC FINAL REPORT, supra note 1, at 237-38.
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eventually spill over into mutual understandings that transcend
any formal arrangement."0

c. Local Actors
Beyond indicating that they are not intended to alter national
or state laws,12 1 the agreements exhibit little appreciation of the
multifaceted nature of U.S. antitrust. The Justice Department
and the FTC are each subject to the agreements, but their nominal
independence would not in any case threaten international
cooperation, 2 and they coordinate fairly effectively with other
federal agencies having regulatory interests touching on

120. Klein, supra note 87, at 11.
121. See supra note 108 (citing relevant agreement provisions).
122. Each agency has the authority to enforce provisions of the Clayton Act. 15 U.S.C. §§
12, 15, 18, 21, 26-27 (2000); id. §§ 13-14, 16-17, 19-20, 22-25 (2000). The FTC's authority
under section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act, id. § 45, moreover, permits it to
challenge conduct also actionable under the Sherman Act, which the Justice Department
enforces through civil and criminal proceedings. Id. §§ 1, 2-4. To address this overlap, the
agencies have agreed that the Justice Department will refer all civil Robinson-Patman Act
matters to the FTC, and the FTC (which lacks the authority to commence criminal actions)
will refer possible criminal matters to the Department. The agencies have also adopted a
clearance procedure that dissolves most potential for conflict. Antitrust Div., U.S. Dep't of
Just. & Bureau ofCompetition, Fed. Trade Comm'n, Clearance Procedures for Investigations
(Dec. 2, 1993); U.S. Dep't of Just. & Fed. Trade Comm'n, Hart-Scott-Rodino Premerger
Program Improvements (March 23, 1995); see also 1 A.B.A. SEC. OF ANTITRUST LAW,
ANTITRUST LAW DEVELOPMENTS 659-60 (4th ed. 1997) [hereinafter ANTITRUST LAW
DEVELOPMENTS (FOURTH)]; ANTITRUST Div., U.S. DEPT OF JUST., ANTITRUST DIVISION
MANUAL ch. VII, at 1-6 (3d ed. 1998) [hereinafter ANTITRUST DIV. MANUAL], available at
http'J/www.usdoj.gov/atr/foia/divisionmanual/ch7.pdf.
This is not to deny the idiosyncrasies, or excesses, of this redundancy. Ernest Gellhom et
al, Has Antitrust Outgrown Dual Enforcement? A Proposal for Rationalization, 35
ANTITRUST BULL. 695, 736-40 (1990) (suggesting that dual enforcement is costly and
unnecessary, and proposing concentration of efforts in the Justice Department); William E.
Kovacic, DownsizingAntitrust:Is It Time to EndDualFederalEnforcement?, 41 ANTITRUST
BULL. 505 (1996) (suggesting that dual enforcement may have little benefit in terms ofinteragency competition or diversification, and that its costs may outweigh its benefits). The
decision by the Justice Department to undertake an investigation ofMicrosoft after the FTC
closed its file illustrates the uncertainty this arrangement can pose for potential targets. See
Donald L. Flexner & Mark A. Racanelli, State and FederalAntitrust Enforcement in the
United States: Collision or Harmony?, 9 CONN. J. INT'L L. 501, 502 (1994) (noting that the
coordination process between agencies "does not prevent them from taking conflicting
positions in adjudicatory proceedings, or seeking conflicting legal interpretations and
results").
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antitrust.1 The lacuna in the agreements, rather, concerns the fact
that nonfederal parties may enforce federal law against foreign
parties and overseas activities.
Foreign governments were, of course, well aware of the private
right of action under the ClaytonAct,M having complained long and
loudly about the in terrorem effect of treble damages," 2s which
bedevil a growing number of international cases." But private
123. The Justice Department is charged with advisingavariety offederal agencies as part
of its sectoral responsibility for antitrust matters concerning banking, telecommunications,
and rail and air transportation. MILTON HANDLER ET AL., TRADE REGULATION: CASES AND
MATERIALS 99 & n.2 (4th ed. 1997); see also 2 ANTITRUST LAW DEVELOPMENTS (FOURTH),
supra note 122, ch. 14 (describing procedures); ANTITRUST DIV. MANUAL, supranote 122, at
ch. VII, 33-38 (same). Most domestic and foreign observers conclude that this arrangement
generally allows adequate attention to competition considerations. The Relationshipbetween
CompetitionandRegulatoryAuthorities,1 OECDJ. C0161ETITIONL. &POLY169,171,175-76
(1999); Michael 0. Wise, Review of United States Competition Law and Policy, 1 OECD J.
COMPETITION L. &POLY 10, 37-54, 61(1999). But cf Eleanor M. Fox, Lessonsfrom Boeing,
supra note 7, at 19, 24 (arguing that antitrust should be kept distant from politics, and that
"[p]olitical officials should leave antitrust to the experts").
124. 15 U.S.C. § 15 (2000). The Clayton Act as amended authorizes private actions to
enforce the federal antitrust laws, including the ShermanAct, the Robinson-Patman Act, and
the Clayton Act itself, id. § 12 (2000), and further permits injured persons to recover treble
damages, id. § 15(a) (2000).
125. E.g., MICHAEL BYERS, CUSTOM, POWERAND THE POWER OF RULES 66 (1999); Joseph
P. Griffin, U.S. International AntitrustEnforcement: APractical Guide to the Agencies' 1995
Guidelines, Corp. Practice Series, A-49, at A-55 (BNA Dec. 23, 1998) (citing foreign
description of U.S. treble damages as a "rogue elephant) (quoting William M. Knighton,
Nationality and Extraterritorial Jurisdiction: U.S. Law Abroad, Remarks Before the
American Law Institute of the Georgetown University Law Center (Aug. 13, 1981)); Karl M.
Meessen,AntitrustJurisdictionUnder CustomaryInternationalLaw, 78 AM. J. NT'LL. 783,
794 (1984) (claiming that "[i]n recent years, foreign protests [against American antitrust]
have focused on treble damage cases").
Of course, private treble-damages actions are also controversial in U.S. circles. Robert H.
Lande,AreAntitrust "Treble"DamagesReallySingleDamages?,54 OHIO ST. L.J. 115,115-18
(1993) (describing controversy, but disputing premise); see also, e.g., Wise, supranote 123,
at 16 (noting possibility of disproportionate punishment through variety of penalties, and
arguing that severity "encouragels] claims for exemption, special treatment, or even
regulation as a substitute for competition enforcement"); id. at3l (querying whether, in light
of class actions and criminal fines, it may be worth reconsidering whether awarding
exemplary damages in antitrust cases is still a sound policy). The Reagan Administration
cited similar concerns in its unsuccessful attempts to limit application of treble damages.
Edward Corriea, Congress and Antitrust Policy After the Reagan Administration, in
REVITAIZING ANTITRUST IN ITS SECOND CENTURY: ESSAYS ON LEGAL, ECONOMIC, AND
POLITICAL POLICY 451, 459-61 (Harry First et al. eds., 1991).
126. See, for example, the recent vitamins controversy, which Professor First has
described as a formative episode in international antitrust. First, supra note 37, at 712-14,
718-19 (describing private class-action settlement for $1.05 billion by six foreign vitamins
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parties go almost unmentioned in the bilateral agreements. 7 The
resulting gap in regulatory comity has been noted, however, in
academic appraisals of HartfordFire, and has resulted in calls for
a legislative resolution" or government participation in private
suits,1 29 lest private parties establish an independent and relatively
unconstrained international economic policy. 3 °
Less attention still has been paid to the state attorneys general,
though they were pivotal participants in Hartford Fire.'' The
bilateral agreements were not intended, it is clear, to amend state
antitrust statutes-the majority of them resembling (if not in every
respect) the federal antitrust statutes.3 2 But states are also able to
enforce federal antitrust law. Just like any other "person,"' a state
manufacturers).
127. Cf Russell J. Weintraub, Globalization'sEffect on Antitrust Law, 34 NEW ENG. L.
REv. 27, 30-31 (1999) (arguing that in light of existing agreements, while debate over comity
is "moot7 with respect to government enforcement actions, the role of comity in private
actions is "less clear"). The exception is the 1982 agreement with Australia, which provides:
When it appears to the Government of Australia that private antitrust
proceedings are pending in a United States court relating to conduct, or conduct
pursuant to a policy of the Government of Australia, that has been the subject
of notification and consultations under this Agreement, the Government of
Australia may request the Government of the United States to participate in
the litigation. The Government of the United States shall in the event of such
request report to the court on the substance and the outcome of the
consultations.
1982 U.SJAustralia Agreement, supranote 72, art. 6.
128. Phillip R. Trimble, The Supreme Court and InternationalLaw: The Demise of
Restatement Section 403, 89 AM. J. INVL L. 53, 57 (1995) (suggesting that if U.S. officials
"decide to extend their view of comity to private litigation, the appropriate procedure would
be by treaty or congressional-executive agreement," and that "[sluch a process would assure
that diplomatically sensitive lawmaking is rooted in the legislature where it belongs").
129. Waller, supranote 79, at 568.
130. E.g., Kenneth W. Dam, Extraterritorialityin an Age of Globalization:The Hartford
Fire Case, 1993 SUP. CT. REV. 289, 325 ("[Where private actions are concerned, the
government has no opportunity to make a decision [regarding comity] and indeed cannot
even block the private action."); id. at 327 (noting relative lack of safeguards for private
actions in the absence of judicial comity).
131. See infra text accompanying notes 520-23.
132. 1 ANTITRUST LAW DEVELOPMENTS (FOURTH), supra note 122, at 742-44; WILLIAM T.
LIFLAND, STATE ANTITRUST LAW § 1.02 (1999). Like state recourse under federal law, most
state laws permit treble damages (and, in a minority of cases, parenspatriae actions) and
criminal penalties for certain classes of violation. 1 ANTITRUST LAW DEVELOPMENTS
(FOURTH), supra note 122, at 742-44; LIFLAND, supra, § 1.04.
133. E.g., Georgia v. Pennsylvania R.R. Co., 324 U.S. 439, 447 (1945). So too are cities,
counties, and other political divisions of states. E.g., Chattanooga Foundry & Pipe Works v.
City of Atlanta, 203 U.S. 390, 396 (1906). States are not, however, persons capable of
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may seek injunctive relief (including divestiture of assets) 3 4 or
treble damages.. 5 for threatened or actual antitrust injuries
suffered as purchasers of goods or services. Unlike purely private
parties, a state may also bring parenspatriaeactions on behalf of
its natural residents, which again may entitle it to equitable
relief 136 or treble damages.3 7
The inattention to state antitrust is unlikely to persist. State
antitrust enforcement has long been controversial domestically,'3 8
and states have no more forsworn intervention in international
matters than they have in matters touching on interstate
commerce. 1 9 States have been actively involved in a number of
violating the Sherman Act, Parkerv. Brown, 317 U.S. 341,351 (1943), though theirpolitical
subdivisions often are. 2 ANTITRUSTLAw DEVELOPMNENTS (FOURTH), supranote 122, at 108591.
134. 15 U.S.C. § 26 (2000).
135. Id. § 15. In order to recover damages under federal law, the state, like any other
plaintiff, must be a direct purchaser. California v. ARC Am. Corp., 490 U.S. 93, 100 (1989).
136. Such suits are authorized both as a matter of common law, as inHawaiiv. Standard
Oil Co., 405 U.S. 251,261-64 (1972) and Georgia v. PennsylvaniaR.R.Co., 324 U.S. 439,445,
447-48 (1945), as well as by section 16 of the Clayton Act. See 15 U.S.C. § 26 (2000); e.g.,
California v. American Stores Co., 495 U.S. 271 (1990).
137. Unlike actions for injunctive relief, such relief does not derive from federal common
law, California v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 474 F.2d 774,777-78 (9th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 412 U.S.
908 (1973), but rather is authorized solely by statute, Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust
Improvements Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-435, § 301, 90 Stat. 1383, 1394 (1976), codified as
amended at 15 U.S.C. § 15g (2000); id. §§ 15 c-f, h (2000). Several limitations bear note:
damages are limited to Sherman Act injuries, id. § 15c(a)(1); exclude injuries suffered by
"unnatural" persons like corporations, see id., or indirect purchasers, cf Illinois Brick Co. v.
Illinois, 431 U.S. 720 (1977), and may be reduced to avoid double recovery (and,
correspondingly, may bar damage claims by others who have not opted out of the state suit),
15 U.S.C. §§ 15c(a)(1)(A), (b) (2000).
138. David W. Barnes, Federaland State Philosophiesin theAntitrustLawofMergers, 56
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 263 (1988); Flexner & Racanelli, supra note 122; C. Douglas Floyd,
Controlof Break-Away StateAntitrust Litigation:An Issue of Federalism,35 HASTINGS L.J.
1 (1983) (discussing conflict between state-law antitrust actions and federal procedural rules
governing removal); Herbert Hovenkamp, State Antitrust in the FederalScheme,58 IND.L.J.
375 (1983) (discussing conflict between state antitrust law and federal antitrust scheme);
Robert H. Lande, When Should StatesChallengeMergers;AProposedFederalIStateBalance,
35 N.Y.L. ScH. L. REv. 1047 (1990).
139. Michael F. Brockmeyer, State Antitrust Enforcement, 57 ANTITRUST L.J. 169, 173
(1988) (rejecting notion that"states should leave the prosecution of national cases to federal
authorities and should concentrate their efforts on local conspiracies"); Roundtable
Conference with Enforcement Officials, 69 ANTrTRUST L.J. 367,381 (2001) [hereinafter2001
Roundtable] (remarks of Thomas Greene, Senior Assistant Attorney General for Antitrust,
State of California, and Chair, NAAG Multistate Antitrust Task Force); Roundtable
Conference with Enforcement Officials, 67 ANTiTRUST L.J. 453, 466-67 (1999) [hereinafter
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recent mergers involving foreign parties or transnational dimensions, such as BP-Amoco/Arco, Exxon/Mobil, and MCIIWorldcom,
sometimes at cross-purposes with one another or with the federal
government.'
States have also been involved in high-profile
lawsuits potentially benefitting from international cooperation,
such as the continuing Microsoft saga, 4 ' and have proceeded
directly against foreign defendants in matters involving parallel
federal, state, private, and foreign proceedings, as in the vitamins
price-fixing cases. 14' The resulting potential for conflict is of no
1999Roundtable (remarks ofThomas Greene). Thus Robert Langer, then-head of the NAAG
Task Force, responded to the question ofwhether states would be interested in international
matters:
Obviously, we were very much involved in TexacolGetty; other states were
involved in Socal/Gulf We look at companies involved in international
operations where we feel there is sufficient local interest that we ought to have
a part to play.
Now, the fact is, if you have EC approval or Canadian approval and FTC or
DOJ involvement, and we believe we have something to say, if we are
reasonably comforted by the level of scrutiny attached to the transaction by
federal officials, it is unlikely that we are going to reinvent the wheel and start
looking at international transactions with our limited resources. I don't
discount the possibility on an ad hoc basis, but it is not going to be our primary
focus.
60 Minutes with Robert M. Langer, Chair, National Association of Attorneys General
MultistateAntitrust Task Force, 61 ANTITRUST L.J. 211, 222 (1992); id. ("'mnot going to
speak for NAAG and say, 'Under no circumstances can I conceive of a circumstance where
we would not have a role to play.' Although it was 'international,' we clearly thought we
should have had a role to play in Texaco/Getty. But I don't see how one can have an
absolutist position on the matter.").
140. See infra text accompanying notes 519, 524-25.
141. See supratext accompanying notes 28-30.
142. Following an investigation by the Justice Department (assisted by Rhone Poulenc,
a French co-conspirator immunized for its cooperation), Roche Holding (a Swiss firm) and
BASF (a German firm) pleaded guilty in May 2000 to price-fixing charges and paid $725
million in fines. Additionally, some executives from each companywere criminally sentenced
to jail terms. Stephen D. Moore, Vitamin MakersStill FaceEU Objections,WALL ST. J., Oct.
12, 2000, at B5. Canada's Justice Department later imposed fines of sixty-nine million
Canadian dollars on the two companies. Id. Still later, Australia imposed record fines of
twenty-six million Australian dollars on three firms after receiving assistance from U.S.
authorities. Three AustralianAnimalVitamin CompaniesFaceAnti-competitionFines,AAP
Newsfeed, Feb. 28, 2001, LEXIS, Nexis Library, WIRES File. The European Commission
followed suit by imposing fines of 855 million Euros on eight companies. European
Commission, Press Release, Commission Imposes Fines onVitamin Cartels, IP/01/1625 (Nov.
21, 2001), available at http-//europa.eu.intlrapid/startcgilguesten.ksh?p-action.gettxt=
gt&doc=IP/01/1625101RAPID&lg=EN&display=.
In the meantime, civil actions led by private and state attorneys general flourished.

2001]

LOCAL LAW OF GLOBAL ANTITRUST

665

small relevance to foreign governments, but there has been as yet
no attempt to moderate the states' role.'4
C. Multilateralismand its Limits
Conscious of the limits to bilateral arrangements, many argue
that they nonetheless set the stage for deeper and broader
international antitrust arrangements. 1 " In the past, every attempt
at international antitrust has failed, due largely to U.S. resistance
-notwithstanding that the United States itself has the most robust
history of national antitrust policy.' 45 Decades of multilateral
initiatives-from the League of Nations to the Havana Charter for
an International Trade Organization, and from the United Nations
Economic and Social Council and its Conference on Trade and
146
Development (UNCTAD), to GATTE-have left little legacy.
Antitrust norms have been incorporated to some degree in traderelated instruments, but such efforts have either been superficial

Private direct purchasers eventually settled class-action lawsuits filed in U.S. district courts
for $1.17 billion. Moore, supra,at B5. Six European and Japanese companies subsequently
agreed to pay twenty-one states (plus the District ofColumbia and Puerto Rico) $225 million
recoverable under state laws permitting states to recover for harm to indirect purchasers,
and paid forty-seven states (again, plus the District of Columbia and Puerto Rico) $30 million
for direct purchases recoverable under federal law. States Reach Settlement with Vitamin
MakersinMassivePrice-FixingCase, ASs'NOFATrYs. GEN. ANTiTRUSTREP., SeptJOct. 2000,
at 1. California separately sought a settlement of$80 million for its claims. Moore, supra,at
B5.
143. See infra text accompanying notes 510-28.
144. E.g., Griffin, supra note 125, at A-49 (citing sources); Griffim, supra note 20, at 506
& nn.10-11 (same).
145. As Professor Waller has concluded,
Every attempt to establish transnational competition law, with the exception
of that of the European Union, has ended either in complete failure or in
dilution into aspirational measures with little content. The United States has
played a curiously ambivalent role in these efforts, often initiatinginternational
efforts and then scuttling them when majoritarian voting at the international
level has influenced the project in directions not to its liking.
Waller, supranote 79, at 344-45; accordGuzman, supranote 10, at 1535 (i[Elfforts to achieve
international cooperationwith respectto antitrust policyhave achieved very little success.").
146. For surveys of these efforts, see Eleanor M. Fox, CompetitionLaw and the Agenda
for the WTO: Forgingthe Links of Competition and Trade, 4 PAC. RIM L. & PoLy J. 1, 2-7
(1995); Guzman, supranote 10, at 1535-38; Waller, supra note 79, at 349-52; Spencer Weber
Waller, Neo-Realism and the InternationalHarmonizationof Law: Lessons from Antitrust,
42 U. KAN. L. REV. 557, 597-601 (1994); Wood, supranote 10.
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(as with GATT),14 narrow (as with the TRIPS Agreement),' or
vague (as with NAFTA). 4 9 Broader efforts at establishing antitrust
within the WTO ran into into implacable opposition by U.S.
antitrust enforcers.15 Although the United States appears newly
willing to discuss the inclusion of core competition principles in the
next WTO round,' 1 and has championed a new International
147. GATT's founders preferred to avoid the issue of competition policy. See Waller, supra
note 79, at 351 & n.32 (citingJOHNH. JACKSON, WORLDTRADEAND THELAWOF GATT 522-57
(1969)). A 1958 recommendation by a group of experts, followed closely by a subsequent
decision, suggested consultation principles. Committee on Restrictive Business Practices,
Report on the Problems Relating to the Control of Restrictive Business Practices Affecting
International Trade, E.41450, at 3 (Jan. 12, 1965) ("[A] nation should accord sympathetic
consideration to requested consultations... [and] if it agrees that such harmful effects are
present, it should take such measures as it deems appropriate to eliminate these effects.");
Decision on Arrangements for Consultations on Restrictive Business Practices, Nov. 18,
1960, GATT B.I.S.D. (9th Supp.) at 28 (1961) (recommending that "at the request of any
contracting party, a contractingparty should enter into consultations on Restrictive Business
Practices on a bilateral or a multilateral basis as appropriate.., and if it agrees that such
harmful effects are present it should take such measures as it deems appropriate to
eliminate these effects"). But that procedure was not invoked for thirty years-and then only
tardily, in the midst of the Kodak/Fuji dispute. OECD REPORT ON POSITIVE COMITY, supra
note 66, 30, at 8.
148. The TRIPS agreement charges members with responsibility for providing "full and
sympathetic consideration to, and ... adequate opportunity for, consultations" relating to
positive comity requests on restrictive business practices, while according them complete
"freedom [to make an] ultimate decision." Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of
Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World
Trade Organization, Annex IC, LEGA INsTRUtmENTs--REsULTs OFTHEURUGUAYROUND voL
31, art. 40(3), 33 I.L.M. 1197, 1213 (1994).
149. North American Free Trade Agreement Implementation Act, Pub. L. No. 103-182,
art. 1501(2), 107 Stat. 2057 (1993) (codified at 19 U.S.C. §§ 3301-3473 (1994 & Supp. V 1999))
(providingfor cooperation "onissues of competition law enforcement policy, includingmutual
legal assistance, notification, consultation and exchange of information relating to the
enforcement of competition laws and policies in the free trade area").
150. In the early 1990s, for example, the International Antitrust Code Working Group,
better known as the Munich Group, drafted an antitrust code for possible adoption as a WTO
instrument, but U.S. skepticism almost immediately doomed the effort. Waller, supra note
79, at 347. The United States subsequently agreed to participate in a new Working Group
on the Interaction Between Trade and Competition Policy, but continued to oppose
promulgating international rules of any substance within the WTO or other multilateral
organizations. E.g., A. Douglas Melamed, PromotingSound Antitrust Enforcement in the
Global Economy, 2000 ANN. PROC. FORDHAM CORP. L. INST. CONF.: INT'L ANTITRUST L. &
POLY 1, 4-6 (Barry E. Hawk ed., 2000); see also Philip Marsden, "Antitrust"at the WTO,
ANTITRUST, Fall 1998, at 28, 29-30 (describing U.S. positions); infra text accompanying note
157 (same).
151. The Bush Administration recently announced that it would reverse course and agree
to discuss competition policy in the upcoming global trade negotiations, and that it saw merit
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Competition Network, 5 2 neither move is intended to yield the kind
of binding antitrust code favored by many in the international
community.

"in adherence to core competition principles of transparency, non-discrimination, and
procedural fairness." Press Release, U.S. Trade Rep., USTR Zoellick Outlines U.S. Efforts
to Promote Growth and Development by Launching New Trade Round (July 17, 2001)
(statement of USTR Zoellick), availableat http'/lwww.ustr.gov/releases/2001/07/01-54.htm.
But it stopped short of agreeing that even such basic principles ought be included in an
international instrument, let alone a binding instrument, and noted uncertainty as to how
obligations would be assessed or disputes resolved. The agreement to negotiate, moreover,
means something less given the government's strategic decision to avbid further disputes
over the round's agenda in favor of debating the merits ofissues during actual negotiations.
Id. The U.S. concession, in any case cleared the way for further negotiations. Paul Blustein,
142 NationsReach Pacton Trade Negotiations,WASE. POST, Nov. 15, 2001, at Al; cf Jaret
Seiberg, Global Antitrust Debate Gets Stormier, THE DAILY DEAL, July 27, 2001 (noting
controversy over competition issues).
152. The ideafora Global Competition Initiative originatedwith the ICPAC Report, which
proposed the need for a new venue in which interested governments, international
organizations, nongovernmental organizations, private firms, and others could conduct a
dialogue on competition issues. ICPAC FINAL REPORT, supranote 1, at 281-85. U.S. officials
warmed to the idea. See Melamed, supranote 150, at 6-9 (sharing provisional thoughts as
to terms and work program for initiative); Charles James, International Antitrust in the
Bush Administration, Address before the Annual Fall Conference ofthe Canadian Bar Ass'n
(Sept. 21, 2001) (describing initiative as "personal priority' and committing to attempt its
launch no later than mid-2002), available at http/www.usdoj.gov/atr/publictspeeches/
9100.htm; Joel I. Klein, Time for a Global Competition Initiative?, Address at the EC Merger
Control 10th Anniversary Conference (Sept. 14, 2000) (advocating a "move in the direction
of a Global Competition Initiative, cautiously and on an exploratory basis"), available at
http/www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/speeches/6486.htm.
The initiative, redubbed the International Competition Network (ICN), was finally
launched in late October 2001, as this Article was being finalized for publication. The ICN's
avowed purpose is to establish a forum 'where senior antitrust officials from developed and
developingcountries"-initially, itwould appear, including Australia, Canada, the European
Union, France, Germany, Israel, Italy, Japan, Korea, Mexico, South Africa, the United
Kingdom, the United States, and Zambia-will work to reach consensus on proposals for
procedural and substantive convergence on antitrust enforcement."Press Release, U.S. Dep't
ofJustice, U.S. and Foreign Antitrust Officials Launch International Competition Network
(Oct. 25, 2001), availableat http'/www.usdoj.gov/atr/publicpress-releases200l/ 9400.htm.
Its output, however, is to be in the form of nonbinding recommendations that governments
are free either to adopt or reject, and it is to have "no rule making or decision making
authority." Id.
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Some explain these failures as a function of entrenched
differences in substantive approach1 5 or legal culture,' or common
but divisive incentives to favor local economies.15 5 Others find such
assessments unduly fatalistic.'5 6 Resolving that debate is beyond
the scope of this Article, but the argument against the WTO
usefully illustrates an important perspective on the preferred terms
for multilateral cooperation. U.S. antitrust officials, in particular,
have stressed that WTO membership is too numerous, diverse, and
inexperienced with antitrust to negotiate "sound" antitrust rules;
that were they to do so, such principles would be of the lowest
common denominator, which would only legitimize weak national
regimes; and that any dispute settlement tools the WTO might
bring to bear would either have little or no influence (in light of the
low standards) or meddle with matters for sovereign consideration
in a politically suspect fashion. 1 '
153. E.g., Daniel J. Gifford, The DraftInternationalAntitrust Code Proposedat Munich:
Good Intentions Gone Awry, 6 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 1, 3-4 (1997) (suggesting that
differences among U.S., European, and Japanese approaches to antitrust standards and
enforcement policy make international agreement difficult); see also supra note 38 (noting
substantive differences between U.S. and European antitrust laws).
154. E.g., Marsden, supra note 38, at 117 (concluding that "fundamentally different
philosophical approaches to economic freedom" in U.S. and EU vertical restraints policies
mean that international cooperation or agreement are neitherfeasible nor desirable); Waller,
supranote 79, at 347-48.
155. Guzman, supra note 10 (arguing that while national-level antitrust enforcement is
suboptimal, the self-interest of individual countries will limit gains realizable through
international antitrust cooperation); Guzman, supranote 26 (same); see also 2 ERIKNEREP,
EXTRATERRITORIAL CONTROL OF COMPETITION UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW 502 (1983)

(describing self-interest of market regulators as the reason "international cooperation is slow
to flourish"). While antitrust authorities frequently downplay any focus on self-interest,
Congress has not been so demure. E.g., InternationalAntitrust Enforcement: How Well is it
Working?: HearingsBefore the Subcomm. on Antitrut,BusinessRights,and Competitionof
the SenateComm. on the Judiciary,105th Cong. (1998) (reviewing allegations that European
Commission and Japanese Fair Trade Commission are reluctant to pursue anticompetitive
practices by domestic outfits).
156. E.g., SeparateStatement ofAdvisory Committee Member EleanorM. Fox, in ICPAC
FINAL REPORT, supra note 1, annex 1-A (arguing for greater substantive harmonization
within the WTO).
157. E.g., James, supra note 152; Joel I. Klein, A Note of Caution with Respect to a WTO
Agenda on Competition Policy, Remarks to the Royal Institute of International Affairs (Nov.
18, 1996) [hereinafter Klein, A Note of Caution], available at http:/www.usdoj.gov/atr/
publiclspeeches/jikspch.htm; see alsoA. Douglas Melamed,AntitrustEnforceentin a Global
Economy, 1998 ANN. PROC. FORDHAM CORP. L. INST. CONF.: INT'L ANTITRUST L. &POLY 1, 9
(Barry E. Hawk ed., 1998); Melamed, supra note 150, at 5-6; Conference Callwith U.S. Trade
Representative Charlene Barshefsky, Federal News Service, Dec. 17, 1999, LEXIS, Nexis
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One premise for these objections is that there is presently a
discrete community of antitrust enforcers, and that these nations
,are already cooperating formally and informally. Those espousing
the WTO solution do not entirely disagree.'58 EU officials, for
example, clearly acknowledge the relative strength of cooperation
taking place among nations with similar philosophies and
resources; at the same time, they and others express concern about
the slow pace of proceeding bilaterally, and about the likelihood
that many will simply be left behind." 9
A second premise is that antitrust issues are distinctive and not
amenable to resolution by trade regimes. Again, advocates for WTO
competition rules are not unsympathetic, and are at least inclined
to exclude the application of certain familiar trade remedies. 60
Library, FEDNWS File ("[W]e know that full negotiations in these areas is [sic] not possible
because there is no consensus, and there is no consensus because the view is they are not
ripe. It's not clear what would be negotiated, what would be the end goal ofthe negotiation.
In competition, half of WTO members don't even have competition laws, let alone a policy.
What exactly would one negotiate?"); Joel I. Klein, A Reality Check on Antitrust Rules In the
World Trade Organization, and a PracticalWayForward on International Antitrust, Address
before the OECD Conference on Trade and Competition (June 29-30, 1999) [hereinafter
Klein, A Reality Check], available at http/www.oecd.orgfdaf/clpltradecompetition
conference/kleinsp.htm.
158. This does not pretend to describe the views of all the relevant parties. Many, but not
all, of the developed nations with established antitrust policies favor more substantial
pursuit of a WTO agenda, though the developing countries, as well as various interest
groups, are more skeptical ICPAC FINAL REPORT, supranote 1, at 264-72.
159. Working Group on the Interaction between Trade and Competition Policy, WTO, A
Multilateral Framework Agreement on Competition Policy, Communication from the
European Community and its Member States, WT/WGTCP/W/152 (Sept. 25, 2000), available
at http'/ldocsonline.wto.org/DDFDocuments/UtWT/WGTCP/W152.DOC; Working Group on
the Interaction between Trade and Competition Policy, WTO, The Development Dimension
of Competition Law and Policy, Communication from the European Community and its
Member States, WT/WGTCP/W/140 (June 8, 2000) (describing value of existing bilateral
relationships, but noting exclusion of developing countries), availableat http'//docsonline.
wto.org/DDFDocumentstVWT/WGTCP/Wl40.DOC; Working Group on the Interaction
Between Trade and Competition Policy, WTO, Report (1999), WT/WGTCP/3 (Oct. 11, 1999)
(describing limited ambit of bilateral agreements, and observing that "it was not feasible to
set up a bilateral agreement with every country, since in many cases very few business
transactions were involved"), available at http'//docsonline.wto.org/DDFDocumentstt/
WT/WGTCP/3.DOC; Working Group on the Interaction between Trade and Competition
Policy, WTO, Approaches to Promoting Cooperation and Communication among WTO
Members, Including in the Field of Technical Cooperation, Communication from the
European Community and its Member States, WT/WGTCP/W/129 (June 1, 1999) (same),
available at httpJ/docsonline.wto.org/DDFDocumentslt(VT/WGTCP/W129.DOC.
160. Communication From the European Community and its Member States to the
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Third, and finally, there is general agreement that national laws on
antitrust would not be displaced absent certain blatant flaws, such
as discrimination on the basis of nationality, 6 ' and that the
discretion of national authorities over individual enforcement
decisions would be preserved-including by recognizing that
positive comity could not be compelled to any degree greater than
at present. 162 Assuming that the discretion to enforce antitrust laws
is not simply inimical to international authority, 63 the general
consensus is that it should not in fact be curbed.
Working Group on the Interaction Between Trade and Competition Policy, The Contribution
of Competition Policy to Achieving the Objectives of the VTO, Including the Promotion of
International Trade, WT/WGTCP/W/130 (July 12, 1999) ("It is clear, for instance, that the
non-violation remedies of the WTO are not an appropriate means to address the interface
between competition law and market access."), available at http://docsonine.wto.orgJ
DDFDocumentst/WT/WGTCP/w130.doc. The need to differentiate between antitrust and
trade regimes was reemphasized in the recent announcement of the International
Competition Network: the ICN, the Assistant Attorney General forAntitrust stressed, would
not deal with trade or other non-antitrust issues, but would be "all antitrust, all the time."
Press Release, supra note 152 (quoting Charles A. James). Professor Guzman, however,
argues that substantive antitrust cooperation is most likely to be achieved if antitrust
principles can be negotiated in tandem with unrelated issues, permitting horse trading;,
because the WTO addresses a variety of issue areas and features a ready-made dispute
resolution system, he argues, it may be the ideal venue. Guzman, supranote 10, at 1545-46;
Guzman, supra note 26, at 1156-63.
161. A Multilateral Framework Agreement on Competition Policy, supra note 159
(describing proposed framework as "fully compatible with respect to differences in national
competition regimes"); The Contribution of Competition Policy to Achieving the Objectives
of the WTO, supranote 160 (emphasizing the need to "fullyrecognize differences in domestic
legal and institutional settings as well as levels of development").
162. Working Group on the 'Interaction between Trade and Competition Policy, WTO, A
WTO Competition Agreement and Development, Communication from the European
Community and its Member States, at 6, WT/WGTCP/W/175 (July 26, 2001), available at
http://docsonline.wto.org/DDRDocuments/tWT/WGTCP/W175.DOC; Brittan, supranote 2;
see also A Multilateral Framework Agreement on Competition Policy, supra note 159
(distinguishing between de jure discrimination by national law and de facto discrimination,
which "raises complex questions about the enforcement policies followed by competition
authorities, including how competition law is being applied to individual cases"); id.
(describing discretionary provisions for negative comity); id. (describing how, in response to
positive comity request from developing country, the "enforcement responsibility lies with
the country with primary jurisdiction over the anticompetitive practices in question and that
enforcement assistance would remain voluntary in nature, ... compatible with the
enforcement priorities, important interests and available resources of the requested

country").
163. But see Ignacio De Le6n, The DilemmaofRegulatinglnternationalCompetitionunder
the WTO System, 3 EUR. COMP. L. REV. 162, 172 (1997) (arguing that "by its very nature,
discretion associated to antitrust enforcement must always be excessive and arbitrary").
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Each of these themes-the development of a separate antitrust
community, the distinctiveness of antitrust, and the respect for
national sovereignty over antitrust regulation-bear on a proper
analysis of international antitrust. But they have been ignored by
contemporary advocacy for a customary international law of
antitrust.
II. THE LOCAL LIMITS TO ANTITRUST CUSTOM
A. The Rise and Fall of JudicialComity
The diplomatic and regulatory practices encouraged by bilateral
agreements continue a tradition with an important judicial
pedigree. The kernel of both traditional and positive comity may be
seen in Hilton v. Guyot,'6 in which the Supreme Court described
the comity to be accorded foreign judgments as
neither a matter of absolute obligation, on the one hand, nor of
mere courtesy and good will, upon the other. But it is the
recognition which one nation allows within its territory to the
legislative, executive, or judicial acts of another nation, having
due regard both to international duty and convenience, and to
the rights of its own citizens, or of other persons who are under
the protection of its laws.165
The highly subjective nature of these considerations, and the
difficult compromise they suggest between international and
domestic obligations, presaged the inconsistent course of comity in
the antitrust context. Justice Holmes's opinion in American
Banana,as previously noted, suggested that comity considerations
required strict territorial limits to U.S. jurisdiction. 68 An almost
deadlocked Permanent Court of International Justice indicated
later in the Lotus case that American Banana might have been
overly reticent in extending American authority,1 67 a permissive
approach that was incidentally reflected in Judge Hand's opinion in

164.
165.
166.
167.

159 U.S. 113 (1895).
Id. at 164.
American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347,356 (1909).
S.S. Lotus (Fr. v. Turk.), 1927 P.C.I.J. (Ser. A.) No. 9 (Sept. 7).
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Alcoa. 16 ' Like the Lotus decision, though, Alcoa also acknowledged
possible limits to that jurisdiction, and considered them relevant to
construing the Sherman Act. As Judge Hand observed, courts "are
not to read general words, such as those in [the Sherman] Act,
without regard to the limitations customarily observed by nations
upon the exercise of their powers; limitations which generally
correspond to those fixed by the 'Conflict of Laws.'"'69
The conflict of laws was not, however, a fixed beacon, and the
effects doctrine remained vulnerable to criticisms that it neglected
international considerations.170 In 1958, Kingman Brewster elaborated what he termed a "jurisdictional rule of reason," a set of
factors designed for prosecutorial and judicial consideration. 7 '
The basis for and derivation of those factors was unclear,'72 and
their application in the courts uncertain: judges were to apply
them to matters of liability and relief, rather than to strictly
jurisdictional matters, within the unspecified "limits of their
discretion." 7 ' Perhaps as a result, the jurisdictional rule of reason
168. United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945). The Lotus case
was more directly influential in the European Court of Justice's deliberations over whether
to recognize extraterritorial antitrust jurisdiction. The judgment was discussed at length by
Advocate General Darmon, who concluded that the effects doctrine was not inconsistentwith
international law. Opinion of the Advocate General, Cases 89, 104, 114, 116, 117 & 12529/85, A. AhlstromOsakeyhitov. Commission, 1998 E.C.R. 5193, [19881 C.M.L.R. 901,921-23
(1988), 4 Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 14,491 (1988). The Court of Justice did not itself cite
the judgment, nor did it go so far as the Advocate General in describing the potential reach
of Community jurisdiction.
169. Aluminum Co. ofAm., 148 F.2d at 443 ("Almost any limitation of the supply of goods
in Europe, for example, or in South America, may have repercussions in the United States
if there is trade between the two. Yet when one considers the international complications
likely to arise from an effort in this country to treat such agreements as unlawful, it is safe
to assume that Congress certainly did not intend the Act to cover them.").
170. E.g., BREWSTER, supra note 47, at 258, 445-46.
171. Id. at 446.
172. Professor Brewster explained that "[since there is no binding external authority to
which the United States has submitted these questions, any limitation, in the last analysis,
is self-imposed. In that sense, the decision to restrict jurisdiction is a matter of national
policy, not sovereign power." Id. at 287; see also David J. Gerber, Beyond Balancing:
InternationalLaw Restraintson the Reach ofNational Laws, 10 YALE J. INT'L L. 185,203 &
n.91 (1984) (observing that the jurisdictional rule of reason "was not based on normative
international law"). The particular factors were not, in any case, traced to any particular
international or domestic law, but instead were described as "essentially political"
considerations.
173. BREWSTER, supra note 47, at 446. Brewster was keenly aware of the problem of
limiting judicial discretion, and would have required that one or more additional factors be
present before any case might be brought or liability imposed, including a relationship to
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appears to have had little influence for nearly twenty years.174 The
initial Restatement of Foreign Relations Law more explicitly
asserted international law limits on the reach of U.S. legislation,175
but was equally slow to make an impression on courts. Although
the United States sometimes dismissed or otherwise truncated
actions based on foreign policy considerations,17 according to one
estimate, prior to 1973 "not one of the 248 foreign trade antitrust
actions brought by the Justice Department
was dismissed for lack
177
of subject matter jurisdiction."
1. Rise: Timberlane and the Restatement
Eventually, spurred by consideration of foreign interests in
analogous contexts 7 s and the evident political conflicts in antitrust
U.S. conduct, domestic initiative or direction, foreign conduct by Americans, or foreign
conduct by foreigners "explicitly aimed at and [with] the actual effect of restraining"
American trade. Id. at 446-48.
174. Brewster'sjurisdictionalapproachappearsnottohavebeencitedpriorto Timberlane.
Andreas F. Lowenfeld, PublicLaw in the InternationalArena:Conflict ofLaws, International
Law, and Some Suggestions for Their Interaction,163 RECUEIL DES COURS 311, 400 (1979)
("[Wiriting in the decade before the conflict of laws revolution in the United States, Brewster
was unable to persuade the legal profession either in the United States or abroad that what
he was talking about was real law, as contrasted with grace, diplomacy, good manners,
prosecutorial discretion, or similar concepts."); accord Dodge, supra note 39, at 128-29;
Gerber, supranote 172, at 203-04.
175. Section 40 of the first Restatement of Foreign Relations Law of the United
States-denominated Restatement (Second)-provided that where two states possessed
prescriptive jurisdiction, and their rules "require[d] inconsistent conduct upon the part of a
person," each state was "required by international law to consider, in good faith, moderating
the exercise of its enforcement jurisdiction." That exercise was to be conducted in light ofa
nonexclusive list of factors: (a) each state's "vital national interests"; (b) the "hardship that
inconsistent enforcement actions would impose upon the person; (c) "theextent to which the
required conduct is to take place in the territory of the other state; (d) the person's
nationality;, and (e) the likely efficacy of enforcement action in securing compliance.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 40 (1965)

[hereinafter RESTATEMENT (SECOND)].
176. See Meessen, supra note 51, at 795 ("As a result of ... negotiations [with foreign
governments], the U.S. Government discontinued antitrust suits (Petroleum, Uranium),
dropped plans for future actions (Petroleum), accepted limitations in orders on remedies
(Bulb,Nylon) and agreed to a settlement incorporated in the final decree (Petroleum,CRPL,
Swiss Watch)."); see also supratext accompanying note 52.
177. Timberline Lumber Co. v. Bank of Am. Nat'l Trust & Say. Ass'n, 549 F.2d 597, 608
n.12 (9th Cir. 1976) (citing WILBtR L. FUGATE, FOREIGN COMMERCE AND THE ANTITRUST
LAWS, app. B, at 498 (2d ed. 1973)).
178. E.g., Lauritzen v. Larsen, 345 U.S. 571 (1953). For an excellent discussion of the
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itself,"'7 9 American courts became more inclined to limit the severity

-ofextraterritorial antitrust. 8 ° The leading case was Timberlane,"8 '
which involved allegations that American and Honduran defendants had conspired with Honduran officials to prevent an American
company from milling Honduran lumber and exporting it to the
United States.'8 2 While the Ninth Circuit acknowledged that the
bare requisites for effects jurisdiction had been established, 8 ' it
noted Judge Hand's original suggestion that the Sherman Act
should be read in light of custom,1 4 and faulted intervening
decisions for having "fail[ed] to consider other nations' interests."' s
To the court, conflicts principles embedded in (if not precisely
defined by) customary international law8 6 required weighing
foreign and national interests affected by American jurisdiction.'8 7
relationship between antitrust comity analysis and the development ofmultilateralism in
conflicts of law, see Dodge, supra note 39, at 123-34.
179. See supra text accompanying notes 51-67.
180. They were not entirely alone. E.g., Barcelona Traction, Light & Power Co., Ltd. (Belg.
v. Spain), 1970 I.C.J. 4, 105 (separate opinion of Judge Fitzmaurice).
181. Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of America Natl Trust & Say. Ass'n, 549 F.2d 597
(9th Cir. 1976).
182. As the Ninth Circuit observed, the full "cast of characters" involved foreign and
American plaintiffs and defendants. Id. at 603-04.
183. Id. at 615.
184. Id. at 609-10,613 (quoting United States v. Aluminum Co. ofAm., 148 F.2d 416,443
(2d Cir. 1945)).
185. Timberlane, 549 F.2d at 611-12.
186. Compare id. at 609 (concluding that "it is evident that at some point the interests of
the United States are too weak and the foreign harmony incentive for restraint too strong
to justify an extraterritorial assertion of jurisdiction. What that point is or how it is
determined is not defined by international law."), with id. at 610-13 (citing criticisms of the
effects doctrine as inconsistent with international law and stating that a conflicts approach
is required by international norms).
187. These interests included:
[Tihe degree of conflict with foreign law or policy, the nationality or allegiance
of the parties and the locations or principal places of business of corporations,
the extent to which enforcement by either state can be expected to achieve
compliance, the relative significance ofeffects on the United States as compared
with those elsewhere, the extent to which there is explicit purpose to harm or
affect American commerce, the foreseeability of such effect, and the relative
importance to the violations charged of conduct within the United States as
compared with conduct abroad ....

Having assessed the conflict, the court

should then determine whether in the face of it the contacts and interests of the
United States are sufficient to support the exercise of extraterritorial
jurisdiction.
Id. at 614-15 (footnotes omitted).
The court noted comparable multifactor tests developed in Kingman Brewster's treatise
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Other courts followed suit,' and after an inauspiciously lengthy
remand, the Ninth Circuit dismissed the Timberlane complaint
largely due to a perceived conflict between U.S. law and conduct
permitted, or at most encouraged, by Honduran law.8 9
Amidst these decisions, the 1981 Tentative Draft No. 2 of the
revised Restatement of Foreign Relations Law," followed by the
Restatement (Third)ofForeignRelationsLaw in 1986, significantly
revised the American Law Institute's treatment of comity issues. 9 '
Even where one of the principal bases for prescriptive (regulatory)
jurisdiction otherwise existed, 19 2 new section 403 required that
its exercise be "reasonable"' 9 3 -not, the reporters' notes stressed,
merely as a basis for moderating enforcement actions, "but as an
essential element in determining whether, as a matter of inter194
national law, the state may exercise jurisdiction to prescribe."
Toward that end, section 403 articulated a list of factors not
dissimilar to those detailed in Timberlane,including the territorial
link to the activity, connections between the state and the persons
engaged in the activity or protected by the state's regulation, the
nature of the activity, any risk of unsettling expectations, the
importance of the regulation to the state and the international
community, and the interests of other nations in regulating the

and in the Restatement (Second)ofForeignRelations Law. Id. at 614 n.31.
188. Industrial Inv. Dev. Corp. v. Mitsui & Co., 671 F.2d 876, 884-85 (5th Cir. 1982),
vacated by 460 U.S. 1007 (1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 961 (1983); Montreal Trading Ltd. v.
Amax, Inc., 661 F.2d 864, 868-69 (10th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1001 (1982);
Mannington Mills, Inc. v. Congoleum Corp. 595 F.2d 1287, 1297-98 (3d Cir. 1979). In
ManningtonMills, the most noteworthy successorto Timberlane, the court detailed a slightly
different set ofconsiderations, and more clearly characterized comity as a matter ofjudicial
discretion. ManningtonMills, 595 F.2d at 1296-98.
189. Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of America, 749 F.2d 1378, 1384 (9th Cir. 1984)
(Timberlane 1), cert. denied, 472 U.S. 1032 (1985).
190. RESTATEMENT OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES (REVISED) § 403
(Tentative Draft No. 2, 1981).
191. RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 17, § 403 reporters' note 10.
192. Id. § 402.
193. Id.
194. Id. § 403 reporters' note 10. The note obscured the ambivalence of the Restatement
(Third)toward equating reasonableness with comity, and comity with international law.
Introductory commentary stressed the distinction between international law and comity, id.
§ 101 cmt. e, and the reasonableness standard in section 403 was intended to be distinct from
comity, which the drafters thought was too easily conceived of as nonlegal in nature, id. § 403
cmt. a.
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activity, including the likelihood of conflict with existing regulations.1 95

Even while section 403 was being readied, the D.C. Circuit's
Laker Airways decision sounded a prominent dissent."' Laker, a
British airline, had initiated a Sherman Act action against U.S.,
British, and other foreign companies, but had been frustrated by an
English court order (enforcing government blocking orders) that
enjoined Laker to dismiss the British companies from the suit. 97
Laker then obtained an antisuit injunction to prevent U.S. and
third-country airlines from availing themselves of similar relief. 98
In affirming, Judge Wilkey's majority opinion concluded that

195. Formally.
(a) the link of the activity to the territory ofthe regulating state, Le., the extent
to which the activity takes place within the territory, or has substantial, direct,
and foreseeable effect upon or in the territory;
(b) the connections, such as nationality, residence, or economic activity,
between the regulating state and the person principally responsible for the
activity to be regulated, or between that state and those whom the regulation
is designed to protect;
(c) the character of the activity to be regulated, the importance of regulation to
the regulating state, the extent to which other states regulate such activities,
and the degree to which the desirability of such regulation is generally
accepted;
(d)the existence ofjustified expectations that might be protected or hurt by the
regulation;
(e) the importance of the regulation to the international political, legal, or
economic system;
() the extent to which the regulation is consistent with the traditions of the
international system;
(g) the extent to which another state may have an interest in regulating the
activity;, and
(h) the likelihood of conflict with regulation by another state.
Id § 403.
As noted below, the Restatement also includes a provision specific to antitrust jurisdiction.
Id. § 415; see infra text accompanying notes 219, 279.
196. Laker Airways Ltd. v. Sabena, Belgian World Airlines, 731 F.2d 909 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
Other courts had earlier refused to decide whether to follow Timberlane. E.g., O.N.E.
Shipping Ltd. v. Flota Mercante Grancolumbiana, 830 F.2d 449, 452 (2dCir. 1987) (declining
to address Timberlane's comity analysis, and resolving jurisdiction on other grounds);
National Bank of Canada v. Interbank Card Ass'n, 666 F.2d 6,8 (2d Cir. 1981) (same); In re
Uranium Antitrust Litig., 617 F.2d 1248,1255-56 (7th Cir. 1980) (holding that district court
assertion of jurisdiction did not abuse its discretion, without determining whether
Timberlane or Mannington Mills constituted circuit law).
197. Laker Airways Ltd., 731 F.2d at 917-18.
198. Id at 918-19.

20011

LOCAL LAW OF GLOBAL ANTITRUST

677

congressionally conferred jurisdiction ought not be refused, 99
even if that meant that more than one nation might assert the
authority to regulate the conduct in question.20 0 The opinion
rejected interest balancing as inappropriate and indeterminate
judicial second-guessing of political branch determinations,
emphasizing the ongoing, confidential negotiations between the
U.S. and British governments concerning the dispute 2 0 -- and the
impropriety of substituting bilateral judicial negotiation of such
issues. 2 Judge Wilkey noted, almost in passing, that there was
no legal obligation for courts to muddy themselves with comity,
absent "evidence that interest balancing represents a rule of
international law," comity was not mandatory, "since Congress
cannot be said to have implicitly legislated subject to these
international constraints."' 3 Alluding to the critical commentary on
Timberlane,ManningtonMills, and the Restatement (Third),2 4 and
confident that balancing's difficulties were insuperable, Judge
Wilkey predicted that the doctrine "has not gained more than a
temporary foothold in domestic law.""5

199. Id. at 945-46, 949, 954 & n.175.
200. Id. at 951-52. As Professor Dodge recounts, Judge Wilkey's demands that the
possibility of concurrent jurisdiction be acknowledged were influential in the revision of
Restatement (Third) section 403(3), though that in turn produced some tension with the
balancing approach in section 403(2). Dodge, supranote 39, at 132-34.
201. LakerAirways Ltd., 731 F.2d at 944-46.
202. Id. at 953 ("It is impossible in this case, with all the good will manifested by the
English Justices and ourselves, to negotiate an extraordinarily long arms-length agreement
on the respective impact of our countries' policies regulating anti-competitive business
practices.").
203. Id. at 950.
204. Id. at 950 & nn.153-54. For contemporary criticisms, see, for example, Dunfee &
Friedman, supra note 39; James M. Grippando, Declining to Exercise Extraterritorial
Antitrust Jurisdictionon Grounds ofInternationalComity: An IllegitimateExtensionof the
JudicialAbstentionDoctrine,23 VA. J. INT'LL. 395 (1983); Steven A Kadish, Comity and the
InternationalApplicationOfThe ShermanAct:Encouragingthe Courtsto Enterthe Political
Arena, 4 N.W. J. INTIL L. & BUS. 130 (1982); Harold G. Maier, ExtraterritorialJurisdiction
At A Crossroad:An Intersection Between PublicAnd PrivateInternationalLaw, 76 AM. J.
INT'L L. 280 (1982); Harold G. Maier, Interest BalancingAndExtraterritorialJurisdiction,
31 AM. J. COMP. L. 579 (1983); Harold G. Maier, Resolving ExtraterritorialJurisdiction,or
'There And BackAgain," 25 VA. J. INT'LL. 7 (1984); Meessen, supra note 51; James A. Rahl,
InternationalApplication ofAmericanAntitrustLaws: Issues and Proposals,2 N.W. J.INTML
L. &BUS. 336,362-64 (1980). For discussion ofthe U.S. government appraisal, see infratext
accompanying notes 268-70.
205. LakerAirways Ltd., 731 F.2d at 950.
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2. Fall: Hartford Fire
Less than a decade later, the Supreme Court appeared to
vindicate Judge Wilkey. HartfordFire.8 involved a suit by private
plaintiffs and nineteen states against domestic and foreign
insurance and reinsurance companies that had allegedly conspired
to restrict insurance coverage-including by dint of an agreement
among London-based reinsurers to offer reinsurance to American
companies only on jointly agreed terms."' A five-member majority,
in an opinion by Justice Souter, held that the conduct satisfied the
effects doctrine, 08 then made short work of the London reinsurers'
argument that claims against them were barred by international
comity: assuming "a court may decline to exercise Sherman Act
jurisdiction over foreign conduct," any such argument failed because
British insurance
regulations did not compel the violation of U.S.
29
antitrust law.
For many, Hartford Fire both confirmed American effects
jurisdiction and ended international comity.210 If so, the coup de
gr6ace was bizarrely indirect. None of Judge Wilkey's trenchant
criticisms were even mentioned. Instead, the majority appeared
to follow Justice Scalia's dissent in blithely equating the
Restatement (Third)"reasonableness" test with any comity-based
restrictions on U.S. jurisdiction,2 11 then proceeded to misapply that
206. Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764 (1993).
207. Id. at 770-79.
208. Id. at 796.
209. Id. at 798-99.
210. E.g., Roger P. Alford, The ExtraterritorialApplication
ofAntitrustLaws:APostscript
on Hartford Fire Insurance Co. v. California, 34 VA. J. INT'LL. 213,214 (1993) (claimingthat
"the United States has followed the European Union in adopting an approach that fails to
accord due respect to legitimate foreign sovereigntyinterests except in the (unusual) instance
of a 'true conflict between foreign and domestic laws"); Scott A. Burr, TheApplicationofU.S.
Antitrust Law to Foreign Conduct: Has Hartford Fire Extinguished Considerations of
Comity?, 15 U. PA. J. INT'L Bus. L. 221,222-23 (1994) (asserting that "[tihe notion of comity
was swept away"); Waller, supra note 82, at 564-65 (describing HartfordFire as "deal[ing]
comity a near death blow"). But see, e.g., infra notes 466-69 (describing potential loopholes
in HartfordFire).
211. The majority assumed, without deciding, that international comity might somehow
affect the existence or exercise of jurisdiction, and turned without explanation to the
Restatement (Third). HartfordFire, 509 U.S. at 798-99. Justice Scalia was more direct, as
befitting his conclusion that jurisdiction was lacking, but nevertheless appeared to endorse
using the Restatement (Third) largely because it would be harmless. Id. at 818 (Scalia, J.,
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test.212 By the majority's lights, the effects doctrine delimited
subject matter and prescriptive jurisdiction, leaving only the
question of whether the court should for some reason decline.213
As Justice Scalia noted in dissent, this was a questionable
understanding of jurisdictional doctrine,214 and inconsistent
with the traditional interpretive presumptions against extraterritoriality and against conflicts with international law;215 it was

also inconsistent with the Restatement (Third)'s framing of
reasonableness as a decisive jurisdictional question,216 and placed
its application in the worst possible posture.217
The majority's narrow understanding of the conflicts occasioning consideration of comity-that is, only those where a person
is subject to two irreconcilable requirements 21 -- was even more
dissenting) ("I shall rely on the Restatement (Third) for the relevant principles of
international law. Its standards appear fairly supported in the decisions of this Court
construing international choice-of-law principles (Lauritzen,Romero, and McCulloch) and
in the decisions of other federal courts, especially Timberlane."). He then argued that
whether the Restatement approach "precisely reflects international law in every detail
matters little here," as any standard would bar prescriptive jurisdiction under the
circumstances. Id.
212. That is not to say, however, that Justice Scalia's contrary conclusion, that section
403(2)'s factors clearly counseled against applying the Sherman Act, id. at 818-19 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting), was above reproach. See Dodge, supranote 39, at 141-42.
213. HartfordFire,509 U.S. at 795-97.
214. See Kramer, supra note 50, at 750 n.3 (suggesting that the majority and dissent
applied different interpretations of"subjectmatterjurisdiction"). CompareHartfordFire,509
U.S. at 797 n.24 (stating that the effects doctrine precludes figuring comity concerns into a
jurisdictional analysis), with id. at 817-18 & n.9 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing that the
majority had misinterpreted the type of comity at issue).
215. HartfordFire,509 U.S. at 814 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citing EEOC v. Arabian Am.
Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244,248 (1991)); id. at 814-15 (citing Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy,
6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 118 (1804)); see also id. at 817-18 ("Considering comity in this way is
just part of determining whether the Sherman Act prohibits the conduct at issue.").
216. Id. at 818-19 (Scalia, J., dissenting). TheRestatement(Third)specificallyavoids using
the term "subject matter jurisdiction," RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 17, § 401 cmt. c,
but does tentatively distinguish between the jurisdiction to prescribe and the jurisdiction to
adjudicate, id. § 401, and describes comity as relevant to the former, id. § 403. See also id.
§ 403 cmt. g (advocating construing U.S. statutes in conformity with sections 402 and 403,
as well as international and foreign law).
217. See Dam, supranote 130, at 309-10. Indeed, the Court's view that prescriptive and
subject-matter jurisdictionunderthe Sherman Actwere co-extensive, HartfordFire, 509 U.S.
at 796 n.22, coupled with its views regarding its extraterritorial prescriptive reach, strongly
imply that courts would be violating congressional intent in bowing to comity concerns.
218. Hartford Fire,509 U.S. at 799 (holding that "[nlo conflict exists ... 'where a person
subject to regulation by two states can comply with the laws of both.'") (quoting
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puzzling. As Justice Scalia argued, the majority "completely
misinterpreted" the only support it cited,2 19 a comment to section
403 that patently applied only to conflicts analyzed under
subsection 403(3), and which left the multifactored "reasonableness" test of subsection 403(2) to govern cases like Hartford
Fire.220 The upshot was that international comity offered little
beyond the foreign compulsion defense, which the Restatement
(Third)addressed elsewhere. 2 ' The interesting question, though,
is not whether the majority was wrong in construing the
Restatement (Third)-itplainly was-but whether that misreading
mattered. One cause for doubt concerns the way the world had
changed even since Timberlane.While the growth in antitrust codes
and their application to foreign conduct increased the potential for
disputes, the growing acceptance of extraterritorial jurisdiction
tended to diminish any basis for principled objection.22 2
More significantly, antitrust enforcers were increasingly internalizing the reasonableness norm and supplanting the role of
RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supranote 17, § 403 cmt. e).
219. E.g., id. at 821 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
220. The majority's mistake was difficult to make. First, the relied-upon comment e,
rendered in full, began by stating that " [ilt"-plainly, in context, subsection 403(3), governing
instances in which more than one state could reasonably exercise jurisdiction--"does not
apply where a person subject to regulation by two states can comply with the laws of both."
RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supranote 17, § 403 cmt. e; see alsoAndreas F. Lowenfeld, Conflict,
Balancing of Interests, and the Exercise of Jurisdiction to Prescribe: Reflections on the
Insurance Antitrust Case, 89 AM. J.INTLL. 42,49-50 (1995). Second, the verynext sentence
in comment e concludes that "ft]hose situations aregoverned by Subsection (2), but do not
constitute conflict within Subsection (3)." RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 17 § 403 cnt.
e (emphasis added). Third, section 403(1) states comprehensively that "a state may not
exercise jurisdiction to prescribe law with respect to a person or activity having connections
with another state when the exercise of such jurisdiction is unreasonable," without hinting
that matters falling within subsection (3) are exempt from analysis. Id. § 403(1). Fourth,
subsection (3) expressly applies only "[wihen it would not be unreasonable for each of two
states to exercise jurisdiction over a person or activity," which again adverts to subsection
(2). Id. § 403(3). Fifth, the majority's path to subsection (3), and past subsection (2), stemmed
from its reliance on commentj to section 415, see HartfordFire,509 U.S. at 799, but section
415's commentary makes clear that "[any exercise of jurisdiction under this section is
subject to the requirement ofreasonableness" as articulated in section 403(2). RESTATEMENT
(THIRD), supranote 17, § 415 cmt. a; see also HartfordFire,509 U.S. at 821 n.l (Scalia, J.,
dissenting). Finally, as indicated in the text, the result of the Court's rule, which made
international comity coterminous with the foreign compulsion defense, should have triggered
doubts that it was correctly reading the Restatement.
221. RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 17, § 403 cmt. e (citing §§ 441, 442).
222. E.g., Waller, supranote 82, at 575.
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courts. In the United States, for example, the enforcement agencies'
guidelines came to endorse comity considerations very much like
those indicated by the Restatement (Third)and by Timberlane,2
including "full account of comity factors beyond whether there is a
conflict with foreign law"-a test manifestly broader than that
taken in Hartford Fire."4 The agencies stressed that this more
deferential approach was purely a matter for their judgment, 2" or
223. The 1995 Guidelines provided that those factors might include:
(1)the relative significance to the allegedviolation of conduct within the United
States, as compared to conduct abroad; (2) the nationality of the persons
involved in or affected by the conduct; (3) the presence or absence of a purpose
to affect U.S. consumers, markets, or exporters; (4) the relative significance and
foreseeability of the effects of the conduct on the United States as compared to
the effects abroad; (5) the existence of reasonable expectations that would
be furthered or defeated by the action; (6) the degree of conflict with foreign law
or articulated foreign economic policies; (7) the extent to which the enforcement
activities of another country with respect to the same persons, including
remedies resulting from those activities, may be affected; and (8) the
effectiveness of foreign enforcement as compared to U.S. enforcement action.
1995 International Guidelines, supranote 48, § 3.2.
The U.S. brief in the HartfordFire litigation recommended for judicial consideration not
only the first six of the above factors, which were the entire roster of considerations
contained inthe 1988 Guidelines, but also those enumeratedin Timberlane.See Brief for the
United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondents, Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v.
California, 509 U.S. 764 (1993) (Nos. 91-1111, 91-1128). It specifically cautioned against
applying, however, the sixth factor of the ManningtonMiUs test, the "[p]ossible effect upon
foreign relations if the court exercises jurisdiction and grants relief," which it regarded as
intruding into political branch prerogatives. Amicus Curiae Brief at 26 n.23, HartfordFire
(Nos. 91-1111,91-1128) (quoting Mannington Mills, Inc. v. Congoleum Corp., 595 F.2d 1287,
1292,1297). It differed for similar reasons, and on vagueness grounds, with two ofthe factors
suggested by section 403(2Xe), "the importance ofthe regulation to the international political,
legal or economic system," and section 403(2)(f), "the extent to which the regulation is
consistent with the traditions of the international system." Id. (quoting RESTATEMENT
(THIRD), supranote 17, § 403(2)).
224. 1995 International Guidelines, supranote 48, § 3.2 &n.72 (citingHiltonv. Guyot, 159
U.S. 113, 164 (1895)); see also infra text accompanying notes 436-40.
225. 1995 International Guidelines, supra note 48, § 3.2 ("T7he Department does not
believe that it is the role ofthe courts to 'second-guess the executive branch's judgment as
to the proper role of comity concerns under these circumstances.') (quoting United States
v. Baker Hughes, Inc., 731 F. Supp. 3, 6 n.5 (D.D.C. 1990), afl'd, 908 F.2d 981 (D.C. Cir.
1990)); seealso Memorandum ofPoints andAuthorities in Support of PlaintiffUnited States'
Opposition to Defendants' Motion to Dismiss at 19, United States v. LSL Biotechnologies,
Inc., (D. Ariz. 2001) (No. CV-00-529-TUC-RCC) ("This litigation does not raise judicially
cognizable issues ofinternational comity, because it is an enforcement action brought by the
United States.... [Qince the Executive Branch has determined that the interests of U.S. law
enforcement outweigh anydetrimentto our foreign relations, separation ofpowers principles
dictate that the court should not second guess the Executive with its own international
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at most subject to discussion with foreign authorities with
reciprocal obligations.' 6 Not incidentally, positive comity provisions
also increasingly offered an alternative to the assertion of U.S.
jurisdiction, thereby obviating any need to apply judicialized
notions of comity."'
In this light, criticisms of HartfordFire as "swimming against a
rising tide of cooperation in international antitrust enforcement," 2"
or leaving the strictest nation's laws to govern global business
activities,,2 seem like exercises in misdirection: the rising tide of
international cooperation should change the complexion of the cases
reaching the courts, and negate the need for any heroic measures
on their parts. In Professor Trimble's words:
The result is a triumph for governmental regulation of anticompetitive behavior. Extraterritdrial application ofcompetition
comity determination."); see also infra text accompanying notes 270-76.
The Guidelines are relatively agnostic as to the deference owed comity determinations by
the FTC, which lies outside the executive branch. 1995 International Guidelines, supranote
48, § 3.2 & n.78 ("To date, no Commission cases have presented the issue of the degree of
deference that courts should give to the Commission's comity decisions.'); cf In re
International Ass'n of Conference Interpreters, No. 9270,1995 FTC LEXIS 452, at *10 (Feb.
15, 1995) (order denying motion to certify interlocutory appeal) (noting that FTC
"presumably"considered comity issues when it issued complaint, and that"[t]here is no basis
in this record for the Commission to conclude on the basis of comity considerations that its
recent decision to issue a complaint in this matter was mistaken'). The Guidelines are also
agnostic as to comity considerations in private antitrust actions-though the latter are
plainly addressed by HartfordFire. 1995 International Guidelines, supra note 48, § 3.2 ("It
is important also to note that in disputes between private parties, many courts are willing
to undertake a comity analysis.") (citing Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank ofAmerica, 549
F.2d 597 (9th Cir. 1976)); see also Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of
Plaintiff United States' Opposition to Defendants' Motion to Dismiss at 19, United States v.
LSL Biotechnologies, Inc., (D. Ariz. 2001) (No. CV-00-529-TUC-RCC) (conceding that"it may
at times be appropriate for courts to apply international comity analysis to litigation between
private parties').
226. The Guidelines note that "in determiningwhetherto assertjurisdiction to investigate
or bring an action, or to seek particular remedies in a given case, each Agency takes into
account whether significant interests of any foreign sovereign would be affected," and
footnote the agencies' obligation to take into account the legitimate interests of foreign
nations "in accordance with the recommendations of the OECD and various bilateral
agreements." 1995 International Guidelines, supranote 48, § 3.2 & n.73.
227. Pitofsky, supranote 1, at 408.
228. Alford, supra note 210, at 230; see also Robert D. Shank, The JusticeDepartment's
Recent Antitrust Enforcement Policy: Toward A "PositiveComity" Solutionto International
CompetitionProblems?,29 VAND. J.TRANSNAT'L L. 155, 185 (1986).
229. See Guzman, supra note 10, at 1532-33.
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law has been legitimated. Domestic courts will not play the role
of diplomats or international arbitrators. The unquestionable
significant conflicts of policy must be worked out by legislators
and diplomats, in the overall public interest."0

As we have seen, however, there are substantial reasons to doubt
the sufficiency of regulatory comity. Bilateral cooperation directly
addresses only a limited group of nations, and leaves national
laws-including the assignment of enforcement authority to unregulated parties-apparently unaffected. The question remains
whether HartfordFire,in permitting such a state of affairs, really
erred-since misconstruingtheRestatement (Third)and permitting
U.S. laws to be enforced are not self-evident legal errors. While
some lower courts continued to adhere to the reasonableness
approach notwithstanding HartfordFire,"' they never addressed
whether that test really had a legal basis in the first place.

230. Trimble, supra note 128, at 57; accord Waller, supranote 82, at 566-68.
231. The Ninth Circuit more or less defiantly applied the traditional Timberlane factors
in Metro Industries,Inc. v. Sammi Corp., 82 F.3d 839 (9th Cir. 1996), notwithstanding the
absence of a "true" conflict in Hartford Fire terms between Korean intellectual property
rights and U.S. antitrust law. Id. at 846 & n.5 ("While Hartford Fire Ins. overruled our
holding in TimberlaneH that a foreign government's encouragement of conduct which the
United States prohibits would amount to a conflict of law, it did not question the propriety
of the jurisdictional rule of reason or the seven comity factors set forth in Timberlane I").
The court nonetheless wound up summarily rejecting the comity defense. Id. at 847; see also
Filetech S.A. v. France Telecom S.A., 157 F.3d 922, 932 (2d Cir. 1998) (noting, in reversing
on other grounds, that the district court had applied a comity analysis without having found
a"true conflict" within the meaning ofHartfordFire),rev'g 978 F. Supp. 464 (S.D.N.Y. 1997);
Trugman-Nash, Inc. v. New Zealand Dairy Bd., 954 F. Supp. 733, 736 (S.D.N.Y. 1997)
(finding "actual and material conflict" between New Zealand Dairy Board regulations
relating to cheese exports and U.S. antitrust law, and proceeding to decline jurisdiction after
full analysis of Timberlane factors), rev'g upon reconsideration 942 F. Supp. 905, 913
(S.D.N.Y. 1996) (finding absence of'sufficient conflict for purposes of HartfordFire).Formore
straightforward applications, see United States v. Nippon PaperIndustries Co., 109 F.3d 1
(1st Cir. 1997), holding, in criminal prosecution of extraterritorial conduct, that "comity
concerns would operate to defeat the exercise ofjurisdiction only in those few cases in which
the law of the foreign sovereign required a defendant to act in a manner incompatible with
the Sherman Act or in which full compliance with both statutory schemes was impossible."
Id. at 8.
Other cases outside the antitrust contexthave continued to apply a broader understanding
of comity, arguably on bases that might lend themselves to antitrust matters as well. E.g.,
Sterling Drug, Inc. v. Bayer AG, 14 F.3d 733 (2d Cir. 1994) (trademark); Evergreen Marine
Corp. v. Welgrow Intl, Inc., 954 F. Supp. 101 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (contract action); In re Maxwell
Communication Corp., 186 B.R. 807 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1995).

684

WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 43:627

B. Reasonableness and the Perilsof Universalism
As discussed in Part IV, HartfordFire presented the Supreme
Court with the opportunity to focus on a very particular question
ofcustomary international law-namely, its application to antitrust
actions maintained by private and state attorneys general. But the
comity principle as framed by the Court was much broader,
applying not only to all invocations of antitrust jurisdiction, but
potentially to all exercises of judicial power. 2 This broader
question continues to occupy critics and defenders of the Court's
decision alike. The Court's critics insist that it misunderstood the
provisions ofthe Restatement(Third)it professed to apply. Hartford
Fire's defenders rarely take direct issue,"' but instead argue that
no harm was done, because the Restatement (Third) did not depict

232. Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764,798 (1993) ("The only substantial
question in this litigation is whether there is in fact a true conflict between domestic and
foreign law.) (quoting Socidt6 Nationale Industrielle Aerospatialev. United States Dist. Ct.,
482 U.S. 522, 555 (1987) (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)).
Aerospatiale was not an antitrust case, but involved a private personal injury suit, and
comity was invoked as a ground for requiring that plaintiffs resort to the Hague Evidence
Convention before exploring alternative means ofobtaining discovery.Aerospatiale, 482 U.S.
at 525, 528. In demurring, the Supreme Court stressed the need for subtle, particularized
applications of comity, id. at 543-44, and cited an altogether different section of the
Restatement (Third)as describing the relevant factors in the discovery context, id. at 544
n.28. The HartfordFire majority relied solely on Justice Blackmun's concurrence. Hartford
Fire,509 U.S. at 768.
233. But see, e.g., 1 HAWK, supra note 42, at 148.2 (asserting that "[tihe Supreme Court
certainly reached the appropriate result"). Professor Trimble goes further, claiming that
"[tihe Souter majority did not refuse to apply international law. It simply declined to apply
section 403." Trimble, supranote 128, at 56. But this seems backwards: the majority did not
"declineD to apply section 403'--it tried to apply the section, but failed to do so properly.
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customary
international law234 or even its understanding by U.S.
23 5
courts.

The criticism is an important one and persuasive in many
respects. As I explain in the following subsection, the reasonableness standard is indeed difficult to defend in terms of the
conventional criteria for customary international law. In the second
subsection, though, I argue that the standard's real flaws lie more
in its unnecessary election of a universal method for making claims
about custom. This approach is itself customary, but examining its
deficiencies helps us appreciate the benefits of approaching the
question of international antitrust in an entirely different way.
1. Reasonablenessas Customary InternationalLaw
The criteria for customary international law are notoriously
unsettled, 6 but most would require "a general practice accepted as
law,"237 or in Restatement (Third) terms, "a general and consistent
234. CompareRESTATEMENT(THD), supranote 17, § 403 cmt. a ("This section states the
principle of reasonableness as a rule of international law."), with Dodge, supra note 39, at
137 (arguing that, in light of nonobligatory nature of section 403, "whether Justice Souter
or Justice Scalia has the better reading of the Restatement (Third) is largely beside the
point"), and id. at 139-42 (elaborating on the Restatement (Third)'s departure from
international law and commenting on Justice Scalia's HartfordFire opinion), and Stephen
B. Burbank et al., Case Two: ExtraterritorialApplication of United States Law Against
United States and Alien Defendants (ShermanAct), 29 NEW ENG. L. REV. 577, 591 (1995)
(arguing, in judicial guise, that "few people other than those who drafted the relevant
sections of the Restatement (Third) ... believe that section 403 states rules of customary
international law"), and Trimble, supra note 128, at 53 ("The Court correctly applied the
customary international law of prescriptive jurisdiction."), and id. at 55 ([Tlhere is no such
general practice and hence no customary international law like that advanced in section
403."), and David B. Massey, Note, How the American Law Institute Influences Customary
Law: The ReasonablenessRequirementofthe Restatement ofForeignRelationsLaw,22 YALE
J. INVL L. 419, 428-37 (1997) (arguing that section 403 did not reflect customary
international law). As explained elsewhere, this perception has dogged section 403 from its
inception. See, e.g., supra text accompanying notes 204, 230; infra text accompanying note
256.
235. Compare RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supranote 17, § 403 cmt. a ("Some United States
courts have applied the principle of reasonableness as a requirement of comity, that term
being understood not merely as an act of discretion and courtesy but as reflecting a sense of
obligation among states."), with Massey, supranote 234, at 434-37 (arguing that U.S. courts
predominately considered comity a matter of judicial discretion, rather than customary
international law).
236. See generallyBROWNIE, supra note 32, at 3-11.
237. Statute of the International Court of Justice, art. 38(b), in DOCUMENTS ON THE
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practice of states followed by them from a sense of legal
obligation."" 8 By its own standard, can the Restatement (Third)
depiction of reasonableness as a limit on prescriptive jurisdiction
-- or its variants in Timberlane and kindred cases-be regarded as
international law? This was oddly free of controversy in Hartford
Fire. As noted above, Justice Scalia assumed the Restatement
(Third) test was substantially authoritative on the content of
international law, and Justice Souter's opinion for the majority
seemed to concede the point. 9
The Restatement (Third) was not plowing new ground in
supposing that customary international law imposed some limit
on the effects doctrine.240 The closely contested Lotus decision was
neither unequivocal nor the last word on extraterritoriality, 241 and
INTERNATIONAL COURT OFJUSTICE 61, 79 (Shabatai Rosenne ed., 1979). Literally, article 38

describes "international custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as law," id., but
it might better be said that general practice is the evidence of custom, G.M. DANILENKO,
LAW-MAKING IN THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY 76 (1993).
238. RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supranote 17, § 102(2). Common to both approaches is some
emphasis on state motivation, or opiniojuriset necessitatis.The function of opiniojuris is
often disputed, but most agree that some showing of perceived obligation is necessary. See
BROWNLIE, supra note 32, at 7-9; O.A. ELIAS & C.L. LIM, THE PARADOX OF CONSENSUALISM
IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 22 (1998). But see supra note 32 (citing examples of contrary views).
239. See supra note 211 (citing majority and dissenting opinions). In Aerospatiale, in
contrast, the Court noted uncertainty on the then-new Restatement's authority on comity's
application to discoverymatters. Socit6 Nationale Industrielle Aerospatiale v. United States
Dist. Ct., 482 U.S. 522, 544 n.28 (1987) (noting "that § 437 of the Restatement may not
represent a consensus of international views on the scope of the district court's power to
order foreign discovery in the face of objections by foreign states," but finding its factors
probative).
240. E.g., BROWNLIE, supra note 32, at 312 ("The American courts, the United States
government, and foreign governments in reacting to American measures assume that there
are certainlimits to enforcement jurisdiction but there is no consensus on what those limits
are."); OSCARScHACETER, INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THEORYAND PRACTICE 250 (1991) ("There
is no dissent from the general proposition that public international law sets limits on the
authority of States to legislate, adjudicate and enforce its [sic] domestic law."); Carlyn Maw,
United States Antitrust Law Abroad-The Enduring Problem of Extraterritoriality,40
ANTITRUST L.J. 796, 799 (1970-71) ("It is generally agreed ... that there are limits under
international law beyond which states may not go in prescribing rules for conduct within the
territorial boundaries of other states. Agreement is lacking, however, as to where the line
should be drawn.").
241. Cf F.A. Mann, The Doctrine of InternationalJurisdictionRevisited After Twenty
Years, 186 RECUEIL DES COuRS 9, 33 (1984) (arguing that "[e]ven the discredited majority
opinion in the Lotus case recognized some limits of a State's legislative jurisdiction," and that
"[s]ince then more than 50 years have expired," during which time "international law has not
stood still").
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the pivotal American decisions establishingthe effects doctrine (not
to mentionAmerican Banana)also indicated that international law
might be reflected in the congressional assignment of antitrust
jurisdiction to the courts.242
But these authorities conspicuously refrained from saying where
the line should be drawn," a task the Restatement (Third)-like
Timberlane before it-then assumed. The Restatement (Third)
began by distancing its approach from comity. As the commentary
indirectly acknowledged, 2" comity sometimes meant something
other than law; the Supreme Court had described comity as
"neither a matter of absolute obligation ... nor of mere courtesy and

good will,"" and contemporary discussion usually treated comity
as closer to the courtesy end of the spectrum.2 4' The possible
242. United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416,443-44 (2d Cir. 1945).
243. In his separate opinion in Barcelona Traction, Judge Fitzmaurice confessed that
there generailywere no "hardand fast rules" restrictingnationaljurisdiction, and that states
had "wide discretion"; while international law did "postulate the existence of limits," it might
be "in any given case ... for the tribunal to indicate what these are for the purposes of that
case." Barcelona Traction, Light & Power Co., Ltd. (Belg. v. Spain), 1970 I.C.J. 3, 105
(separate opinion of Judge Fitzmaurice).
244. RESTATEMENT(THIRD), supranote 17, § 403 cmt. a ("Some United States courts have
applied the principle of reasonableness as a requirement of comity, that term being
understood not merely as an act of discretion and courtesy but as reflecting a sense of
obligation among states. This section states the principle of reasonableness as a rule of
international law.").
245. Hiltonv. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 163-64 (1895); see also Socidt6 Nationale Industrielle
Aerospatiale v. United States Dist. Ct., 482 U.S. 522, 543 n.27 (1987) (describing comity as
"the spirit of cooperation) (citing Emory v. Grenough, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 369, 370 n.1 (1797)
(referring to "the courtesy of nations")).
246. E.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 17, § 101 cmt. e (noting various approaches
to comity, butpurportingto distinguish it from internationallaw); MichaelAkehurst, Custom
as a Source of InternationalLaw, 47 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 1, 33 (1974-75) (explaining that
"opiniojurisis... needed in order to distinguish legal obligations from non-legal obligations,
such as obligations derived from considerations of morality, courtesy or comity"); Michael
Akehurst, Jurisdictionin InternationalLaw, 46 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 145, 214-16 (1972-73)
(claiming that ordinary, but not exclusive, usage is inconsistent with regarding comity as a
matter of legal obligation); Peter MacAlister-Smith, Comity, in 1 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC
INTERNATIONAL LAW 671 (Rudolph Bernhardt ed., 1992) ("By definition, the rules of comity
lack a legal nature."); id. at 672 (claiming that "[s]ince a rule of comity does not involve a
legal obligation, its non-observance produces no legal consequences"); id. at 672 (citing
"misleadingH" use of comity "as a synonym for international law," but giving "[n]o further
consideration... to any of these variants"); Gerber, supranote 172, at 205 ("Although the
concept of comity has had a variety of meanings, it is now generally considered to be little
more than an exhortationto neighborliness,' withno specific content andno binding effect.");
Harold G. Maier, ExtraterritorialJurisdictionat a Crossroads:An Intersection Between
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reasons bear closely on the Restatement (Third)'s enterprise. For
one, nations frequently speak and behave as though comity is
not obligatory. Even if we are not strict about requiring that
nations describe their behavior as legally compelled,1 7 and avoid
attributing too much significance to signs of disobedience," there
is abundant evidence that comity is sometimes used to mean
something other than law.249
A second problem is that comity's terms, if assumed in principle
to be mandatory, employ a nondeterminative means for answering
determinative jurisdictional questions. In any given dispute, each
side will likely be able to invoke comity on its behalf; any principle
capable of providing succor so generously, it may be argued, lacks
legality."0 Justice Scalia's attempt in his HartfordFire dissent to
Public and PrivateInternationalLaw, 76 AM. J. INT'L L. 280,283 (1982) (explaining that a
political notion of comity "represents modem American judicial and scholarly usage and is
reflected in many of the more recent transnational regulation cases"); Paul, supranote 22
passim (arguing at length that comity, as employed in theRestatement (Third),misconceives
discretionary limits as legal); Don Wallace, Jr., ExtraterritoriolJurisdiction,15 L. & POLy
INT'LBus. 1099,1106 (1983) ('[C] ourts, too, are asked to limit U.S. jurisdiction by employing
the doctrine of'comity,' a soft doctrine if ever there was one. Indeed, it is neither a doctrine
nor a policy, but merely an emanation of the awareness that nation-states must co-exist.").
But see infra text accompanying notes 388-91 (citing contrary views).
247. See Paul B. Stephan, InternationalGovernanceand American Democracy, 1 Clu. J.
INT'L L. 237, 245-46 (2000) (noting lack of clarity and precision in typical state expressions
ofinternational obligations); cf Frederic L. Kirgis, Jr., Custom on a Sliding Scale, 81 AM. J.
INT'LL. 146,148 &n.14 (1987) (citing authorities indicating thatwidespread, consistent state
practice may obviate the need for direct evidence ofopiniojuris).
248. The recurring question is how to assess when disobedience is simply a breach and
when it undermines the process of customary international law. See BYERS, supranote 125,
at 135-36.
249. For a valuable recitation of the range of views expressed by OECD members see, for
example, OECD, MINIMIZING CONFLICTING REQUIREMENTS: APPROACHES OF "MODERATION
AND RESTRAINT" 9-11 (1987) ("Most [d]elegations recognize a distinction between

international comity and rules of international law in that application of comity is not
considered to be a legally binding obligation."). Of those distinguishing comity, however, a
number found firmer evidence, of international obligations. Id.
250. Professors Neale and Stephens state this with particular clarity:
Thus state A will believe that out of "comity" state B could very well enable
state A's regulation to take effect; but state B will probably reply that state A
might well have refrained out of "comity" from pressing the matter. This
feature of being all things to all men led Brownie to equate comity to
"neighbourliness" and "mutual respect." When states differ about the strictness
with which each other's sovereign rights should be respected, "comity" will not
resolve the problem, for they will differ correspondingly about what comity
requires.
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link comity to familiar choice-of-law principles was of little
252

assistance. 25 1 Choice-of-law principles are not the best role model,
and even if comity requires states to heed their national conflicts
principles (whatever they may be) in addressing international
matters, such "enlightened self-interest" does not sound like the
rigorous legal principle that may be desired.'
The Restatement (Third) made little headway by repackaging
Elaboratingfactors for balancingmay
comity as "reasonableness.'
improve transparency, but not predictability. Individual factors will
AD. NEALE&M.L. STEPHENS, INTERNATIONALBUSNESS ANDNATIONAL JURISDICTION 14-15
(1988); see also Macalister-Smith, supra note 246, at 672-73; ef BROWNLE, supra note 32,

at 8 (discussing the North Sea Continental Shelf Cases).
Vagueness may also be desirable to the extent it gives political decision makers flexibility
and, hence, makes customary international law tolerable to them. This appears to be what
Myres McDougal was driving at when he claimed, in another context, that reasonableness
was a norm "formulated at the highest level of abstraction" and thus "ambiguous in highest
degree." MYRES S. MCDOUGAL LTAL., STUDIES IN WORLD PUBLIC ORDER 776 (1987). But see

Anthony A. D'Amato, Consent,Estoppel,and Reasonableness:Three Challengesto Universal
InternationalLaw, 10 VA. J. INTL L. 1, 23 (1969) (suggesting that reasonableness is in the
eye of the beholder, and might be claimed for positions with which McDougal would
disagree).
251. Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764, 816-18 (1993) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting).
252. Those principles are far from stable, e.g., Gary B. Born, A Reappraisal of the
ExtraterritorialReach of U.S. Law, 24 LAW &POL'YINT'LBUS. 1, 81 (1992) (noting nostrum

that in conflict of laws, everything has been tried, because nothing works), and are certainly
notuniversal. KarlM. Meessen, ConflictsofJurisdictionundertheNewRestatement,50 LAW
& CONTEMP. PROBS. 47, 54-60 (1987).
253. Meessen, supranote 51, at 798-801; Meessen, supra note 252, at 57-60; see infratext
accompanying note 263 (describing international law principles undergirding Meessen's
approach). Professor Meessen's discussion is couched as an attempt to come up with an
international law basis for the Restatement's approach, and it is not wholly clear whether he
subscribes to the result. E.g., Meessen, supranote 252, at 59 ('Te renvoi ofreasonableness
is to the enlightened self-interest of the state about to exercise its jurisdiction. An
international law rule reflecting that interpretationofreasonableness could well be assumed
to exist."). He does appear, however, to recognize its deficiencies. Id. at 59-60 ("To be sure,
an international law renvoi to enlightened self-interest adds no substance to the obligations
already contained in the respective rules of national conflicts law. The value of such a rule
of international law is exhortatory, but it also opens access to the remedies of the
internationallaw of state responsibility ifthe domestic law standard ofreasonableness is not
observed.").
254. RESTATEMENT(THIRD), supranote 17, § 403 cmt. a ("Some United States courts have
applied the principle of reasonableness as a requirement of comity, that term being
understood not merely as an act of discretion and courtesy but as reflecting a sense of
obligation among states. This section states the principle of reasonableness as a rule of
international law."); see also Lowenfeld, supranote 220.
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often point in different directions, placing a premium on the
decision maker's judgment, and opposing parties will still be able
to claim credibly that the test supports each of their positions.2"
More fundamentally, to the extent that the reasonableness
standard improves comity's apparent precision, it undermines any
claim to accord with actual state practice. No one, not even the
American Law Institute, contended that section 403's list of
relevant factors or its conclusive nature was based on evidence of
how states actually proceeded.256 The question, it bears emphasis,
is not merely whether nations are obliged to be reasonable, but
whether the Restatement (Third) describes the standard by which
they have agreed to be assessed.
One might argue, of course, that the Restatement (Third)in
fact became customary international law-particularly since
gravitating toward reasonableness seems so, well, reasonable,2 "7
255. MILTON HANDLER ET AL., TRADE REGULATION 1195 (4th ed. 1997) ("[V]irtually any

result can be justified under the balancing test, no matter what facts are in the record,
unless the case has such an obvious outcome that the test wasn't needed to begin with.");
SCHACHTER, supra note 240, at 259; see also Meessen, supra note 51, at 802 (describing
Timberlane as "too open a rule to be operable on the level of international law"); Meessen,
supra note 252, at 55 (describing Restatement (Third) factors as nonexhaustive, more
detailed even than Timberlane, and yet "as open-ended as ever").
256. Dodge, supranote 39, at 139-40 n.241 (citing authorities); see, e.g., Karl M. Meessen,
supra note 252, at 59 ("No way exists to accept the Restatement's claim for qualifying
reasonableness as a rule of international law if the standard of reasonableness is interpreted
by reference to an independent international law standard based on the common
denominator of a widely diverging state practice."); Cecil J.Olmstead, Jurisdiction,14 YALE
J. INT'L L. 468, 472 (1989) (I]t seems implausible that Section 403 rises to the level of... 'a
principle of international law.'") (quoting RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supranote 17 § 403 cmt. a);
The Restatement of ForeignRelations Law of the United States, Revised: How Were the
Controversies Resolved, 81 AM. SOcY INTVL L. PROC. 180, 188 (1987) (remarks of Cecil
Olmstead) (noting, in assessing "reasonableness" limit to jurisdiction as a principle of U.S.
and international law, that "[wihile surely this is a highly desirable rule and principle, its
roots in international law appear somewhat less than deep. Its establishment in U.S. law is
also based on only a few cases. ... I think that the concept is highly desirable; I agree with
its thrust. I just question the depth of its roots."); id. at 192 (remarks of Monroe Leigh)
(asserting, in appraising section 403, cmt. a, regarding"reasonableness"jurisdictional limit
as a principle of U.S. and international law, that"[n]o international tribunal has so ruled as
of this date, and I doubt that such a ruling is to be expected any time soon").
257. LOUIS HENKIN, INTERNATIONAL LAW: POLITICS AND VALUES 246 (1996) ("Something
like the principle of reasonableness is inescapable. ... I believe that the principle of
reasonableness to adjust the traditional bases ofjurisdiction to prescribe has arrived, and
by some name, in some guise or guises, will be recognized."); Macalister-Smith, supra note
246, at 673 ("The characteristic lack of the opiniojuris which separates comity from the
realm of customary international law may be reversed when a particular rule or practice of
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and its alternatives no more appealing.2 " Judicial decisions
like those anticipating or applying the Restatement (Third) are
potentially important indicia of custom, 9 as are the views of
respected scholars like those active in the American Law
Institute. 260 But courts and scholars were hardly of one mind even
after the Restatement (Third)was finalized, 26' and those favoring
international law limits on jurisdiction frequently chose divergent
tests like minimum contacts2 62 or balancing state interests only.263
comity maintained over a sufficient period of time develops into customary law by its
acceptance as law."); P.M. Roth, ReasonableExtraterritoriality:Correctingthe 'Balanceof
Interests," 41 INT'L &COMP.L.Q. 245,285 (1993) (concluding that"[the extent of continuing
criticism and the inconsistency of State practice means that 'interest-balancing' cannot be
asserted as an independent principle of international law"); id. at 286 ("If the requirement
of reasonableness is not yet lex !ata, then it is a necessary development."); cf Kirgis, supra
note 247, at 149 (suggesting that "[a] reasonable rule is always more likely to be found
reflective of state practice andfor the opiniojuristhan is an unreasonable (for example, a
highly restrictive or inflexible) rule."). This argument is fully elaborated in Massey, supra
note 234, at 437-44. But see Meessen, supranote 252, at 53, 59 (arguing that while "today's
lex ferenda might be tomorrow's lex ataif only due to the impact ofthe Restatement itself,"
the range of factors identified for determining reasonableness, among other factors, means
that "no chance exists" that the balancing test will become customary international law).
258. The limitations of these alternatives undoubtedly led some back to the
reasonableness approach. E.g., Born, supra note 252, at 83-84 (claiming that "there is
probably a rough consensus among academic commentators in the United State surrounding
Section 403's approach, if only for want of more attractive alternatives").
259. Statute of the International Court of Justice, art. 38(1)(d), supra note 237, at 79
(identifying judicial decisions and the teachings ofthe most highly qualified publicists ofthe
various nations, as subsidiary means for the determination of rules of law"); RESTATEMENT
(THIRD), supra note 17, § 103(2)(b) (according "substantial weight" to 'judgments and
opinions of national judicial tribunals").
260. Statute ofthe International CourtofJustice, art. 38(1Xd),supra note 237. Academics,
of course, are often quick to defend their influence, see RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supranote 17
§ 103(2)(c) (according "substantial weight" to "the writings of scholars"), sometimes to an
extreme. Louis B. Sohn, Sources ofInternationalLaw, 25 GA. J. INTL & COMP. L. 399, 401
(1996) (asserting, with approval, that "international law is made, not by states, but by 'silly'
professors writing books, and by knowing where there is a good book on the subject"); id, at
399 ("I submit that states really never make international law on the subject of human
rights. It is made by the people that care; the professors, the writers of textbooks and
casebooks, and the authors of articles in leading international law journals.").
261. The best survey of the state of thought prior to the promulgation of the Restatement
(Third)is provided in 2 NEREP, supra note 155, chs. 14-15; see also supranote 204 (citing
criticisms of the reasonableness approach).
262. E.g., Mann, supra note 241, at 28.
263. Meessen, supranote 51, at 802-08; Meessen, supranote 252, at 63. Under Professor
Meessen's approach, if each state's enlightened self-interest, as measured by its domestic
conflicts principles, is truly incompatible, then international law intercedes. Id. at 67. Such
an approach may be more in keeping with the traditional focus ofcustom, see Meessen, supra
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Even those decisions giving rise to the reasonableness principle did
little to give it teeth, prompting criticism that reasonableness was
largely a veil for U.S. national interests.2 ' The final blow to any
note 51, at 802-03, but to that extent accentuates the difficulty of distinguishing between
decisions based on "mere" interest and those derived from a sense of obligation. Goldsmith
& Posner, A Theory of Customary InternationalLaw, supranote 23, at 1117-18 (describing
observational problems attending principle of opinio juris); id. at 1122-23, 1131-32
(identifying, and distinguishing, coincidence of interests from traditional requisites for
customary international law). This is apparent even in Meessen's citation of the early 1980s
pipeline controversy, in which he essentially assumes that U.S. capitulation to its allies may
have resulted from its desire to heed customary international law. Meessen, supranote 252,
at 67-68. Other contemporary episodes suggest an erosion ofany focus on international law.
See Roth, supra note 257, at 273 (contrasting the 1964 British blocking statute, which
expressly provided for resisting foreign measures only where they infringed on U.K
jurisdiction under international law, with the 1980 Protection ofTrading Interests Act, which
abandoned reference to international law in favor of considering "the trading interests ofthe
United Kingdom" and "prejudice to UK sovereignty or to its foreign relations").
More generally, Professor Meessen's theory suffers from some of the same drawbacks as
the Restatement (Third). One of the examples he cites of salient practice, the German
Bayer/Firestonecase, surrendered jurisdiction over the merger of French subsidiaries that
had faint German effects in the first place. Meessen, supra note 51, at 792 & n.50 (citing
Kammergericht [KG, Berlin Ct. App.], Decisions I and II, Nov. 26, 1980, Wirtschaft und
Wettbewerb/Entscheidungssammlung [Wuw/E] OLG 2411 (1980) (Bayer/Firestone v.
Bundeskartellamt [Federal Cartel Office, FCO])); see also Meessen, supra note 252, at 68.
The Bayer/Firestonecase also better illustrates the sway of legal theory in continental legal
systems than the realities of state practice; the FCO ignored the putative existence of
international law constraints, and the court based its supposition ofthose constraints solely
on Professor Meessen's work. David J. Gerber, The ExtraterritorialApplication of the
GermanAntitrust Laws, 77 AM. J. INVL L. 756, 774-75 (1983). Another example is the later
decision in PhilipMorris.Rothmans,which also invoked as limits to the effects doctrine the
international principles ofnonintervention and the principle against abuse ofdiscretion. THE
INTERNATIONALCHAMBEROFCOMMERCE,THEEXTRATERRTORIALAPPLICATIONOFNATIONAL
LAWS 10 (Dieter Lange & Gary Born eds., 1987) (citing BKartA, Feb. 24,1982, WuW/E Bkart
A 1943 (Morris/Rothmans),at 1953-54)); Gerber, supra,at 777-78; Meessen,supra note 252,
at 67. But there are numerous counterexamples, e.g., Roth, supra note 257, at 282; and
German doctrine is perhaps unique in taking the view it does ofinternational law, Gerber,
supra, at 779 (describing examples as "novel usages of international law principles, and,
although they require further refinement, they expand the potential role ofinternational law
in this context"). The problems ofbalancing, of course, remain. 1 HAWK, supranote 42, at 94
(contending that"[allthough Meessen's balancing ofstate interests testis narrower than the
reasonableness test ofSection 403, it is also subject to the significant criticism that balancing
of United States and foreign interests is beyond judicial competence").
264. In Laker Airways Ltd. u. Sabena, Judge Wilkey observed:
When push comes to shove, the domestic forum is rarely unseated.... [C]ourts
inherently find it difficult neutrally to balance competing foreign interests.
When there is any doubt, national interests will tend to be favored over foreign
interests. This partially explains why there have been few times when courts
have found foreign interests to prevail.
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claim that reasonableness prevailed is HartfordFire's suggestion
that the effects doctrine described custom's limits, 2 5 a position also
attracting considerable support among academics.266
In any event, even if scholars and judges came to accept the
reasonableness approach, the target audience should be the
governments involved.267 Some U.S. objections were satisfied when
731 F.2d 909, 951 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Wilkey, J., dissenting). Judge Wilkey's view was echoed
several years later by Professor Trimble:
There is a major problem with [the Restatement's] position: most courts seem
to have rejected it. Furthermore, even those courts that have rhetorically
adopted Timberlane have found, for the most part, that the balance favored
United States interests. Hence, there is no support in the actual holdings of
these cases for the proposition that a rule of customary law can be applied to
frustrate policies endorsed by the political branch.
Trimble, supranote 21, at 702; accord SCHACHTER, supranote 240, at 260-61; Mann, supra
note 241, at 45, 52, & 83 (citing "chauvinism ofAmerican applications of balancing).
265. As explained above, the Hartford Fire majority apparently perceived that the
Sherman Act eclipsed comity, or that the effects doctrine (as modified by the Court's gloss),
wholly incorporates it. Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764,796 (1993); see also
In re Uranium Antitrust Litigation, 617 F.2d 1248, 1255-56 (7th Cir. 1980) (arguing that
Timberlane factors are consistent with determining jurisdiction under Alcoa). Read
differently, Hartford Fire simply denies that comity is customary international law.
Compare,e.g., Lowenfeld, supranote 220, at47 (arguing that, after HartfordFire,"it is now
clear beyond doubt that the Supreme Court-majority and minority-understands that the
reach of a nation's law is a subject of internationallaw-public customary international
law"), with Andreas F. Lowenfeld, Jurisdictional Issues Before National Courts: The
InsuranceAntitrust Case, in EXTRATERRITORIAL JURISDICTION IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 1,
13 (Karl M. Meessen ed., 1996) (remarks of Gary Born) (disagreeing that "you can fairly rely
on [HartfordFire] for the proposition that international law and international comity are
part of the US law and automatically get incorporated into some statute," and noting that
"Justice Souter went out of his wayto say almost exactly the opposite"). Professor Lowenfeld
later seemed to modify his claim. See ANDREAS F. LOWENFELD, INTERNATIONAL LITIGATION
ANDTHE QUESTFORREASONABLENESS 27 (1996) ("The Court [inHartfordFire]says that only
comity might counsel against exercising jurisdiction, whereas the Restatement purports to
set out a rule of law.").
266. See supra text accompanying notes 204, 230, 234, 256.
267. Judicial decisions are usually regarded as evidence of customary international law,
rather than sources of it. Statute ofthe International Court of Justice, art. 38(lXd), supra
note 259 (identifying 'judicial decisions and the teachings of the most highly qualified
publicists of the various nations, as subsidiary means for the determination of rules of law");
RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 17, §§ 102, 103. This places them in an inferior position
relative to the executive branch as regards the formation of custom. See also RESTATEMENT
(THIRD),supranote 17, § 111 reporters' note 4(observing that"[i]n determining international
law, judges are less free in their 'sources' and are subject to international constraints");
Louis HENmIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE U.S. CONSTITUTION 137 (2d ed. 1996) (arguing
that, relative to common law, "judges have been substantially less free to follow their own
bent in determining customary international law, in view of the authority of the Executive
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the American Law Institute redrafted section 403 to drop its
pretense to definitively allocate jurisdiction when each of two states
had reasonable claims, 268 and the United States seemed to favor
applying the standard in private cases, so long as it could be so
confined. 9 But the government also continued to insist that
reasonableness in any public action should be entrusted to political,
rather than judicial, discretion.
Critics maintained that this
branch in the matter and the need to attend to the practices and opinions of many nationstates over many years"). But cf Michael J. Glennon, Can the PresidentDo No Wrong?, 80
AM. J. INT'LL. 923,929 (1986) (arguing that the President is not the sole means by which the
United States participates in international law, because "[t]he courts, Congress and the
Executive all partake in the process of customary law formation and transformation; a norm
of customary international law reflects the acts of all three branches"); Jordan J. Paust, The
PresidentIs Bound by InternationalLaw, 81 AM. J. INTL L. 377, 388 (1987) (same). Indeed,
it is sometimes argued that the absence of court cases suggests the existence of an
international rule. E.g., S.S. Lotus (Fr. v. Turk.), 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 4 (Sept. 7, 1927),
1927-32 WORLD COURT REPoRTS 20, 42, discussed in BROWNLIE, supra note 32, at 7-8.
268. Small, supra note 52, at 291-93 (citing, in addition, modifications in the bases for
jurisdiction); see also Davis R. Robinson, Conflicts of Jurisdictionand theDraftRestatement,
15 LAW & POL'Y INTL BUS. 1147, 1152-53, 1155 (1983) (explaining U.S. view that draft
Restatement (Third) "does not accurately reflect the state of international law," and
indicating a preference for the prior standard of Restatement (Second) section 40); accord
Carl A. Cira, Jr., The Challenge of ForeignLaws to Block American Antitrust Actions, 18
STAN. J. INT'L L. 247, 269 (1982).
269. Kenneth Dam, then-Deputy Secretary of State, declared that:
We in the Department of State are not altogether satisfied with making a
balancing test the prerequisite to the existence of jurisdiction. As a practical
matter, however, a careful weighing of the states concerned is obviously a
useful procedure and a deterrent to unwarranted conflicts. We welcome the
Federal courts' use of a general balancing analysis in private cases like
Timberlane, Mannington Mills, and Mitsui. Balancing can certainly help to
ensure that decisions affecting significant foreign concerns are not taken
lightly.
Kenneth W. Dam, Address Before the American Society of International Law (Apr. 15,1983),
in 2 CuMuLATIVE DIGEST OF U.S. PRACTICE IN INTL LAW 1981-88, at 1323, 1325 (1993)
[hereinafter CUMUILATIVEDIGEST] (internal cross-reference omitted); accordCira, supranote
268, at 266-69 (assessment by Assistant Chief, Foreign Commerce Section, Antitrust
Division, U.S. Department of Justice, that"[t]he Justice Department welcomed Timberlane,
since it reinforced the principles which the Department has applied in investigation and
prosecution of foreign commerce cases in recent years") (citing authorities); see alsoinfra text
accompanyingnotes 434-40 (discussingtermsofthe U.S. agencies'international guidelines).
The Legal Advisor, though, warned that the prospect that a-court might establish binding
precedent as to the "reasonable" scope of the Sherman Act, and so constrain federal
enforcement, could force the executive branch to intervene in private litigation. Robinson,
supra note 268, at 1153.
270. Thus the executive branch claims to evaluate comity independently in the exercise
ofprosecutorial discretion. See supra text accompanying notes 225-26.
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"treated an issue of law as if it were an issue of politics,"27' but the
point is that it contributed to defining what the law was. 72 That
position, moreover, found support not only among U.S. courts, 273 but
also from abroad.274 Some foreign governments exhibited concern
about the propriety of entrusting any balancing exercises to the
judiciary, 275 even though they appeared to benefit from any leniency
271. Lowenfeld, supranote 220, at 53; see also 1988 A.B.A. REP. SEC. oFANTITRUSTL. AND
SEC. OF INT'L TRADE AND PRACTICE TO THE HOUSE OF DELEGATES ON DRAFT ANTTRUST

GUIDELINES FORINT'L OPERATIONS, in 57 ANTrrRUSTL.J. 651,663 (1988). The reception given
the 1995 Guidelines was no kinder. WALLER, supra note 45, § 6:22, at 6-70 (describing
differentiation of executive branch application as the "Government's assault on comity");
Joseph P. Griffin, Extraterritorialityin U.S. and EU Antitrust Enforcement, 67 ANTITRUST
L.J. 159, 189-92 (1999); accord Waler, supra note 82, at 567-68. As noted below, their
appreciation of comity was considerably different. See infratext accompanying notes 437-40.
272. Arthur M. Weisburd, The Executive Branchand InternationalLaw,41VAND. L. REV.
1205, 1254 (1988) ("In essence, every time a state takes a position with respect to a particular
question in international relations, the state is not only acting to deal with that particular
question, but also providing an example of state practice that can affect the content of
customary international law. In that sense, every state action in the international arena has
a double quality. Each state action is simultaneously a response to a given concrete problem
and, in effect, a legislative act.").
273. United States v. Time Warner, Inc., 1997-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 71,702 (D.D.C. 1997);
United States v. Baker Hughes Inc., 731 F. Supp. 3,6 n.5 (D.D.C. 1990), affd, 908 F.2d 981
(D.C. Cir. 1990).
274. The European Commission, for example, appears to regard its internal evaluation of
comity as both necessary and sufficient. LEON BRI7TAN, COMPETITION POLICYAND MERGER
CONTROL IN THE SINGLE EUROPEAN MAR
16 (1991) (stating that whether or not comity is
a principle of international law, "the Commission does consider itself obliged to have regard
to comity when exercising its jurisdiction in competition cases with a foreign element"); id.
at 16-17 ("[T]he Commission as a collegiate body does not have to consult another
department or branch of government to ascertain the likely impact of a proposed course of
action on the Community's external relations. A Commission decision on competition policy
reflects the totality of the Commission's views and policies."); see also Atwood, supranote
111, at 83; Joseph P. Griffin, ECand U.S. Extraterritoriality:Activismand Cooperation, 17
FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 353, 358 (1994) ("It appears that the Commission believes that
international comityis a matter ofprosecutorial discretion, including consultation within the
College of Commissioners, and not a legal prerequisite to the exercise of jurisdiction."). But
see Walter Van Gerven, EC Jurisdictionin Antitrust Matters: The Wood Pulp Judgment, in
1989 ANN. PROC. FORDHAM CORP. L. INST. CONF.: INT'LANTITRUSTL. & POLI' 451, 480 (Barry
E. Hawk ed., 1989) (arguing that international comity, as rule of law, must be applicable in
European courts "regardless of whether the issue has or has not first been addressed" by the
Commission).
275. Civil law jurisdictions, in particular, typically regard balancing as more of a
regulatory function than ajudicial one. See Gerber, supranote 172, at 208; Harold G. Maier,
JurisdictionalRules in CustomaryInternationalLaw, in EXTRATERRITORIAL JURISDICTION,
supranote 265, at 64, 85 (remarks of Andrea Bianchi); Mann, supra note 241, at 45, 52, 83,
89-91; Meessen, supranote 252, at 57-58; Brian Pearce, Note, The Comity Doctrineas a
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276
in the exercise of U.S. jurisdiction, however ill-conceived.

The distinction between types of antitrust enforcement is also a
fundamental challenge to the standard's inductive premises. The
reasonableness approach claimed to derive a judicial rule at least
in part from state practice, and with limited exceptions, the
Restatement (Third) treated regulatory and judicial comity as
identical. 77 If so, the fact that national governments prefer to
insulate their decisions from judicial review, and to maintain
unalloyed discretion over their evaluations of comity, would
undermine the impression that reasonableness was everjudicially
enforceable."7 If, on the other hand, states differentiate between
BarriertoJudicialJurisdiction.AU.S.-E.U. Comparison,30 STAN. J. INT'LL. 525,563(1994)
("[Sluch balancing in civil-law countries appears to be endogenous to the law; that is, the
civil-law judge is expected to apply jurisdictional rules which are the result of the
legislature's diplomatic balancing of the permissible public and private interests. Interest
balancing in civil-law jurisdictions is thus exhausted upon formulation and permits little
discretion in application."); id. at 550.
Common law jurisdictions also shared these concerns. 2 JAmES R. ATwoOD & KINGmAN
BREWSTER, ANTITRUST AND AMERICAN BusINEss ABROAD 21-26 (2d ed. 1981); see also, e.g.,
Peter Durack, Extraterritorial Application of United States Law, Address to the American
BarAssociation (Aug. 12,1981), in A.V. LOwE,EXTRATERRITORIALJURISDICTION 91, 94(1983)
(arguing that, although international law places limits or should limit the extraterritorial
application of law, "it is not feasible for a Court of Law applying judicial techniques to
balance the disparate interests of two States which they claim to be ofnational importance");
The UraniumAntitrust Litigation-Extractsfrom CanadianAmicus CuriaeBriefs of2l May
1979 and 1 July 1980, reprintedin LOWE, supra,at 109 (arguing that balancing approach
adopted by U.S. courts improperly reviews decision making by the Canadian government,
where international comity requires that official pronouncements by foreign government
concerning its own activities must be decisive). Within the United States, the objection was
best articulated by Judge Wilkey's dissent in LakerAirways, which argued that balancing
was better conducted by the U.S. political branches that were assigned diplomatic functions
under the Constitution-and which were engaged in ongoing negotiations with the British
government in the case at hand. See supra text accompanying notes 196-205; see also In re
Uranium Antitrust Litigation, 480 F. Supp. 1138, 1148 (N.D. Ill. 1979), affd, 617 F.2d 1248,
1255-56 (7th Cir. 1980). These perceptions undoubtedly contributed to the perception of
comity as more of a political than a legal enterprise. E.g., MINIDMIZING CONFLICTING
REQUIREMENTS, supra note 249, at 12-13 (noting emphases by U.S., U.K, Australian,
Canadian, French, and German delegations on the role of political branches in implementing
principles of "moderation and restraint") (citing authorities).
276. This suggests the limitations of attempts to assess comity strictly in terms of obvious
national interests. But see Guzman, supra note 10, at 1532-33.
277. E.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 17, § 403 cmts. a, g (describing practices of
legislatures, administrative agencies, and courts, and urging that U.S. law be interpreted by
courts, executive branch officials, and regulatory bodies so as to avoid conflict with
reasonableness principles).
278. At a minimum, a moratorium onjudicial review ofgovermnent decisions means that
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public and private actions, and resist the judicial review of public
actions, it raises a quandary as to how the latter's distinctive limits
might be derived.
2. Reasonablenessas Universalism
All this suggests that the factor-rich reasonableness norm is
unpersuasive: there is simplyinsufficient evidence, under generally
accepted criteria, that it is customary international law. But the
flaws in the existing doctrine are both more profound and more
easily addressed than this suggests, and certainly less marginal to
the overall enterprise of international law. Three missteps deserve
particular emphasis.
The first involves the attempt to elaborate a theory of nearuniversal application, without regard to potential distinctions
among subject matter or constituents. Section 403 of the
Restatement (Third) states a norm to apply across all regulatory
contexts. Although several areas are singled out for additional
279
discussion, they depend upon the same reasonableness principle,
and the antitrust provisions are typical in referring back to section
403 for the standard of reasonableness.8 ° Professor Meessen's
state practices lose transparency, making it difficult to determine whether those decisions
have been made for reasons of expediency or in order to ensure compliance with the law. Cf
Meessen, supra note 252, at 68 (noting that 'the impact of international law can be more
clearly established in disputes determined by the courts").
279. RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supranote 17, § 403 cmt. h.
280. Section 415 provides:
(1) Any agreement in restraint of United States trade that is made in the
United States, and any conduct or agreement in restraint of such trade that is
carried out in significant measure in the United States, are subject to the
jurisdiction to prescribe of the United States, regardless ofthe nationality or
place of business of the parties to the agreement or of the participants in the
conduct.
(2) Any agreement in restraint of United States trade that is made outside of
the United States, and anyconduct or agreement in restraint of such trade that
is carried out predominantly outside of the United States, are subject to the
jurisdiction to prescribe of the United States, if a principal purpose of the
conduct or agreement is to interfere with the commerce of the United States,
and the agreement or conduct has some effect on that commerce.
(3) Other agreements or conduct in restraint of United States trade are subject
to the jurisdiction to prescribe of the United States if such agreements or
conduct have substantial effect on the commerce ofthe United States and the
exercise of jurisdiction is not unreasonable.
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argument for balancing state interests begins, refreshingly enough,
with antitrust,"' but he also suggests that an identical norm of
balancing governs other exercises of jurisdiction, 2 and the
generality of his argument seems to require that result absent
obvious state dissent.283
A similarly expansive approach is taken to the type of disputes
to which reasonableness applies. The HartfordFiremajority's "true
conflicts" test, which it sought to found on section 403 of the
Restatement (Third), owed as much to comity precedent decided in
a wholly different context.2 4 The Restatement (Third)itself did little
better, asserting a universal requirement for the exercise of
jurisdiction-reasonableness-and placing no limitations on the
occasions for that inquiry. 5 In consequence, a clash between U.S.
Id. § 415.
This adds little to section 403, particularly as to the question of international law; the
antitrust-specific analysis of section 415 simply incorporates the reasonableness approach
of section 403, and does not attempt separately to describe international legal norms for
antitrust jurisdiction. Id. pt. IV, ch. 1, subch. C ("These sections focus on exercise of
jurisdiction by the United States, but other states (and the European Community) can apply,
and to some extent have applied, the same principles in regulating similar activities."). What
is more, section 415 arguably expands antitrust jurisdiction on the basis of situs and
principal purpose to a degree unsustainable under domestic law. 1 Hawk, supra note 42, at
154-57 (concluding that "if section 415 is intended to be a restatement of antitrust
jurisdiction, it is inconsistent with both statutory and case law," and "[ilf section 415 is
intended to be an antitrust-specific standard of reasonableness, it is unnecessary,
unpersuasive and would be unconstitutionally employed if used as a basis to exercise
antitrust jurisdiction").
281. 2 NEREP, supranote 155, at 492-94 (describing Meessen's attempts to differentiate
international antitrust).
282. Meessen, supranote 125, at 804 (describing international law ofantitrust); Meessen,
supra note 252, at 62 (suggesting that "[in the form of a hypothesis, it may be extended to
cover every field oflaw"). But cf Meessen, supranote 252, at 52,54 (criticizingRestatement
(Third)for indiscriminately addressing divergent fields).
283. The American Law Institute and Professor Meessen are merely illustrative. See also
BYERS, supra note 125, at ch. 4; THE EXTRATERRITORIAL APPuCATION OF NATIONAL LAWS,
supra note 263, at 46-48 (arguing generally for "jurisdictional rule of reason); Patrick M.
McFadden, Provincialism in United States Courts, 81 CORNELL L. REv. 4, 25-26 (1995)
(criticizing majority decision in Hartford Fire for ignoring "an international law of
prescriptive jurisdiction). Some studies focus on antitrust only because of its centrality to
jurisdictional disputes, or ally it with another area of similar controversy. E.g., 1 NEREP,
supra note 155, at XXII (explaining limitation of study to extraterritorial antitrust and
securities regulation largely for purposes of manageability).
284. See supra text accompanying note 239 (describing invocation of Aerospatiale).
285. The exception, previously described, was for"true" conflicts in which the exercise by
each of two states would "not be unreasonable." RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 17, §
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antitrust laws and a safe harbor established by foreign insurance
laws was supposed to be evaluated by the same calculus as the
discrepant application of essentially compatible U.S. and foreign
antitrust laws.
Considering reasonableness at this level of abstraction is hardly
arbitrary, given the norms derivation from metaprinciples such as
sovereign equality, nonintervention, and territorial integrity," 6 and
more immediately from jurisdictional principles forged for international criminal law and related areas. 87 Critics ofreasonableness
tend to follow the same course, often denying the existence of the
norm en toto." But nothing about this kind of generalization is
inevitable. Customary international law affords its observers
discretion in determining the appropriate level at which to
generalize rules, 9 and doing so clearly involves value judgments.
Broad renderings of a principle may be attractive where they
efficiently resolve a broader range of perceived problems, or allow
greater analytic clarity. But they also risk overlooking nuances in
the evidence, and tend to be easier to contraindicate at the margins,
in ways that do not necessarily reflect on the presence or absence
403(3) reporters' note e. Justice Scalia, likewise, would have used a traditional (though not
the only traditional) conflicts analysis. Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764,821
(1993) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (proposing that conflicts should be deemed to exist "[wihere
applicable foreign and domestic law provide different substantive rules of decision to govern
the parties' dispute").
286. Declarationon PrinciplesofInternationalLaw ConcerningFriendly Relations and
CooperationamongStates, G.A. Res. 2625, U.N. GAOR, 25th Sess., Supp. No. 18, U.N. Doc.
A/8018 (1970), reprintedin 65 Am. J. INTL L. 243 (1971); BROWNLIE, supranote 32, ch. XIV;
D.W. Bowett, Jurisdition:ChangingPatternsofAuthority OverActivities andResources,53
BRIT.Y.B. INT' L. 1,14-18 (1982); Mann, supra note 241, at 20-21; Meessen, supranote 252,
at 63 (describing each state's duty to ensure that another state has "an equal chance to take
effective legal action to implement its policies").
287. See 2 NEREP, supra note 155, at 482.
288. See, e.g., Kelly, supranote 21, at 482 ("[Tlhe reasonableness limitation, like much of
asserted CIL principles, has no basis in general state practice nor is there any evidence that
states accept it as mandatory. There is virtually no evidence that states, including the United
States, accept such a principle as legally obligatory."); Trimble, supra note 21, at 701-07
(dismissing balancing approach of Restatement (Third)in its entirety); cf Paul, supra note
22passim (critically scrutinizing comity, broadly construed).
289. E.g., Stephan, supranote 247, at 245-46 (describing need to have scholars construe
vague signals about "what states believe their obligations to be"); see also supra note 260
(citing authority for weighing academic views); cf LAURENCE H. TRIBE & MICHAEL C. DoRF,
ON READING THE CONSTITUTION ch. 3 (1991) (stressing significance of judicial values in
determining level of generality at which constitutional rights should be construed).
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of a narrower principle.29 Given the difficulties in sustaining a
workable theory for all exercises of prescriptive jurisdiction, it may
be fruitful to consider whether they might be avoided by any
antitrust-specific alternatives.
There is an independent warrant for a more cautious approach.
Custom's critics increasingly stress its antidemocratic elements:
not only is the law elaborated by unelected judges and scholars,2 91
but it is characteristically imposed by a few countries upon many
that are given little opportunity to participate.2 92 American complaints about extraterritorial constraints ring somewhat hollow,
given the global reach of U.S. laws and the tremendous influence of
American norms on international law,29 and tend to omit custom's
290. For example, the reporters' notes for Restatement (Third)section 403 cite an OECD
statement calling upon members to have regard to "revant principles ofinternational law,"
cooperate "as an alternative to unilateral action," and "take fully into account the sovereignty
and legitimate economic, law enforcement and other interests of other Member countries."
RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 17, § 403 reporters' note 1 (quoting Committee on
International Investment and Multinational Enterprises, OECD, THE 1984 REVIEW OF 1976
OECD DECLARATION AND DECISIONS ON INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT AND MULTINATIONAL
ENTERPRISES 28 (1984) [hereinafter 1984 REVIEW]; see also Conflicting Requirements
Imposed on Multinational Enterprises, in MINIMIZING CONFLICTING REQUIREMENTS, supra
note 249, annex I, at 41, 42 n.1 (noting, additionally, that "[aipplying the principles of comity,
as it is understood in some Member countries, includes following an approach of this nature
in exercising one's jurisdiction"); OECD, Declaration and Decisions on International
Investment and Multinational Enterprises, annex 2, OECD Doc. DAFFEIIME(2000)20 (as
amended June 27, 2000), available at http:lwwwl.oecd.org/daf/investmenttguidelines/
conflict.htm. But the 1984 statement pointedly defers to provisions already in place with
respect to restrictive business practices. 1984 REVIEW, supra,at 27 ("These procedures do not
apply to those aspects ofrestrictive business practices or other matters which are the subject
of existing OECD arrangements."). Thus, while the annex may support the general position
of the Restatement (Third), it is more ambiguous as to whether the same principle applies
in the particular context of antitrust.
291. Kelly, supra note 21, at 518 & n.290; Stephan, supranote 247, at 245-48; Trimble,
supranote 21, at 717-23. Foreign judges and scholars, presumably, are still further removed
from local democratic influence. Kelly, supra note 21, at 526-30.
292. Charney, supranote 24, at 537 (1993) (claiming that "when authorities examine the
evidence necessary to establish customary law, they consider actions of a limited number of
states, often only the largest, most prominent, or most interested among them"); Hiram E.
Chodosh, Neither TreatyNor Custom: The Emergence of DeclarativeInternationalLaw, 26
TEL INT'L L.J. 87, 102 (1991) (arguing that "[tihe number of states required to meet the
generality requirement [of customary international law] is often no more than a mere
handful"); David P. Fidler, Challengingthe ClassicalConceptof Custom:Perspectiveson the
Futureof CustomaryInternationalLaw, 39 GER. Y.B. INV'LL. 198, 203-04,209 (1996); Kelly,
supranote 21, at 519-23; see also id. at 523-30 (describing related problems created by new
states and ICJ lawmaking).
293. Cf W. Michael Reisman, The Cult of Custom in the Late 20th Century, 17 CAL. W.
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countervailing democratic virtues, particularly in protecting unrepresented foreigners from the extraterritorial application of U.S.
law.2 9 ' But it remains the case that unnecessarily broad assertions
of customary international law shift authority from representative
institutions to the courts.
A second misstep has been to conflate evidence of norms with
their realization. Custom is afflicted by observational problems.
Practices and opinions giving rise to custom are usually less
than uniform,"' and may be even more disparate when the norms
296
in question are envisioned as granting the states latitude;
departures from a putative norm, too, may be interpreted as either
detracting or contributing to that norm's formation, 297 or perhaps as
INTVL L.J. 133, 135 (1987) (depicting "custom" as an attempt to shift international decision
making "from the floors of the world legislatures to back rooms").
294. Professor Brilmayer has forcefully argued to this effect. Much of international law,
she notes, is not inconsistent with the expressed views of the political branches. Brilmayer,
supra note 21, at 2310. Additionally, democratic values counsel in favor of restricting the
ability of the U.S. government to act extraterritorially against foreign citizens who lack input
into that governmenfs policies. Id. at 2311; see also Alan 0. Sykes, Externalities in Open
Economy Antitrust and Their Implications for InternationalCompetitionPolicy, 23 HARV.
J.L. & PUB. POLY 89, 92 (1999) (observing that "it is exceptionally unlikely that the welfare
of foreign citizens will be weighted equally with the welfare of domestic citizens in the
domestic political process").
295. Even individual practices deemed sufficiently uniform for doctrinal purposes will
differ somewhat from one another. Judge Hudson's classic definition of the elements required
for custom, for example, demanded a "concordant practice by a number of States with
reference to a type of situation falling within the domain of international relations." [1950]
2Y.B. Intl L. Comm'n 26, UN Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1950/Add. 1; see also BROWNUIE,supra note
32, at 5 (indicating that in order to establish customary international law, "[clomplete
uniformity is not required, but substantial uniformity is"). It might be the case, for example,
that the U.S. balancing test exemplifies and contributes to a custom of reasonableness, but
that does not mean that balancing is synonymous with reasonableness, nor that U.S.
deviation from balancing (let alone a foreign state's failure to embrace that approach)
amounts to a violation of international law.
296. See infra text accompanyingnotes 382-84 (discussingexistence of, andpreference for,
such rules).
297. In the Nicaraguacase, the International Court of Justice noted that
for a rule to be established as customary, the corresponding practice [need not]
be in absolutely rigorous conformity with the rule.... [It is] sufficient that the
conduct of States should, in general, be consistent with such rules, and that
instances of State conduct inconsistentwith a given rule should generally have
been treated as breaches of that rule, not as indications of the recognition of a
new rule. Ifa State acts in a way prima facie incompatible with a recognized
rule, but defends its conduct by appealing to exceptions or justifications
contained within the rule itself, then whether or not the State's conduct is in
fact justifiable on that basis, the significance of that attitude is to confirm
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something else entirely.298 But one of the most basic problems
concerns distinguishing between near custom and new custom, 299
including how to treat what is often called "emerging" custom."' 0
We proceed on the premise that customary norms are legally
distinctive; even if there is some basis for accommodating near
custom,'O its violation ought not have the same consequences as
violations of actual custom. At the same time, a nascent custom
ought in principle to be regarded as seriously as its older
brethren.3 0 2

rather than to weaken the rule.
Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14, 98,

186 (June 27).

298. ROSALYN HIGGINS, PROBLEMS AND PROCESS: INTERNATIONAL LAW AND HOW WE USE

IT 19 (1994) (noting that "[o]ne of the special characteristics of international law is that
violations of law can lead to the formation of new law"). For some, such as Professors
D'Amato and Wolfke, only state acts violating custom are capable of changing it. BYERS,
supra note 125, at 134 (reviewing position and its critics).
299. V.D. DEGAN, SOURCES OF INTERNATIONAL LAw 185 (1997) ("[lit is almost impossible
to ascertain the precise moment at which a settled practice crystallizes into a new legal
rule."); HENKIN, supranote 257, at 34 (noting, even of more "traditional" customary law, that
"it is rarely clear when a norm mature(s]"); Maier, supra note 22, at 470 (commenting that
"lilt is exceedingly difficult to determine the precise moment in time when a rule of
customary international law changes or initially emerges").
300. To add confusion, sometimes emerging custom is contrasted to less developed (or
"emerged") norms, see, e.g., North Sea Continental Shelf (F.R.G. v. Den.; F.R.G. v. Neth.),
1969 I.C.J. 38, 1 62 (Feb. 20) ("[T]he principle of equidistance, as it now figures in Article 6
ofthe Convention, was proposed by the Commission with considerable hesitation, somewhat
on an experimental basis, at most de lege ferenda, and not at all de lege lata or as an
emerging rule of customary internationallaw.") (emphasis added), but at other times the
intention seems to be to stress that the norm has not yet arrived. See id. at 55 (separate
opinion of Judge Zafrula Kahn) (arguing that "the emerging customary law, now become
more defined ... crystallized in the adoption of the Continental Shelf Convention by the
Conference") (emphasis added).
301. E.g., Oscar Schachter, Towards a Theory of International Obligation, in THE
EFFECTIVENESS OF INTERNATIONAL DECISIONS 14 (1971) (arguing that notwithstanding

"uncertainty as to the legal authority of emerging principles" in international economic
matters, they "exhibit some measure of practical efficacy' and give rise to widespread
expectations as to their future application"); Kara H. Ching, Note, Indigenous SelfDeterminationIn An Age Of Genetic Patenting:Recognizing An Emerging Human Rights
Norm, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 687, 719 (1997) ("Although not binding on states, evidence of
emerging norms anticipates what may develop into positive law or become recognized as
customary international law. Thus, such emerging norms may eventually be binding on
states. If a norm is identified as emerging, or established, the norm should positively affect
state behavior.").
302. E.g., Fisheries Jurisdiction Case (U.K. & N. Ir. v. Ice.), 1974 I.C.J. 23-24 (July 25)
(observing that "the Court, as a court of law, cannot render judgment sub species legis
ferendae, or anticipate the law before the legislator has laid it down"); see also DANILENKO,
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This problem is inherent to custom, and institutional considerations may be cited in favor of greater or lesser generosity in
construing custom on the cusp. 3 3 But the Restatement (Third)made

relatively little attempt to explain how reasonableness evolved from
discretionary "United States law" to "emerge[ I as a principle of
international law as well"' 4 -except by citing widely disparate
claims in the reporters' notes, none of which resembled the
reasonableness approach in their particulars.0 5 The result, given
the influence of the Restatement (Third)at home and abroad, is that
a dubious assessment of emerging law became further evidence of
its emergence, seemingly illustrating the dangers of treating
marginal cases as custom.30 6
Such bootstrapping is made more troubling by the strong position
the Restatement (Third)takes toward the enforcement of custom.
According to the Restatement, custom should influence the
interpretation of federal statutes, perhaps even at the expense of
conflicting federal statutory law that antedates emerging customsuch as, for example, the Sherman Act. 0 Applying these rules
supra note 237, at 22 & n.22 (citing additional examples). Thus, for example, in the leading
case of Filartiga, in which the district court properly declined to enforce what it
(mis)perceived to be an "emerging" principle of customary international law, the court of
appeals properly enforced what it took instead to be an established norm. Filartiga v. PenaIrala, 630 F.2d 876, 880, 884 (2d Cir. 1980). But see Laura Dalton, Note, Stanford v.
Kentucky and Wilkins v. Missouri: A Violation of An Emerging Rule of Customary
InternationalLaw,32 WM. &MARYL. REV. 161 (1990) (arguing that Supreme Court decisions
upholding the death penalty for juveniles do not violate U.S. obligations under emerging
international human rights law).
303. See infra text accompanying notes 344-70 (discussing institutional considerations
relating to treatment of nascent custom under CharmingBetsy canon).
304. RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 17, § 403 cmt. a (distinguishing treatment of
reasonableness as comity by U.S. courts).
305. Id. § 403 reporters' notes 1-9. In explaining the evolution from the priorRestatement,
the reporters' notes allude to "developments in the practice of other states," id. § 403
reporters' note 10, but it is difficult to discern what were those developments.
306. This problem, which plagues the enterprise of customary international law, means
that the "internalizing" function that Professor Koh and others attribute to courts and other
domestic actors invariably involves "externalizing" as well. Harold H. Koh, Transnational
Legal Process, 75 NEB. L. REV. 181, 204 (1996); see also Harold H. Koh, Bringing
InternationalLaw Home, 35 HoUS. L. REv. 623, 626-27 (1998) (describing interpretive
function of courts).
307. RESTATEMENT(THIRD), supranote 17, § 403 cmt. g (describing principle that U.S. law
should be interpreted to avoid both unreasonableness and conflict with international law);
see also id. § 114 cmt. a ("[C]ourts are obliged to give effect to a federal statute even if it is
inconsistent with a pre-existing rule of international law or with a provision of an

704

WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 43:627

appears to involve the definitive rendering of customary international law that will afterward become enforceable as federal law
in all U.S. courts. 8 ' Such implications place a special premium on
distinguishing near law and new law, an interpretive burden the
Restatement (Third)fails to discharge.
A third, and final, misstep concerns a different form of universalism: the undifferentiated application to all agents of antitrust.
Reasonableness purportedly states a decisive limitation that courts
may apply to terminate any suit, by any party, seeking to enforce
U.S. antitrust laws. This is not how it has worked in practice. Prior
to Timberlane, as previously noted, no court had invalidated any
attempt by the U.S. government to enforce antitrust law extraterritorially; as of the time the Restatement (Third)came into being, the
only two cases in which a court had found an insufficient U.S. interest in extraterritorial regulation both involved private actions.30 9
One might conclude from this record, even prior to HartfordFire,
3 10
that reasonableness was not in fact a rule of international law,
international agreement of the United States.") (emphasis added); id. § 115 cmt. d ("It has
also not been authoritatively determined whether a rule ofcustomary international law that
developed after, and is inconsistent with, an earlier statute or agreement of the United
States should be given effect as the law of the United States."). Statutes are also supposed
to be interpreted so as to avoid conflict with the laws of states that, according to the criteria
of the reasonableness test, have a greater interest in the matter at hand, but it is not clear
what this adds to the Restatement's view of what international law requires. Id. § 403 cmt.
g.
308. Id. § 111(1) (-International law and international agreements of the United States
are law of the United States and supreme over the law of the several States"); id. § 111 cmt.
d ("As law of the United States, international law is also the law of every State, is a basis for
the exercise ofjudicial authority by State courts, and is cognizable in cases in State courts,
in the same way as other United States law.").
309. Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of Am. Natl Trust & Say. Assoc., 749 F.2d 1378 (9th
Cir. 1984); Montreal Trading Ltd. v. Amax, Inc., 661 F.2d 864 (10th Cir. 1981), cert. denied,
455 U.S. 1001 (1982).
310. Professor Trimble summarized the record as of 1986:
Since Timberlane, there have been at least nineteen cases involving the
application of United States antitrust, securities, intellectual property, and
commodity trading regulation extraterritorially. Only two cases applied a
balancing test and found insufficient United States interests. Neither of those
involved an attempt by the government (as opposed to a private party) to
enforce a regulatory scheme, so even these cases did not involve a direct
restraint of the political branches. Eleven cases rejected the balancing
approach; the Second and D.C. Circuits seem squarely opposed to it. Three
more cases accepted a balancing approach, but found the United States interest
prevalent. Three cases were remanded or continued for development of the
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and even more readily infer a particular reluctance by the judiciary
to challenge the political branches.
Such reticence is hardly senseless. Although international law
generally constrains national governments, and in the U.S. legal
system may be interpreted and enforced by the courts, the ordinary
difficulties in identifying and applying sometimes elusive customary
norms, and of attempting to constrain coordinate institutions, are
redoubled when courts seek to apply custom against the very
institutions charged with its making.3 ' The advantages ofjudicial
enforcement may seem particularly marginal in light of the federal
government's active administration of comity in its relations with
other antitrust authorities. Yet the Restatement (Third)standard,
record for purposes of carrying out the prescribed interest analysis. On the
basis of this limited experience, I infer a different rule of customary
international law-that states are free to regulate economic activity that has
minimum contacts with its territory or nationals whenever its interests so
dictate, subject only to limitation by treaty (as in the tax field). The court
decisions do not support a more restrictive view.
Trimble, supranote 21, at 702-04.
311. Thus, Professor Henkin acknowledges that
the courts ought to follow the Executive at least when it has taken an
international position on an issue of international law, not only for the obvious
practical reasons, but because the practices andpolicies ofexecutives, including
our own, are major ingredients of customary international law, and Executive
statements on international law make foreign policy and are legislative in some
measure.

HENKIN, supranote 267, at 511 n.21; see alsoBanco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S.
398, 432-33 (1964) ("When articulating principles of international law in its relations with
other states, the Executive Branch speaks not only as an interpreter of generally accepted
and traditional rules, as would the courts, but also as an advocate of standards it believes
desirable for the community of nations and protective of national concerns. In short,
whatever way the matter is cut, the possibility ofconflict between the Judicial and Executive
Branches could hardly be avoided."); RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 17, § 112 cmt. c.
To be sure, arguments for exempting executive branch activities from review for their
conformity with international law are problematic, and often subject to qualification. E.g.,
RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 17, § 112 cmt. c ("Courts give particular weight to the
position taken by the United States Government on questions of international law because
it is deemed desirable that so faraspossiblethe United States speak with one voice on such
matters.") (emphasis added). One might wish, for example, to distinguish formal acts of the
President, in furtherance of his constitutional foreign affairs powers, from less concerted
violations ofinternationsl obligations, and further distinguishviolations by lesser agents like
the Attorney General and the Federal Trade Commission. HENKIN, supranote 267, at 243-45;
Jonathan I. Charney, The Power of the Executive Branch of the United States to Violate
Customary InternationalLaw, 80 Am J. INT'L L. 913, 919-22 (1986); Louis Henkin, The
Presidentand InternationalLaw, 80 AM. J. INT'L L. 930, 936-37 (1986).
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like those of Timberlane and Mannington Mills before it, drew no
clear distinction between suits brought by the federal government
and those brought by others, 12 making the Justice Department's
attempted self-exemption appear ad hoc. 13 Foreign governments,
too, repeatedly objected to the pretense of American courts
balancing interests confined to their own or, at best, intergovernmental assessment.3 1' Invoking custom against national
governments-hoisting them with their own petards-is a
conundrum inherent to international law, but applying determinative standards against all parties, without regard to their
differences, seems to invite objection unnecessarily.
Due to these errors, one of the Restatement (Third)'s most
important insights was essentially squandered. The low threshold
for engaging in reasonableness analysis (that a law "respect [ed] ...
a person or activity having connections with another state"),"' and
the broad-ranging inquiry into every nearly conceivable interest,
suggest-correctly, in my view-that extraterritoriality per se is of
diminishing import in antitrust. The appropriate focus, instead,
concerns the variety of circumstances in which states may have
conflicting interests. But the ubiquity of the problem, as I have
argued, may not direct an equally broad solution.
III. LOCALIZING INTERNATIONAL LAW: A METHODOLOGY
The universalist impulse undergirding the case for reasonableness picks up one thread in a long-standing division among
international lawyers. Much like American constitutional law, 16
312. Timberlanecited the relatively unreflective nature ofprivate actions as an additional
basis for exercising judicial control, but suggested no difference in judicial evaluation.
Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of America, 549 F.2d 597, 613 n.28 (9th Cir. 1976) (citing
call for prohibition of such suits by statute); see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 17,
§ 403 cmt. e (opining that when two states may reasonably exercise jurisdiction, but their
regulations conflict, the Restatement's evaluation is "addressed primarily to the political
departments of government, but it may be relevant also in judicial proceedings"). The
comment references the accompanying reporters' notes, which appear to indicate a
preference for the judicial balancing of state interests, aided where appropriate by executive
branch submissions. Id. § 403 reporters' notes 6, 7.
313. See supra text accompanying note 271 (discussing criticisms of agencies' positions).
314. See supra text accompanying notes 274-75.
315. RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supranote 17, § 403(1).
316. Compare, e.g., Robert H. Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment
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international law scholarship is divided between attempts at
grand unifying theories and highly particularized, if not obscure,
accounts of law in context. 17 Likewise, one finds a division between
those supposing that customary international law gets made in
one way and one way only, and those instead gravitating toward
the view that every instance of custom is as unique as a
snowflake."1 ' Reasonableness clearly reflects more universalist
impulses; in exploring whether that exhausts the possibilities for
an international law of antitrust, I develop in this section an
alternative, "local" methodology for custom. Such a theory stresses
the importance of context in deciding the content of particular
international law, and is well-illustrated by insights from antitrust extraterritoriality. At the same time, it is intended to be a
generalizable theory of how custom may be perceived in other
contexts as well, not a theory applicable for "this day and train
3 19
only."
This warrants two cautions. First, the local theory is not
mutually exclusive with more universalist approaches. If a broader
custom is also apparent, nothing in the local theory suggests the
meaner form has to be preferred; to the contrary, custom may come
into being among all nations, without regard to domestic
conditions or subject matter, just as in the classical description.
Problems, 47 IND. L.J. 1, 1 (1971) (arguing for "the necessity for theory" in constitutional
law), with Paul E. McGreal, Ambition's Playground,68 FORDHAM L. REV. 1107, 1110 & n.13
(2000) (rejecting, in principle, any and all attempts at grand constitutional theory).
317. In my view, it lapses toward the former. It is difficult to imagine, for example, many
fields that would attempt something like the Hague Lectures, which typically enlist a highly
esteemed scholar to explain much or all ofinternational law. For very different estimations,
see THOiAS M. FRANCK, FAIRNESS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW AND INSTITUTIONS 5 (1995)
(describing increased specialization of international scholars and practitioners as a function
of maturity and attending complexity); Phillipe Sands, Treaty, Custom and the CrossfertilizationoflnternationalLaw, 1 YALE HUM. RTS. & DEV. L.J. 85, 88 (1998) ("The world of
international law is invariably presented as one in which the various substantive subject
matters areas exist in quasi-hermetical isolation... taught and treated as discrete areas,
subject to their own norms and institutional structures. The separate subject matter areas
are treated as a part of general international law, but often presented as organically
disconnected from each other. The whole is made up of a collection of fragmentary parts, the
implication being that the different parts only seldom, if ever, connect.") (footnote omitted).
318. HENKIN, supra note 257, at 30 (remarking that "every 'piece' of customary law is
different, develops in different circumstances, at a different rate of growth").
319. Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649, 669 (1944) (Roberts, J., dissenting) (voicing fear
that shifting precedent will appear like a restricted railroad ticket, "good for this day and
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Instead, the local theory is intended to establish an alternative
methodology that may prove useful for identifying actual or
potential instances of custom.
Second, notwithstanding the above, the local theory is not
designed to generate custom in order to meet some unfulfilled
need, though such a demand-centered perspective is occasionally
voiced.320 Thus, although Part IV contends that there is a budding
principle of antitrust comity that deserves recognition, it would not
be a failure of the local theory were it otherwise. Even in such
circumstances, the local theory may usefully suggest that if custom
cannot be established under such accommodating conditions, it may
not exist at all.
A Local Consent: The Possibility of Special Custom
Consent is the bugbear of custom. While some argue that
individual state consent is a prerequisite for any customary obligation, 21 and others shrink from the merest mention,32 many
argue that some form of consent is necessary --but that it may
be supplied by acquiescence, 32' subscription to the system of
320. E.g., Kirgis, supra note 247, at 147-48 (noting, with approval, the tendency to
recognize custom to respond to "need for stability" in cases involving armed force, as well as
the need to fill "ominous silences" regarding fundamental human rights); cf Daniel
Bodansky, Customary (andNot So Customary)InternationalEnvironmentalLaw, 3 IND. J.
GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 105, 111 (1995) ("As a growing number ofinternational legal scholars
are recognizing, there is a divergence between the traditional theoryofcustomarylaw, which
emphasizes consistent and uniform state practice, and the norms generally espoused as
'customary.') (citing authorities).
321. This view found its most concrete expression in contentions by Soviet writers that
new states were not bound by earlier custom. E.g., HENKIN, supra note 257, at 30-31 & n.*
(citing G.I. TUNKIN, TBEORYOFINTERNATIONALLAW 133 (E.E. Butler trans., 1974)); id. at 3536.
322. E.g., Jordan J. Paust, CustomaryInternationalLaw andHumanRights TreatiesAre
Law of the United States, 20 MICH. J. INT'LL. 301,315 (1999) (identifying as "incorrectfl" the
assertion "that state 'consent' is the basis of customary law"); accord International Law
Ass'n, supra note 32, at 38-40.
323. KAROL WOLFKE, CUSTOM IN PRESENT INTERNATIONAL LAW 162 (2d rev. ed. 1993)

(concluding that states may be bound "exclusively by their own sovereign will"); cf BYERS,
supra note 125, at 142 ("International lawyers have generally assumed that rules of
international law do not bind States against their will.").
324. BYERS, supranote 125, at 142-43 ("Mostinternationallawyers have relied oninferred
consent, in the form of acquiescence, to explain the consensual basis" of obligations not
expressly accepted); WOLFKE, supra note 323, at 97 (describing will relevant to custom as
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customary international law," consent by representative
na3 27
26
or perhaps by simply looking the other way.
There is no disputing, at least, that consent is a desirable
attribute, and it seems relatively well-satisfied when an identifiable
group of states choose to recognize a custom as binding-that is,
give express or implicit consent to be governed by a norm that may
or may not be more generally applicable. The existence of such
norms, variously described as "local," "special" or "particular"
custom, is now widely accepted, as is the notion that the common
3
interests addressed by the custom need not be regional in nature. 2
Special custom remains, however, a controversial method for
analyzing international law. 329 Among its virtues are the potential
tions,

"mostoften reduced to a mere tacit acquiescence in the practice"); Charney, supra note 24,
at 536-38.
325. BYERS, supranote 125, at 143-44 (citing examples among commentators).
326. HENKIN, supranote 257, at 36 (describing customary law as "not a product ofthe will
of states but a 'systemic creation,' reflecting the 'consent' of the international system, not the
consent of individual states"); id.at 38 ("Consent of the system need not include the consent
of all states but it must have the consent or acquiescence of many, varied states, 'active'
states, influential states, those that may be deemed to represent the whole system on a
particular issue.").
327. Fidler, supranote 292, at 208.
328. RightofPassage over India (Port.v. India), 1960 I.C.J. 6 (Apr. 12) at 39 ("It is difficult
to see why the number of States between which a local custom may be established on the
basis of long practice must necessarily be greater than two. The Court sees no reason why
long continued practice between two States accepted by them as regulating their relations
should not form the basis of mutual rights and obligations between the two States.");
RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supranote 17, § 102 cmts. b, e; ANTHONYA. D'AMATO, THE CONCEPT
OF CUSTOM ININTERNATIONAL LAw ch. 8 (1971); WOLFKE, supra note 323, at 88-89.
329. As previously noted, the objection that special customary law is limited to regional
matters attracts less support nowadays. BYERS, supra note 125, at 3 n.3. But whether
nonregional special custom requires more rigorous attention to consent is a point of
continuing dispute. According to one view, nonregional special custom requires explicit
recognition by all the states concerned, whereas the relative homogeneity of regional
interests permits custom to be enforced among all states absent persistent objection. MARK
E. VILLIGER, CUSTO iARYINTERNATIONALLAW AND TREATiES: AMANUAL ONTHE THEORYAND
PRACTICE OFTHE INTERRELATIONOF SOURCES 56-57 (2ded. 1997); see alsoH.W.A.THIRLWAY,
INTERNATIONAL CUSTOMARtYLAWAND CODIFICATION 13540 (1972) (evaluating whether new
members of a given community are bound by preexisting local, nonregional custom, and
noting that the apparent presumption against local custom means that any "State which
invokes such a rule will have to prove that it exists and is opposable to the State against
which it is invoked"). Others argue more generally that all of special custom requires a
distinctive focus on consent. Compare RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 17, § 102 cmt. e
(indicating that special custom "may be seen as essentially the result of tacit agreement
among the parties"), and D'AMATO, supra note 328, at 234 (concluding that, in contrast to
general custom, "[sipecial custom does indeed require stringent proof of consent or
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for accommodating diverse interests and values,3 ° and tempering
the antidemocratic tendency of custom to impose rules on nations,
subnational governments, and citizens that are offered little
genuine opportunity for participation."3 ' Deliberately opting to form
rules by special custom may, on the other hand, be regarded as
detracting from any parallel efforts at establishing general rules.33 2
As a forensic matter, in any event, there are sound reasons for
routinely examining whether special custom addresses a particular
international problem. Obviously, a special custom may exist even
in the absence of a more general custom, perhaps warranting its
examination in the alternative. But special custom may also
function as the proverbial canary in the coal mine: if no subset of
the world community has recognized a particular norm, its
existence in any wider setting may legitimately be called into
question. Such an analytic technique, if sound, may at least make
custom more falsifiable, a not unwelcome attribute in light of its
famous uncertainty.
There are evident advantages, certainly, to exploring the
possibility of special custom relating to extraterritorial antitrust.
The one-size-fits-all approaches of Hartford Fire and the
Restatement (Third)-theformer taking the view that only "true"
conflicts merit moderation, and the latter subjecting conflicts of
every type to the same reasonableness analysis-derived from the
self-imposed challenge of addressing wildly different contexts for
recognition of a practice on the part of the defendant state"), with WOLFKE, supra note 323,
at 90 (finding consensual requirementfor all custom, including general custom, with stronger
evidence tending to be required for particular customary rules). Most, I think, would agree
that courts are inclined to demand clearer evidence ofconsent with respect to special custom,
and nonregional special custom at a minimum requires greater attention to establishing a
relevant community. E.g., THIRLWAY, supra,at 139-40. But see O.A. ELIAS & C.L. LIM, THE
PARADOX OF CONSENSUALISM

IN INTERNATIONAL LAW

128-30 (1998) (contesting any

distinctions, including relating to burdens of proof, between general and special custom).
330. VILLIGER, supra note 329, at 56.
331. See supra text accompanying notes 290-91. But see supratext accompanying notes
292-93.
332. See VILLIGER, supra note 329, at 56-57 ("Ultimately, however, special rules will
exclude generalcustomary law, since the more States adhere to the special rule, the less will
the general rule attract the requisite widespread practice."); cf D'AMATO, supranote 328, at
236 (criticizing oral advocacy in South West Africa litigation against apartheid on ground
that it undermined force of argument for broad norm). Assuming a general rule is
established, of course, states are not ordinarily at liberty to opt out by tailoring a special
custom for themselves. DANILENKO, supranote 237, at 110-13.
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conflict." Given that charge, one may forgive Hartford Fire for
isolating only the most pointed type of conflict, thus avoiding the
prospect of creating an "'unregulated middle' in which no state
could exercise jurisdiction,"3"' while equally appreciating the
Restatement (Third) for refusing categorically to disregard any
potential conflicts, and so avoiding the dismal prospect
that the
335
most stringent regulations would routinely prevail.
Special custom avoids the need for such extremes by focusing on
relatively homogenous countries, practices, and problems.3 3 6 Among
nations with established antitrust authorities, for example, there
may be serious disagreements as to the legality of particular
conduct, but less so than among countries with fundamentally
different commitments toward free competition. Similarly, there is
less likelihood of fundamental jurisdictional disputes among
countries that recognize the effects doctrine or its equivalent. Such
an examination may reveal principles for determining the best
means of proceeding against conduct that would be illegal under
one or more regimes, as well as appropriate remedies. Determining
whether such principles amount to enforceable custom, however,
raises an entirely separate set of considerations.
B. Local Law: Accommodating New, and Emerging,Custom
In dualist systems like that of the United States, identifying
customary international law, and explaining why it is binding on
333. See supra text accompanying notes 279-85 (describing different types of conflict
subjected to reasonableness).
334. Robinson, supra note 268, at 1153 (objecting to draft Restatement (Third)on ground

that expanded breadth of conflicts imposed the risk that individuals might "create an
'unregulated middle' in which no state could exercise jurisdiction").
335. Such a result is particularly perverse in cases where the majority of interested
plaintiffs and defendants are foreign. Guzman, supranote 10, at 1533 (describing a variation
on the facts of HartfordFire in which the defendants and plaintiffs are almost uniformly
British).
336. Even antitrust, of course, can be disaggregated. Eleanor M. Fox, National Law,
Global Markets, and Hartford: Eyes Wide Shut, 68 ANTITRUST L.J. 73, 81-82 (2000)
(suggesting distinction among offshore cartels aimed at the regulating nation, offshore
targeted boycotts, internal market conduct with spillover effects, and mergers in world
markets with production assets in supportive home states); id. at 84-85 (suggesting prospect
for international consensus on choice-of-law for cases of naked, targeted restraints, cases of
internal market restraints, and cases of world markets and world effects).
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the sovereign, is only half the battle. An equivalent challenge lies
in unpacking its domestic consequences. For some, customary
law is an independent source offederal law, effective in all courts.33
For others, custom is only part of federal law where it has been
authorized by the federal political branches.338 The range of dispute
includes, naturally enough, whether Congress or the executive
branch may properly be deemed to have violated custom, and
whether such transgressions are matters more for the judgment of
other nations than for the domestic political process. The consensus
is especially unclear as to whether subsequently developed custom
overrides, by virtue of a "later-in-time" principle, a pre-existing
statute.3 9
337. Among the statements customarily cited for this proposition are the declaration in
The PaqueteHabanathat "[jinternational law is part of our law," The Paquete Habana, 175
U.S. 677, 700 (1900), and the statement in The Nereide that U.S. courts are "bound by the
law of nations which is a part ofthe law of the land," The Nereide, 13 U.S. (9 Cranch) 388,
423 (1815). See also Filartigav. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 885 (2d Cir. 1980) (concludingthat,
for jurisdictional purposes, "the law of nations ... has always been part of the federal
common law"); Republic of Argentina v. City of New York, 250 N.E.2d 698, 700 (N.Y. 1969)
("It is settled that, where there is neither a treaty, statute nor controlling judicial precedent,
all domestic courts must give effect to customary international law."); RESTATEMENT(THIRD),
supranote 17, § 111(1) ("International law and international agreements ofthe United States
are law of the United States and supreme over the law of the several States."); id. at § 111
cmt. d ("As law of the United States, international law is also the law of every State, is a
basis for the exercise ofjudicial authority by State courts, and is cognizable in cases in State
courts, in the same way as other United States law."). See generally Koh, supra note 21
(defendingposition that international law is federal law); Neuman, supra note 21 (responding
to critiques of federal handling of customary international law); Paust, supra note 322.
338. Professors Bradley and Goldsmith have consistently argued for this view. Curtis A.
Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Customary InternationalLaw: A Critique of the Modern
Position,110 HARV. L. REV. 815, 849-70 (1997); Bradley & Goldsmith, FederalCourts,supra
note 21, at 2260; Bradley & Goldsmith, The CurrentIllegitimacy, supranote 21, at 319.
339. Thus, most case law and commentary indicate that later-in-time statutes would
prevail over prior inconsistent custom, but hedge as to whether the converse is true. See
supra note 307 (discussing Restatement (Third)sections 114, 115); Bradley, The Charming
Betsy Canon, supra note 34, at 497-98 (observing that "it is well settled that, when
confronted with a clear conflict between a federal statute and an earliertreaty or customary
international law, U.S. courts are to apply the statute") (emphasis added); id. at 498 n.98
(describing "unanimousG" view of lower courts, and Supreme Court dicta, to the effect that
"Congress can violate customary international law"); Stefan A. Riesenfeld, The Powers of
Congress and the Presidentin InternationalRelations:Reuisited, 87 CAL. L. REV. 817, 824
(1999) ("[Clustomary international law, even if self-executing, will not be enforced for the
benefit ofindividuals if it conflicts with a Congressional statute, at least so long as the rule
of customary international law is not a newly emerging one.") (citations omitted). See
generally Paust, Customary InternationalLaw, supra note 322, at 319-20 (describing split
in authorities, but claiming tentative trend supporting the proposition that customary law

2001]

LOCAL LAW OF GLOBAL ANTITRUST

713

Such squabbles have no direct bearing on the underlying
international obligation-even if U.S. law does not permit its courts
to enforce international law, the United States is still responsible
for any violations"--but surely have internal and external
repercussions. A compromise position, as it happens, is that U.S.
law may at least indirectlyreflect customary international law. The
presumption against extraterritoriality, for example, is designed to
construe statutes so as to minimize conflicts between U.S. and
foreign or international law. 4 ' To the extent that the presumption
actually depends on international law, however, it is regrettably
static; increased acceptance of extraterritorial legislation, whether
generally or in the relevant field, surely undermines its premises. 42
The presumption against extraterritoriality is also quite crude.
Even if it were overcome long ago in the antitrust context, 4 that
says very little about whether and how jurisdiction ought be
moderated.
The CharmingBetsy presumption against construing statutes to
violate international law is a more nuanced and discerning tool.3 4 4

The canon's broadbased support stems at least in part from its wide
prevails over inconsistent state statutes); Garland A. Kelley, Note, Does Customary
InternationalLaw Supersede a FederalStatute?, 37 COLUM. J. TRANSNATL L. 507, 512-14
(1999) (describing "theoretical adjustments" madeto accommodate claim for permitting laterin-time custom to prevail, but concluding that the position is unsound).
340. Thus, evaluating Judge Wilkey's concerns in Laker Airways, Professor Meessen
observed:
International law mainly prescribes obligations binding upon sovereign states.
It always leaves undecided which branch of government should ensure
compliance with those obligations. An international law rule requiring some
balancing of interests could therefore be assumed to exist independently of
whether, within the domestic legal system, it would have to be applied by the
judiciary and/or the executive branch.

Meessen, supra note 51, at 801; see also Laker Airways Ltd. v. Sabena, Belgian World
Airlines, 731 F.2d 909, 950 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (setting forth Judge Wilkey's concerns).
341. E.g., EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244, 248-59 (1991).
342. See supratext accompanying notes 60-66.
343. Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764, 814 (1993) (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(citing Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 582 n.6 (1986);
Continental Ore Co. v. Union Carbide & Carbon Corp., 370 U.S. 690, 704 (1962); United
States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416 (2d. Cir. 1945)).
344. Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 118 (1804) (holding that

"an act of Congress ought never to be construed to violate the law of nations if any other
possible construction remains"). This canon is "wholly independent" of the presumption
against extraterritoriality. ArabianAm. Oil Co., 499 U.S. at 264 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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variety of rationales. 4 5 Courts and commentators often endorse it
as an unalloyed principle of legislative intent, on the assumption
that Congress would not ordinarily elect to violate international
law.146 Others defend the canon as a means of reconciling domestic
law with international legal values; 47 although it does not permit
enforcement of international law in the event of pitched conflict
with a federal statute, it avoids a "pathological" focus on those
relatively rare occasions,"~ in keeping with an internationally
reputable technique. 49 Professor Bradley has recently defended it
more in separation of powers terms, based on the constitutional
assignment of foreign affairs to the political branches and their
functional advantages in conducting foreign relations.5 0 As he
explains, applying the CharmingBetsy canon allows the courts to
sound out the political branches as to whether and how they wish
to violate international law, reduces judicial interpretations
mistakenly placing the United States in conflict with customary
international law, and reduces inadvertent interference by
Congress with the president's diplomatic prerogatives. 5 1

345. But see Jonathan Turley, DualisticValues in theAge oflnternationalLegisprudence,
44 HASTINGS L.J. 185 (1993) (arguing for rejection of the CharmingBetsy canon, in favor of
a more expansive judicial role).
346. Bradley, The Charming Betsy Canon, supra note 34, at 495-97 (describing theory);
e.g., RESTATEMENT (TID), supra note 17, § 115 cmt. a (stating that "[i]t is generally
assumed that Congress does not intend to repudiate an international obligation ofthe United
States by nullifying a rule of international law or an international agreement as domestic
law").
347. Professor Bradley describes this as an "internationalist conception." Bradley, The
Charming Betsy Canon, supra note 34, at 497-504 (describing, and rejecting, this
conception); e.g., Amerada Hess Shipping Corp. v. Argentine Republic, 830 F.2d 421 (2d Cir.
1987), rev'd on other grounds, 488 U.S. 428, 438 (1989); Ralph G. Steinhardt, The Role of
InternationalLaw as a Canon of Domestic Statutory Construction, 43 VAND. L. REV. 1103
(1990).
348. Steinhardt, supranote 347, at 1109-10.
349. E.g., Brief for the Government of Canada as Amicus Curiae in Support of Certain
Petitioners, Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764 (1993) (Nos. 91-1111, 91-1128)
(citing similar practices in Canada and the United Kingdom).
350. Bradley, The Charming Betsy Canon, supra note 34, at 524-29.
351. Id.; cf Steinhardt, supra note 347, at 1129-34 (describingpossibilityofanincomplete,
"dualist" rationale based on separation of powers concerns). As Bradley notes, the result
resembles the Supreme Court's reasoning inBancoNacionalde Cuba v.Sabbatino,376 U.S.
398,431-34 (1964), which affirmed the act-of-state doctrine based on concerns about judicial
competence and authority. Bradley, The Charming Betsy Canon, supra note 34, at 528-29.
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Nothing in the CharmingBetsy canon speaks, however, to the
standard that domestic courts should apply in reckoning the
customary law that bears on statutory questions,3 52 and here the
consensus begins to unravel. An internationalist approach would
take a relatively expansive view of the forms of custom that might
contribute to statutory analysis, arguing that even "soft" law, or
other indicia of custom valued in the "international community as
a whole," ought play a role.35 3 In Professor Bradley's view, on the
other hand, the separation of powers warrant for the canon can only
be maintained if courts play a more modest role, deferring to the
political branches as to the content of international law and
requiring"clear evidence of the international law principles alleged
to be violated," especially in nontraditional areas of custom.35 4
Custom's innate subjectivity surely raises serious questions
regarding the judiciary's role. The problem is only worsened by the
difficulty of ensuring internal consistency: because U.S. judicial
precedent construing custom may easily be overtaken by evolving
international behaviors, recurring questions of custom may legitimately generate divergent answers in successive cases. 5 5 This is
not to deny the possibility of a common discourse for evaluating
custom. 3 "6 But the looseness with which custom is examined in

352. Steinhardt, supra note 347, at 1164.
353. Id. at 1180-82.
354. Bradley, The Charming Betsy Canon, supra note 34, at 533.
355. The problem is not unlike, for example, the difficulty federal courts may have in
reckoning state common law in diversity cases. In the instant context, however, federal
courts construing international custom have no equivalent to state supreme courts to which
they might turn.
356. In addressing the issue of opinojuris,Sir Humphrey Waldcock noted that
[it may... be conceded that the formation of custom is often a gradual process,
so that it is difficult to say exactly when it becomes a matter of legal right and
obligation; and it may further be conceded that there is a large element of
appreciation in making that determination. Nevertheless, the appreciation
must ultimately be based upon some legal criterion and Article 38 is quite
explicit that the test is whether or not there is a general practice accepted as
law.
Humphrey Waldcock, General Course on Public InternationalLaw, in 106 RECUEIL DES
COUS 5, 47 (1962). Such a discourse might, conceivably, generate determinative answers
as to the content of international law used for interpretive purposes. E.g., Steinhardt, supra
note 347, at 1143, 1146-52 (arguing that it is ironic to construe statutes in light of comity,
since it would be a poor candidate for status as customary law even under undemanding
standards).
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CharmingBetsy and like cases,3 57 and the underlying theoretical
difficulties, raise the question of whether "clear" evidence adequately constrains the courts, or whether we even can develop a
collective sense of what would constitute clear evidence.
The best solution, I would argue, lies within the CharmingBetsy
opinion itself. The Court's failure there to engage in a close reading
of the custom at issue is less of a lapse than part of a practice
of compounded avoidance-avoiding, that is, not only statutory
constructions that would violate international law, but also
constructions that might be regardedas violating international law
(or, for that matter, lesser principles), 3 ' and by the same token
avoiding definitive constructions of international law that might
place a statute or other political act in jeopardy were they
maintained. Such an approach certainly helps prevent unnecessary
international controversies of the kind the canon generally seeks to
avoid. More tentative readings of custom also maximize the freedom
of the political branches to persist in contrary readings of international law, or to evolve toward divergent views in the future. The
357. Murrayv. Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64,118 (1804) (asserting that
duty to avoid constructions "violatring] the law of nations if any other possible construction
remains" entails the duty to avoid constructions that would "violate neutral rights, or ...
affect neutral commerce, further than is warranted by the law of nations as understood in
this country," without construing law ofnations); e.g., EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S.
244, 255 (1991) (noting that extraterritorial reading of title VII would raise "difficult issues
ofinternational law"); Romero v. International Terminal Operating Co., 358 U.S. 354,382-83
(1959) (stating that "inthe absence of a contrary congressional direction," courts should apply
"principles of choice of law that are consonant with the needs of a general federal maritime
law and with due recognition ofour self-regarding respect for the relevant interests offoreign
nations in the regulation of maritime commerce as part of the legitimate concern of the
international community," so heeding "the interacting interests of the United States and of
foreign countries"). For criticism, see Steinhardt, supra note 347, at 1135-38; id. 1138-39
(discussing CharmingBetsy);id. at 1168-71 (discussingAmericanBaptistChurchesu. Meese);
id. at 1171-73 & n.297 (discussing appellate decision inArgentineRepublic v. AmeradaHess
Shipping Corp.).
358. Numerous cases thought to depend at least in part on the CharmingBetsy canon
advert less to concrete legal matters than to international controversies stemming from
foreign effects and perceived legal conflicts. InMeCulloch v. SociedadNacionaldeMarineros
de Honduras,for example, the Court alluded to a"well-established rule ofinternational law,"
that "the law of the flag state ordinarily governs the internal affairs of a ship," without
explaining whether the application of U.S. labor laws would present a true conflict.
McCulloch v. Sociedad Nacional de Marineros, 372 U.S. 10, 21 (1963). The greater weight
was given to "[tihe possibility of international discord," or retaliation, and the "highly
charged international circumstances" in a manner disassociated with the presence of any
actual violation. Id. at 21.
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Charming Betsy canon, in this regard, is like the principle of
construing statutes to avoid deciding "serious" constitutional
questions, 5 9 in that courts should construe statutes to avoid
"potentialviolations of international law." 60
According this broader swathe to custom may serve the
separation of powers in some respects, but it clearly poses offsetting
risks. One is that courts will underenforce federal mandates. 6 ' In
addition, heeding less determinate international law-even within
the limitations imposed by statutory text-may verge on a political
enterprise. 6 2 In the instant context, indeed, it may appear to let the
reasonableness standard in through the back door.
Those concerns are largely contained, I believe, by a second
element of CharmingBetsy: its attention to "the law of nations as
understoodin this country."3 ' Local courts are probably inevitably
biased toward the local understanding of international law, 64 and
every rationale that might be mustered for the Charming Betsy
canon suggests that they ought to be. If the canon is at least partly
an estimate of congressional intent,6 5 that clearly places a premium
359. E.g., NLRB v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago, 440 U.S. 490,500 (1979) (citingMcCulloch,
372 U.S. at 21, and CharmingBetsy, 6 U.S. at 118). But see Steinhardt, supra note 347, at
1131 (describing this application of CharmingBetsy as "seriously flawed").
360. United States v. Yunis, 924 F.2d 1086, 1091 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (emphasis added). In
Sabbatino,the Court took on a time-honored doctrine ofobscure footing, and did relatively
little to lend clarity-as evidenced by the continuing debate over whether the Court was
really applying customary international law, see, e.g., Bradley & Goldsmith, Customary
InternationalLaw, supranote 338, at 828-30,859-60; Koh, supranote 21, at 1833, or at least
cleared the way for its incorporation into federal common law, RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra
note 17, § 111 reporters' note 3 ("Based on the implications of Sabbatino, the modern view
is that customary international law in the United States is federal law and its determination
by the federal courts is binding on the State courts."); Neuman, supra note 21, at 375-76.
361. Bradley, The Charming Betsy Canon, supra note 34, at 532.
362. Cf Banco Nacional De Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 428 (1964) ("It should be
apparentthat the greater the degree ofcodification or consensus concerning aparticular area
ofintemational law, the more appropriate it is for the judiciary to render decisions regarding
it, since the courts can then focus on the application of an agreed principle to circumstances
of fact rather than on the sensitive task of establishing a principle not inconsistent with the
national interest or with international justice."); see alsoHarold Hongju Koh, Transnational
PublicLaw Litigation, 100 YALE L.J. 2347, 2386-87 (1991).
363. CharmingBetsy, 6 U.S. at 118 (emphasis added).
364. Born, supra note 252, at 82 & n.399 (observing that cases applying the Charming
Betsy canon have particularly stressed the ALI's Restatements ofForeignRelations Law and
Conflicts of Law, as well as case law from common law countries).
365. While it is hard to defend the canon entirely on an interpretive conceit, given the
difficulties in generalizing about congressional intent and in assuming that Congress always
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on determining what the political branches understand to be
international law. A separation of powers approach also suggests
that courts should be attentive to occasions when the political
branches have deliberately flouted international norms, and
equally sensitive to the possibility that they may have done so
inadvertently. 66 Finally, though an internationalist approach
favors rigorous judicial supervision, 3 7 it would be difficult to
maintain adequate respect for the primacy of custom's intergovernmental character were judicial decisions-themselves
evidence of custom-allowed to proceed heedlessly.
This preference for local understanding does not require a
parochial focus on the positions staked by those branches
themselves, which we should assume are also capable of appreciating the views of their sovereign counterparts.3 6 Nor does it
require subscribing to the view that custom is federal law only by
virtue of independent, political-branch lawmaking. 69 But where
avoids conflict, see Bradley, The Charming Betsy Canon, supra note 34, at 518-23, it is
equally hard to disregard that objective altogether, see id. at 533 (concluding that the
CharmingBetsycanon's legislative intent warrant, though not strong, "probably still carries
some force").
366. Bradley, The Charming Betsy Canon, supra note 34, at 525-26, 533.
367. E.g., FRANCK, supra note 317.
368. Though arguing along somewhat similar lines, Gary Born seems to equate "U.S.
understandings of international law" with "the treatment of international law in the United
States," laying particular emphasis'on the readings ofinternational law by U.S. courts. Born,
supra note 252, at 82. For reasons previously discussed, such authorities are not the most
convincing evidence of international law; given frequent criticism in official U.S.
commentary, they maynot even be terriblyprobative of the politicalbranches'understanding
of the law.
369. Professor Bradley, for example, argues that it is inconsistent to suppose that both the
federal courts and the president have been delegated the authority to construe custom, and
in fact finds no authority for either exercise; the conflict, he concludes, "recogniz[es] that
customary international law is not inherently part of United States federal law, whether
common law or otherwise," and only achieves that status "if brought in by the political
branches." Bradley, Chevron Deference, supranote 34, at 708-09. Treating custom as federal
law may indeed be problematic. See supra text accompanying notes 337-39 (discussing
controversy). But the president's authority to contribute to custom's interpretation need not
invariably be located in a separate, mutually exclusive statutory or constitutional grant.
Bradley, Chevron Deference, supra note 34, at 708-09. Instead, it derives from the national
government's inherent function in contributing to custom's formation. Compare id. at 707
("Customary international law is not made by an act of the President, or the President and
the Senate acting together; it is made instead by the overall beliefs and practices ofthe world
community."), with id. at 688 ("The executive branch is considered this nation's principal
representative with respect to international law matters, and courts generally give
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primary sources suggest that the inquiry is a close one, any clear
position staked out by the local sovereign should be favored in
construinglocal political enactments. 70 This approach also bears on
the treatment of emerging custom. As noted previously, it is
inappropriate for a court to regard a yet-emerging custom
as
equivalent to one that has fully bloomed; at the same time, the line
between the two is often hard to draw, and gainsaying a position
taken by the political branches on the question may unduly
interfere. The best approach, on balance, is to permit legitimate, if
not necessarily wholly mature, assertions of customary international law to influence the judicial construction of domestic law,
without requiring that courts take a position on the existence or
relevance of that norm at the precise moment of decision.
Perhaps unsurprisingly, this approach is well suited to antitrust.
The Sherman Act is notorious for conferring interpretive freedom
on the courts and federal agencies,37 1 including the authority to
reconcile its reach with international law. In enacting the Foreign
Trade Antitrust Improvements Act of 198272 and the International
substantial weight to the executive branch interpretations of international law.").
370. Born suggests that those considerations "at a minimum" ought to counsel in favor of
U.S. political constructions whenever "there are differences" between U.S. and foreign

government positions. Born, supra note 252, at 82-83; see also HENEIN, supranote 257, at
511 n.21 (arguing that courts "ought to follow" executive branch positions on international
law questions). That duty of consistency surely should be limited, however, where the
political branches are so at odds with foreign sentiment as to be outliers, without having
secured the right to object to customs formation; otherwise, the judiciary would in effect be
sanctioning lawbreaking, and suggesting a course of conduct more likely to encourage than
discourage clashes with foreign sovereigns.
371. E.g., Appalachian Coals, Inc. v. United States, 288 U.S. 344,359.60 (1933) (describing
the Sherman Act as a "charter of freedom," with "a generality and adaptability comparable
to that found... in constitutional provisions"); see also 1 AREEDA & HOvENKAMP, supra note
50, 103, at 63 (explaining that 'the Sherman Act effectively vested the federal courts with
a power to make competition policy analogous to that of common law courts"); id. 1 103 at
62-63 (observing that'judges sometimes talk as if Congress has already decided the question
beforethembut Ithiis usually amisconception"); FrankH. EasterbrookStatute'Domains,
50 U. Cmt. L. REV. 533, 544-47, 551-52 (1983) (contrasting broad enactments such as the
Sherman Act that invite courts to fashion common lawwith more precise enactments whose
gaps should not be filled).
372. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1, 6a,45(aX3) (2000). The House Report explained that the bill was:
[Ilntended neither to prevent nor to encourage additional judicial recognition

ofthe special international characteristics oftransactions. Ifa court determines
that the requirements for subject matter jurisdiction are met, this bill would
have no effect on the courts' ability to employ notions of comity, or otherwise to
take account of the international character of the transaction.
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Antitrust Enforcement Assistance Act of 1994,"' 8 Congress appears
to have deliberately avoided addressing the propriety of
Timberlane and kindred jurisdictional tests. In taking advantage
of this latitude, courts applying the Charming Betsy canon have
properly refrained from resolving the scope of the custom bearing
on the question. 7 4 The result allows arguably "soft" principles like
comity the opportunity to emerge as international law.375 If such
H.R. REP. No. 97-686, at 13 (1982), reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2487, 2498 (citation
omitted). Commentators vary in assessing the relevant legislative history. Compare, e.g.,
Dam, supranote 130, at 301 (construing the House Report as having "apparently endorsed"
comity), with O.N.E. Shipping Ltd. v. Flota Mercante Grancolumbia-NA, S.A., 830 F.2d 449,
457 (2d Cir. 1987) (Cardamone, J., dissenting) (concluding, based on legislative history of
FTAIA, that Congress left to the courts "how to employ notions of international comity in
extraterritorial antitrust cases"), and Kramer, supra note 50, at 756 (noting that the
legislative history indicates that "Congress deliberately left the problem of extraterritorial
limits to the courts"). See also GARY B. BORN & DAVID WESTIN, INTERNATIONAL CIVIL
LITIGATION IN UNITED STATES CouRTs 615 (2d ed. 1992) (noting congressional consideration
of bill that would have explicitly included comity in Clayton Act).
373. 15 U.S.C. §§ 6201-6212 (2000); H.R. REP. No. 103-772, at 8 (1994), reprintedin 1994
U.S.C.C.A.N. 3647, 3648 (noting changing judicial interpretation of the "plain language of
the Sherman Act" from American Banana to Timberlane to HartfordFire, and noting that
"[tihe affirmative commitment of our economic partners to develop a comprehensive and
binding competition policy would do much to free the courts of having to play the periodic
role of arbiter on questions very often involving international political concerns as much as
the substantive interpretation ofthe Sherman Act"); id. at 10, reprintedin 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N.
3647, 3651 (noting that "there have also been a number of more recent cases in which courts
have addressed the subject of when comity considerations may counsel against the exercise
of jurisdiction").
374. E.g., Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764, 814-15 (1993) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting) (invoking the Charming Betsy canon); id. at 817 (citing other invocations in
Sherman Act context); id. at 818 ("[W]hether the Restatement precisely reflects international
law in every detail matters little here, as I believe this litigation would be resolved the same
way under virtually any conceivable test that takes account offoreign regulatory interests.");
United States v. Nippon Paper Indus. Co., 109 F.3d 1, 9-13 (1st Cir. 1997) (Lynch, J.,
concurring) (citing CharmingBetsycanon, and applyingprinciples oftheRestatement (Third)
thought to be "derived from international law"); O.N.E. Shipping Ltd., 830 F.2d at 452
(concluding that Congress "left it to the courts to decide when to employ notions of abstention
from exercising jurisdiction in extraterritorial antitrust cases"); United States v. Aluminum
Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416, 443 (2d Cir. 1945) (cautioning that "we are not to read general
words, such as those in [the Sherman] Act, without regard to the limitations customarily
observed by nations upon the exercise of their powers; limitations which generally
correspond to those fixed by the 'Conflict of Laws').
375. I OPPENHEIM'S INTERNATIONAL LAW 51 (Robert Jennings & Arthur Watts eds., 9th
ed. 1992) ("[Many a rule which formerly was a rule of international comity only is nowadays
a rule of international law.... It is probable that many a present rule of international comity
will in future become one of international law."); see also The Over the Top, 5 F.2d 838, 842
(D. Conn. 1925) (concluding that, though customary international law "bends to the will of
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principles are more than merely colorable, and can be reconciled
with federal antitrust laws, unnecessary conflict with domestic
political enactments perhaps may be avoided.
C. Local Actors: DifferentiatingAuthority
Respect for the separation of powers may seem superficial-when
the judiciary posits customary norms that purportedly bind the
political branches. An international law of antitrust, for example,
might constrain not only the initial exercise of prosecutorial
discretion by the U.S. government, but also the ability ofthe federal
courts to assist in any party's enforcement of the Sherman Act. In
the face of such custom, half-measures are awkward. Deferring to
the executive stewardship of foreign relations, for example, would
simply leave U.S. law inconsistent with our international
obligations.

376

Even the reasonableness norm, however, suggests that U.S.
courts need not always play such an intrusive role in order to
vindicate international law. Arguments in support of reasonableness generally supposed that the norm should be applied equally to
public and private enforcement of the laws. But the United States
and a number of other nations consistently indicated that they
did not regard sovereign enforcement as open to judicial review;
absent their support, in fact, it is quite difficult to find sources of
international law that would support reasonableness or any kindred
constraint. Under the circumstances, domestic norms favoring
judicial review may be misplaced.3 77 Judicial review is not, after all,
the Congress ... unless it unmistakably appears that a congressional act was intended to be
in disregard of a principle of international comity, the presumption is that it was intended
to be in conformity with it").
376. Unless, ofcourse, the international law is later-in-time, andis deemedto override the
domestic law. See supra text accompanying note 339.

377. E.g., W.S. Kirkpatrick & Co. v. Environmental Tectonics Corp., Intl, 493 U.S. 400,
409 (1990) (stating that [clourts in the United States have the power, and ordinarily the
obligation, to decide cases and controversies properly presented to them); Japan Whaling
Ass'n v. American Cetacean Soc'y, 478 U.S. 221, 229-30 (1986) (stating that "it is 'error to
suppose that every case or controversy which touches foreign relations lies beyond judicial
cognizance'" (quoting Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 211 (1969)); The Paquette Habana, 175
U.S. 677, 700 (1900) ("International law is part of our law, and must be ascertained and
administeredby the courts ofjustice ofappropriate jurisdiction, as often as questions of right
depending upon it are duly presented for their determination.").
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the only (or even the principal) means of ensuring compliance with
international law, 378 and its absence is scarcely tantamount to
denying a norm's status as law. 7 9
This illustrates a more general methodological point: the terms
of customary international law must be carefully scrutinized with
an eye toward the parties a norm is supposed to constrain, as well
as the means by which it is to be enforced against them. As
previously mentioned, international law ordinarily binds the nation
as a whole, without respect to horizontal or vertical division of
powers within the municipal system. But it would be perfectly
intelligible-for example, were custom to constrain national
governments without constraining private parties or subnational
governments-to constrain all three while limiting the power of
judicial review, or compose different constraints on different
parties. The mere fact that subnational governments or private
378. Head Money Cases, 112 U.S. 580,598(1884) (noting that, while atreatymayprovide
for individual redress, it "depends for the enforcement of its provisions on the interest and
the honor of the governments which are parties to it. Ifthese fail, its infraction becomes the
subject of international negotiations and reclamations, so far as the injured party chooses
to seek redress, which may in the end be enforced by actual war. It is obvious that with all
this the judicial courts have nothing to do and can give no redress."); HENKIN,supra note 257,
at 62 (explaining that compliance may be self-induced or encouraged through horizontal
negotiation on a bilateral or multilateral plane, third-party intervention, or even self-help);
id. at 50 (describing horizontal enforcement by the victim state, often threatened retaliation,
as "[t]he principal inducement[s] to compliance with international law"); cf Michael J.
Glennon, Two Views of PresidentialForeignAffairs Power: Little v. Barreme or CurtissWright?, 13 YALE J. INT'L L. 5, 15 (1988) (observing that "[iun international law, as well as
in these frequently non-justiciable stretches of constitutional terrain, embarrassment is the
principal, and sometimes the only, sanction that the law can impose. It often is the central
means of maintaining the integrity of the legal system, of preserving the rule of law."). But
cf Chorz6w Factory (Ger. v. Pol.), 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No.9, at 21 (July26) ("It is a principle
of international law that the breach of an engagement involves an obligation to make
reparation in an adequate form. Reparation therefore is the indispensable complement of a
failure to apply a convention and there is no necessity for this to be stated in the convention
itself.").
Somehow, in any event, such informal means manage to ensure that "almost all nations
observe almost all principles of international law and almost all of their obligations almost
all of the time." LOUIS HENKIN, HOW NATIONS BEHAVE: LAW AND FOREIGN POLICY 47 (2d ed.
1979) (emphasis omitted); Robert O. Keohane, When Does InternationalLaw Come Home?,
35 HOUS. L. REV. 699 (1998); see also INTERNATIONAL COMPLIANCE WITH NONBINDING
ACCORDS (Edith Brown Weiss ed., 1997) (discussing observance of international law even in
cases of soft law).
379. Cf H.LAUTERPACHT, THEFUNCTIONOFLAWINTHEINTERNATIONALCOMMzUNiTY13965 (1933) (arguing that denominating issues as political rather than legal, and withdrawing
them from international consideration, still permits "the possibility] ofjudicial settlement").
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parties are inherently unable to conform to internationally binding
principles, accordingly, may suggest that a national government is
compelled to take prophylactic action to limit their exercise of
authority, or connote that customary international law is simply
inapplicable to them, depending upon the context.
The nature of the legal duty may be highly instructive on these
questions. Proponents ofthe reasonableness norm, as we have seen,
generally regard it as an enforceable jurisdictional limitation, to be
evaluated de novo in judicial proceedings. But it might also be
conceived of as a procedural principle, an "instruction to decisionmakers to undertake the process of analysis and assessment,"8 0
while maintaining the principal's sovereignty over the principle's
application. Whether or not this is the only sort of custom that
ought be recognized, 8 ' there is a good argument for indulging
constructions of this kind, particularly where-as in comity's
case-they are designed to perfect, rather than supplant, political
relations. Such norms plainly demand different treatment than
those susceptible to independent, ahistorical evaluation by courts.
To take an infamous example, the Vienna Convention on Consular
Relations-which largely codifies customary international lawrequires notifying the relevant consular post when a foreign
national is detained, but does not purport to license judicial review
of whether subsequent diplomatic communications are given due
of
consideration, let alone demand the independent evaluation
82
heeded.
be
ought
interests
foreign
how
and
whether
Custom may, indeed, vest discretion in individual states to
implement an objective in the fashion best suited to their municipal
orders, including as to the kind of parties it constrains. As the
original Draft Articles on State Responsibility indicated, inter380. SCHACHTER, supranote 240, at 259; see also Meessen, supra note 252, at 62.
381. Professor Kelly, arguing generally against custom as a source of international legal
obligation, appears to look more favorably on what he characterizes as "structural
norms"-apparently including diplomatic immunity-that are "primarily permissive and
uncontroversial." Kelly, supra note 21, at 479-81.
382. Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, Apr. 24, 1963, art. 36(1)(b), 21 U.S.T. 77,
596 U.N.T.S. 261 (imposing duty to notify consular post ofnational's detention, and to notify
national of attending rights). The Convention does not, it should be stressed, impose a
different obligation on U.S. state authorities, though enforcing it against the states has
proven difficult. Breard v. Greene, 523 U.S. 371, 377-78 (1998). See generally Jonathan I.
Agora: Breard, 92 ABI. J. INTVL L. 666 (1998).
Charney et al.,
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national obligations may oblige a state to follow a certain course of
conduct, but equally may give the state latitude to achieve an
obligatory end. 83 In an international order premised on national
sovereignty,3 8 ' it seems appropriate to presume that such discretion
exists absent evidence to the contrary. Such a presumption is
particularly appropriate where the principle in question is abstract
in nature, such as reasonableness," a and still more so when it is
objective-oriented, as with rules designed to minimize conflict over
the exercise of national jurisdiction.
By affecting the appraisal of otherwise ambiguous cases, such
presumptions may be perceived as undermining the national
commitment to judicial enforcement of custom, or as betraying our
obligation to conform U.S. law to international norms irrespective
of municipal eccentricities. But such concerns put the cart before
383. International L. Comm'n, Draft Articles on State Responsibility, arts. 20, 21 (first
reading, 1996) [hereinafter Draft Articles on State Responsibility (First Reading)]
(distinguishing between obligations of particular conduct and obligations to achieve, "by
means of its own choice," a specified result), availableat http://www.un.org/law/ilc/reports/
1996/chap03.htm#doc38 ; see also 2 Y.B. Int'l L. Comm'n. pt. 2, at 11-30 (1977), U.N. Doc
AICN.4ISER.A11977/Add.1 (78.V.2) (commentaries to articles 20 and 21, adopted by the
Commission at its 29th session). Both articles were deleted in the draft second reading, in
part to avoid confusion created by contrary terminology in French law. James Crawford &
Pierre Bodeau, Second Reading of the ILC Draft Articles on State Responsibility: Further
Progress,2 INTL L.F. 45 (2000); Report ofthe InternationalLaw Commission on the Work of
132-186, U.N. Dec.
its Fifty-FirstSession, International L. Comm'n, 51st Sess., no. 10,
A/54/10 (1999), availableathttp/www.unorg/law/ilc/reports/1999/english/99repfra.htm. But
much the same basic distinction exists in the revised article 12's reference to the varying
"character" of international obligations. Crawford & Bodeau, supra; State Responsibility.
Titles and Texts of the Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Intentionally Wrongful
Acts Adopted by the Drafting Committee on Second Reading, art. 12, Intel L. Comm'n, 53d
Sess., no. 10, at 4, U.N. Doc. AICN.4/L.602/Rev.1 (2001) [hereinafter Draft Articles on State
Responsibility (Second Reading)], availableathttp /lwww.un.org/lawilc/sessions/53/english
602revle.pdf. A similar distinction is present in the law of remedies. Filartiga v. Pena-Irala,
577 F. Supp. 860,863 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) (noting responsibility of individual nations to develop
remedies appropriate to violation of international law against torture); id. at 863-64
(considering Paraguayan law and interests under U.S. choice-of-law principles to determine
remedy).
384. But see STEPHEN D. KRASNER, SOVEREIGNTY: ORGANIZED HYPOCRISY (1999) (arguing

that claims for sovereignty, particularly those relating to the right to exclude external
authority, are routinely exaggerated).
385. See, for example, the separate opinion of Judge Alvarez in FisheriesCase (U.K. v.
Nor.), 1951 I.C.J. 116 (Dec. 18), in which he concluded that states may individually
determine the extent of their territorial seas, and the means of measuring them, so long as
their approaches satisfied general criteria-including reasonableness, as reckoned by
geographic and economic considerations.
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the horse-presupposing that norms are articulated, adopted, and
sustained without regard to complications in their eventual enforcement. 8 It may, in any event, be possible to develop alternative
strategies for ensuring compliance with international norms. One
such possibility, as we will see, is presented by the U.S. federal
system and the divided responsibility for enforcing antitrust.
IV. THE CASE FOR ANTITRUST COMITY
It seems fairly clear, for reasons already detailed, that the
reasonableness principle comports neither with the conventional
approach to custom nor with that of local international law. State
practice does not specify the factors elaborated (inconsistently) by
the theory's various proponents, nor suggest that they are regarded
as legally binding in the antitrust context or otherwise. As
presently articulated, moreover, the reasonableness norm is applied
as a decisive limit on all attempts to invoke antitrust jurisdiction,
albeit with little practical effect. The question remains, however,
whether any other legal principles might be divined. I suggest below
that a local law of antitrust may exist, founded on many of the same
premises as regulatory comity, but without certain of its signal
limitations. After examining whether the uncertain status of
antitrust comity is compatible with U.S. law, I.argue that the norm
may be most significant as a basis for re-examining the authority
of private and state attorneys general.
A. Antitrust Comity as Special Custom
Comity, writ large, is considered by many to be something less
388
than law.3"' Not everyone agrees, of course. Some commentators,
386. Cf Bradley, Chevron Deference, supranote 34, at 650-53 (describing reservations to
"Marburyperspective").
387. See supra text accompanying notes 244-49, 428-29.
388. I INTERNATIONAL LAW: COLLECTED PAPERS OF HERSCH LAUTERPACHT 43-46 (E.

Lauterpachted., 1970) (cautioning that excludingissues described as involving comitywould

marginalize matters "clearly governed by international law"); F.A. MANN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS
INENGLISH COURTS 134, 137 (1986) (arguing that "in most cases the meaning of comity is
coextensive whith [sic] public international law"); IOPPENHEIM'SINTERNATIONALLAW, supra
note 375, at 50-51 (noting that comity is sometimes used-especially by English and
American courts-to describe matters that would otherwise be termed questions of
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and countries, 8 9 contend that comity has become binding in
principle. Others dismiss comity because they regard it as a
misleadingly "soft"term for genuine limits, or regard jurisdiction as
limited by more stringent principles, such as a stricter sense of
territoriality." ° Although these divergent reactions might illustrate
comity's unprincipled character, 91 they might equally support
recognizing some principle such as the least-restrictive common
ground.
It is more productive, though, to consider comity's potential in the
particular context of antitrust. The principles of traditional and
positive comity are derived largely from a series of antitrust-specific
cooperation recommendations developed within the OECD. s2 Since
1967, members conducting antitrust investigations have been
exhorted to notify other members with important interests at
international law); id. at 139-40 (criticizing attempt in LakerAirways to describe comity as
obligatory limit on antitrust jurisdiction, rather than differentiating between comity and
international law limits); id. at 22 n.38 (asserting that "[the language of the 19th century
was in many ways different from that of the present day. Those writers who developed the
idea of comity were not merely thinking of the State's duty to be courteous. They were
thinking in terms of an obligation, ofwhat today one would designate as public international
law."); see alsoMann, supranote 241, at 31 (assenting to the view that foreign law is applied
on the basis of comity only if,
"[als so often, comity may in truth mean public international
law"); id. at 87 ("In truth 'comity' is only another word for international law.").
389. See, for example, the position attributed to Australia and Greece that "comity is a
policy base from which rules or principles of international law have developed." OECD,
MINIMIZING CONFLICTING REQUIREMENTS, supra note 249, at 9.

390. In 1987, for example, Canada, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom reportedlytook
the view that "moderation and restraint" was "anapproach based on principles or rules of
international law with respect to jurisdiction, that require each state to respect the
sovereignty of every other state," albeit with a different understanding of the law and its
implications. Id. The Swiss "specifically reject[ed] comity as the basis for moderation and
restraint because of its non-compulsory nature," arguing instead that moderation and
restraint derived from principles of sovereignty. Id. at 9-10. Belgium, likewise, considered
comity as "devoid of any legal consequence," id. at 9, but expected that internal sovereignty
would be secured by universal recognition of territoriality, id. at 38 n.12.
391. E.g., Paul, supra note 22, at 3-4 (1991) ("Comity has been defined variously as the
basis of international law, a rule of international law, a synonym for private international
law, a rule ofchoice of law, courtesy, politeness, convenience or goodwill between sovereigns,
a moral necessity, expediency, reciprocity or 'considerations of high international politics
concerned with maintaining amicable and workable relationships between nations.)
(footnotes omitted).
392. The OECD recommendations themselves appear to have been inspired by U.S.Canadian Antitrust Notification and Consultation Procedure. D.H.W. Henry, The United
States Antitrust Laws: A CanadianViewpoint, 1970 CAN. Y.B. INT'L L. 249, 269-71.
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stake, and to consider their views.3 9 Amendments made clear that
members learning of investigations potentially touching on their
important interests should provide such input-rather than,
perhaps, retaliating after the fact-and that overlapping investigations should be coordinated and information shared. The
recommendations made clear that foreign input was not binding,
and acknowledged that circumstances might prevent even advance
notice, but provided that any important interests voiced were to be
considered as grounds for exercising constraint. 94 Positive comity,
introduced in 1973, provided that members substantially harmed
by restrictive practices within another member's territory should
request consultation, to which the other member was to give "full
consideration;" where convinced, the requested member was
supposed to95act "on a voluntary basis and considering its legitimate
3
interests."
These recommendations inspired bilateral antitrust agreements
among members, 9 ' and probably contributed to the flowering of
similar, if similarly limited, principles under the WTO and
NAFTA. 9 7 In light of the absence of any more conspicuous inter393. 1967 Cooperation Recommendation, supranote 68 (recommending that a member
nation pursuing an investigation or proceeding involving another member's "important
interests" should (where possible and appropriate) notify that nation in advance, and "while
retaining full freedom of ultimate decision" take account of its views and of any remedial
action it might feasibly take to address the challenged practice). As a later OECD report
explained, the 1967 Cooperation Recommendation provided for notice, but not a right of
consultation, which was dropped for unexplained reasons duringthe drafting process-along
with a positive comity provision thatwas added and then deleted. OECD REPORTONPosITIVE
Cor, supranote 66, at 8-9 (describing evolution ofprovisions). The recommendations also
contained a conciliation procedure, see 1967 Cooperation Recommendation, supra note 68,
but it seems never to have been applied. See ICPAC FINAL REPORT, supra note 1, at 228.
394. 1995 Cooperation Recommendation, supra note 48 (suggesting that members
coordinate overlapping proceedings, share information permissible and consistent with the
disclosingnation's legitimate interests, notifyothermembers upon learningofinvestigations
or proceedings touching potentially legitimate interests, and give "full and sympathetic"
consideration to such views); accord 1979 Cooperation Recommendation, supra note 68.
395. Recommendation of the Council Concerning a Consultation and Conciliation
Procedure on Restrictive Business PracticesAffecting InternationalTrade, OECD Doc. C
(73)99/final (1973) [hereinafter 1973 Consultation and Conciliation Recommendation],
reprintedin 19 ANTrrRusTBuLL. 283 (1974), revised by 1979 Cooperation Recommendation,
supranote 68, revised by 1995 Cooperation Recommendation, supranote 68.
396. E.g., Parisi, supranote 81, at 134 (noting that OECD recommendations inspired U.S.
agreements with Germany, Australia, Canada, and the European Community).
397. See supra text accompanying notes 147-49.
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national antitrust law, it is worth considering whether the OECD
recommendations have somehow contributed to the development of
any legal restrictions, and what those restrictions might be. It is
occasionally hinted that OECD recommendations and like measures
must contribute, somehow, to international lawM8 -that they are
more than the disconnected aspirations of their members399-and
it is worth being precise as to why that might be.
Their format, surely, is not propitious. Assuming ostensibly
nonbinding measures can ever have legal effect, 00 recommen398. E.g., Hans W. Baade, The Legal Effects of Codes of Conduct for Multinational
Enterprises,22 GER. Y.B. INTL. 11, 39 (1979) (arguing that while OECD recommendations
do not constitute "instant international law," they can be "transformed into customary
international law through state practice" as "declarations of general principles of
international public policy which the declarant states are legally obliged to respect"); R.R.
Baxter, InternationalLaw in "HerInfinite Variety", 29 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 549, 556 (1980)
(explaining that the 1967 OECD Recommendations, and like instruments, "have more of the
character of agreed procedures of international public administration than of law, yet they
do belong to the domain of law in a qualified sense that makes it impossible to bring them
within any of the existing categories of international law"); Ingrid Delupis, The Legal Value
of Recommendations of International Organisations, in INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE
INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM 47, 52 (W.E. Butler ed., 1987) (noting that while recommendations
are not themselves binding, they may "have important legal consequences"); Gunther F.
Handl et. al., A Hard Look at Soft Law, Panel at 82nd Annual Meeting of the American
Society ofInternationalLaw (Apr. 22, 1988) thereinafterA HardLook at Soft Law], in 1988
PROC.AM. SOC'YINT'LL. 371,388 (1990) (remarks of Pierre Marie Dupoy, stating that "[n]ot
one of these standards, it seems, should suffice, if not respected, to create an illicit act in the
case when it has been ignored. But this deficiency can play as a presumption of illicity, the
gathering of a certain amount of which shall consolidate the demonstration of the reality of
an illicit act."); Patricia Isela Hansen,Antitrust in the GlobalMarket:Rethinking"Reasonable
Expectations",72 S. CAL. L. REV. 1601,1645 (1999) (arguing that WTO tribunals "should give
due consideration to emerging international norms in the area of competition policy," such
as the consensus for limiting certain harmful exclusive dealing policies, since "[wihile this
emerging consensus does not in itself create an international legal obligation, it can
nevertheless give rise to a presumption of unreasonableness sufficient to justify good faith
negotiations"); id. at 1645 n.228 ("WTO tribunals might give similar weight to decisions and
recommendations issued by the OECD.").
399. Cf THIRLWAY, supranote 329, at 65 ("It cannot be denied that when a resolution is
formally adopted in so universal an organization as the United Nations, the resolution is
something more than the consistent statements or wishes of the member States; that, in a
sense, the whole is more than the sum of its parts.").
400. The literature on this question is voluminous. For balanced discussions, see INGRID
DETTER, THE INTERNATIONALLEGALORDER212-51 (1994); HIGGINS, supranote 298, at 22-28;
THIRLWAY, supra note 329, at 61-79; A Hard Look at Soft Law, supra note 398 (panel
discussion by Gunther Handl, W. Michael Reisman, Bruno Simma, Pierre Marie Dupuy, and
Christine Chinkin). Compare, e.g., G.M. DANILENKO, AW-MAKING IN THE INTERNATIONAL
COMMUNITY 20-22 (1993) (noting need for distinction between "soft law" and binding
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dations are particularly unpromising. A recommendation itself
does not show any state practice," 1 unless we count the members'
supporting votes 4 2 or the text itself.4 3 Likewise, while resolutions
and the like might evidence opinio juris,0 4 the whole idea of a
recommendation is inconsistent with any present sense of legal
international norms), and V.D. DEGAN, SOURCES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 238-40 (1997)
(disputing conceptual clarity of"soft law," but contending that as conventionally understood,
such rules are not legally binding), and Norbert Horn, Normative Problems of a New
InternationalEconomicOrder,16J.WORLDTRADEL. 338,347-51(1982) (criticizing "softlaw"
for failingto distinguish betweenunderlying ethical andpolitical principles and authoritative
lawmaking), and Prosper Weil, TowardsRelativeNormativityinlnternationalLaw?,77 AM.
J.INTLL. 413 (1983), with Anthony Aust, The Theory and PracticeofInformal International
Instruments,35 INT'L&COMP. L.Q. 787 (1986) (describingthe diplomatic practice of creating
informal agreements), and Baxter, supra note 398 (describing soft law as part of legal
continuum).
401. E.g., WOLFKE, supra note 323, at 84 (explaining that nonbinding General Assembly
resolutions, "that is, non-binding recommendations, being merely verbal postulates,
proposals, declarations of principles, etc., do not constitute acts of conduct described in their
content, nor, even multiplied, any conclusive evidence of any practice"). But cf G.I. Tunkin,
The Role ofResolutions of InternationalOrganisationsin CreatingNorms of International
Law, in INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM, supra note 398, at 5, 12
(reporting consensus among participants in Institute of International Law study that
resolutions may evidence practice).
402. E.g., Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14 (June 27)
(citing acceptance of U.N. resolutions concerning use of force as establishing customary
international law); RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supranote 17, § 102 reporters' note 2 (considering
degree ofsupport probative for purposes of determining value of U.N. and other resolutions
as sources ofinternational law); MALCOLM N. SHAW, INTERNATIONAL LAW 91 (1986) ("Where
the vast majority of states consistently vote for resolutions and declarations on a topic, that
amounts to state practice and a binding rule may well emerge."); cf RESTATEMENT (THIRD),
supra note 17, § 103 reporters' note 2 (noting reservations, under certain circumstances, to
relying on degree of support for resolutions in determining weight as evidence of
international law). For some ofthe many criticisms, see, e.g., WOLFKE, supranote 323, at 8385; Anthony D'Amato, TrashingCustomary InternationalLaw, 81 AM. J. INTLL. 101 (1987);
cf Susan H. Bragdon, NationalSovereignty and Global EnvironmentalResponsibility: Can
the Tension Be Reconciled for the Conservationof BiologicalDiversity?, 33 HARV. INVL L.J.
381, 386 (1992) ("[Allthough these resolutions adopting declarations, recommendations, or
principles are evidence of customary international law, they are not themselves a form of
international legislation.'); C.M. Chinkin, The Challenge of Soft Law: Development and
Change in InternationalLaw, 38 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 850, 858 (1989) (claiming that
precedential value of the Nicaraguacase for international economic law is limited).
403. Some commentators, like Professors Wolfke and D'Amato, espouse the view that
actions alone may count as state practice, a point of view that has proven quite
controversial-particularly for those concerned with how custom might be changed. See
BYERS, supranote 125, at 134-36 (describing controversy). One need not go so far, however,
to regard recommendations as relatively low-value speech.
404. E.g., id. at 135; THIRLWAY, supra note 329, at 66.
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obligation.0 5 OECD recommendations, in particular, appear
designed to lack binding force. 4 6 As if that were not enough, the
cooperation recommendations themselves stress that implementation does not compromise "the legal positions of Member
countries with regard to such questions of sovereignty, and in
particular the extra-territorial application of laws concerning
restrictive business practices, as may arise."40 7 Maybe members
could independently invest the recommendations with legal
significance,'40 but instead they seem to have eschewed any
405. DETTER, supranote 400, at 250-51; Delupis, supranote 398, at 52. But see HIGGINS,
supra note 298, at 25 (noting that in some international organizations, "even the term
'recommendation' in its context sometimes signals more than one would expect from a literal
reliance on that word"). Formally, too, there is the problem that the recommendations
emerge directly from the organizations, rather than their members. WOLFKE, supranote 323,
at 84. Custom, in any case, normally progresses from mere practice to something regarded
as legally binding, whereas a recommendation more plausibly sets the stage for subsequent
practice that must itself, separately, communicate legal obligation. See Tunkin, supranote
401, at 13-15. There is a line ofthought, accordingly, that recommendations may, ifpreceded
by practice, "contribute to the presumption of acceptance as law of such a practice, that is,
to a customary rule of international law." WOLFKE, supranote 323, at 84.
406. Compare Convention on the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and
Development, Dec. 14, 1960, art. 5(a) (empowering OECD to "take decisions which, except
as otherwise provided, shall be binding on all the Members"), available at http'//www.
oecd.org/oecd/pages/home/displaygeneral/0,3380,EN-document-589-17-no-6-5610-589,00.htm,
withid. art. 5(b) (empowering OECD to"make recommendations to Members"). Commentary
almost universally supports the inference that recommendations lack the binding quality of
decisions. E.g., UNCTAD, supra note 79, at 13-14.
407. 1967 Cooperation Recommendation, supra note 68 (Preamble); 1973 Consultation and
Conciliation Recommendation, supra note 395 (Preamble); 1979 Cooperation Recommendation, supra note 68; 1995 Cooperation Recommendation, supra note 68; see also
Recommendation of the Council Concerning Action against Restrictive Business Practices
Affecting International Trade Includingthose InvolvingMultinational Enterprises, C(78)133
(f'mal), July 20, 1978 [hereinafter 1978 Restrictive Business Practices Recommendation],
availableat http://wwwl.oecd.org/daf/clpRecommendationstREC3com.htm. Perhaps thiswas
intended to avoid the waiver of legal arguments against nonmember, third-party countries,
but the import seems broader. E.g., Kurt E. Markert, Recent Developments in International
Antitrust Cooperation,13 ANTITRUST BULL. 355,363 (1968) (arguing that recommendations
make clear that members "retain entirely their freedom to decide generally or in particular
cases whether or not to apply any of the recommended measures," making it "a purely
academic question whether, and if so to what extent, recommendations by the Council of
OECD have binding effects on member states").
408. DETTER, supra note 400, at 251 (claiming that "in specific cases, recommendations
provide useful, provisionalnorms which, by the consent, and the convenience of States, can
later be adopted ... by way of clear, parallel unilateral undertakings"); id. at 250
("Recommendations may thus serve as support for future action or they act as a cadre de
referencefor such action. Thus, recommendations must be seen in their context as they are
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suggestion that the recommendations are obligatory in and of
themselves.0 9
It may be argued, nonetheless, that the recommendations
have influenced other international instruments, resulting in a
conscious parallelism that evidences custom.4 10 Some such
instruments, like those of the OECD 1 ' or UNCTAD, 412 are also
proteiforme.") (citations omitted); WOLFKE, supra note 323, at 85 (explaining that where
national practices implementing a resolution as law rise to the level of custom, "the
resolutions do not participate directly in the custom-formation as its elements, but do so
often indirectly, as ready drafts of desirable rules, incentives for practice or other factors
mobilizing world opinion").
409. EC officials, typically the quickest to embrace international antitrust obligations,
have cited the recommendations as insufficiently binding. Faull, supra note 2; Alexander
Schaub, InternationalCo-OperationIn AntitrustMatters: Making The PointIn The Wake Of
The Boeing/MDD Proceedings,4 EC COMPETITION POL'Y, no. 1 (Feb. 1998). U.S. officials,
likewise, have avoided any suggestion that the recommendations imposed a legal obligation.
E.g., Klein, A Reality Check, supra note 157; Submission From the United States to the
Working Group on the Interaction between Trade and Competition Policy, supra note 101.
410. Cf South West Africa (Eth. v. S. Afr.; Liber. v. S. Afr.), 1966 I.C.J. 6, 292 (Jul. 18)
(Tanaka, J., dissenting) (describing how resolutions and like instruments may, if repeated,
contribute to a"collective, cumulative and organic process of custom-generation" in a"middle
way between legislation by convention and the traditional process of custom making").
411. The principles of the cooperation recommendations are reflected in the
Recommendation of the Council Concerning Effective Action Against Hard Core Cartels,
supra note 37 (relating "principles of comity" to hard-core cartels, and encouraging further
agreements consistent with those principles); Recommendation of the Council for Cooperation betweenMember Countries in Areas ofPotential Conflict between Competition and
Trade Policies, C(86)65(final) (1986), I.A.b.8 (recommendingthatmembers,pursuantto the
1979 Recommendations, coordinate under "existing national laws" respecting "any
investigation into possible anti-competitive effects of arrangements located in their countries,
recognising the jurisdictional difficulties that sometimes arise when information is sought
from abroad or where the parties to a restrictive agreement are located abroad"), available
at http/wwwl.oecd.org/daf/clp/Recommendations/REC6com.htm; id. I I.B.b.13 (providing
that Imlember countries should respond as positively as possible" to requests for
consultations, "without prejudice to each government's full freedom of action"); 1978
Restrictive Business Practices Recommendation, supranote 407, 2 (urging members "to
develop, consistent with established rules of international law and taking international
comity into account, appropriate national rules to facilitate investigation and discovery by
their respective competition authorities of relevant information within the control of an
enterprise under investigation, where such information is located outside their respective
national territories and when its provision is not contrary to the law or established policies
ofthe country where the information is located"); id. J 3 (urging disclosure of information to
other authorities); id. 4 (urging "facilitat[ion], through conclusion of or adherence to
bilateral or multilateral agreements or understandings, mutual administrative or judicial
aid in the field of restrictive business practices"); id. [ 5 (urging, consistent with vigorous
antitrust enforcement, use of OECD procedures on cooperation). As previously noted, the
significance of the 1984 annex on conflicting requirements for antitrust is somewhat obscure.

732

WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 43:627

facially nonbinding, and offer little potential for legal evolution;
binding multilateral instruments like the TRIPs agreement and
NAFTA, on the other hand, are relatively limited in scope. 4 But
the recommendations' role in inspiring binding bilateral agreements
is more concrete. Such agreements might be regarded as an
independent source of custom,4 14 or supply the practice, and
indicate a sense of legal obligation, that invest the OECD
recommendations themselves with custom's requisites.4 1 5
Such an account is robust precisely because of how it differs from
typical analyses of custom. The OECD recommendations, properly
understood, act as a template for custom: rather than letting a
thousand flowers bloom,4 16 the recommendations carefully describe
practices that, where implemented, convert matters of courtesyinto
obligation. The OECD recommendations and their implementation
also surmount the typical inability to explain how and why custom
arises,4 1 7 since the entire initiative can only be understood as an
antidote to clashes over extraterritoriality. Merely issuing the
recommendations was not supposed to resolve the controversy, as
their preambles consistently cautioned, but implementing the
recommendations surely was. Negative comity provided a principled
basis by which countries otherwise inclined to assert extraterritorial jurisdiction might moderate its exercise in response to
requests from affected nations. Investigative assistance and positive
comity, in turn, afforded such countries a regulatory alternative to
See supra note 290.
412. UNCTAD, Set of MultilaterallyAgreed Equitable Principles and Rules for the Control
of Restrictive Business Practices, U.N. Doc. TD/RBP/ CONF/10 (1980), revised by U.N. Doc.
TD/RBP/CONF/10/Rev.1 (1981),availableat http//www.unctad.orgensubsites/cpolicy/docs/
CPSetlcpset.htm.
413. See supra text accompanying notes 148-49.
414. RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 17, § 102 cmt. i ("A wide network of similar
bilateral arrangements on a subject may constitute practice and also result in customary
law."). See generally Jonathan I. Charney, InternationalAgreementsand the Development of
Customary InternationalLaw, 61 WASH. L. REV. 971 (1986); Stephen C. McCaffrey, The
Restatement's Treatment of Sources and Evidence ofInternationalLaw, in COMMENTARIES

ON THE RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES 1
(1992).
415. See supra text accompanying note 120.
416. See Goldsmith & Posner, A Theory of Customary InternationalLaw, supranote 23,
at 1116 (depicting custom, by conventional accounts, as norms "said to arise spontaneously
from the decentralized practices of nations").
417. Id. at 1119.
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exercising unilateral extraterritoriality, by offering the assistance
of foreign countries.4 1 Complying with the recommendations
provided, in
this view, a safe harbor for moderated extraterri419
toriality.
The evolving text of the recommendations suggests a growing
appreciation for this function. As previously noted, the 1967
Cooperation Recommendation purposefully left unresolved "such
questions of sovereignty, and in particular the extra-territorial
application of laws concerning restrictive business practices, as
may arise," a caveat reiterated in other recommendations. The
sovereignty issue, the original recommendation made clear,
concerned the "unilateral application of national legislation" to
foreign business operations; the unresolved question, in other
words, being the legality of unilateral extraterritoriality, rather
than extraterritoriality pursued in a cooperative context. 20
Subsequent recommendations further articulated the international expectations associated with accommodating extraterri418. OECD REPORT ON POSTIVE CoMITY, supra note 66,
67 (citing Commission's
description of the 1998 agreement as one by which the parties agree "to co-operate with
respect to antitrust enforcement rather than seeking to apply their antitrust laws
extraterritorially); id. (citing Assistant Attorney General Klein's assertion that "positive
comity 'respects the sovereignty principle of participating countries since it recognises that
the country whose market is most directly affected has the principal responsibility for
enforcement"); ICPAC FINAL REPORT, supra note 1, at 235 (quoting James Rill, thenAssistant Attorney General, as claiming that the positive comity provisions in the 1991
agreement would 'be animportant step toward minimizing disputes over the extraterritorial
application of the antitrust laws); Charles F. Rule, Introductory Note, European
Communities-UnitedStates: Agreement on the Application of Their Competition Law, 30
I.L.M. 1487, 1488 (1991) (claiming that "rather than seeking primarily to protect the
sovereign interests of one jurisdiction against encroachments by the antitrust authorities of
the other, the agreementbetween the United States and the [European] Commission is more
clearly designed to facilitate cooperative, and in some cases coordinated, enforcement by
antitrust authorities").
419. Cf Ignaz Seidl-Hohenveldern, Hierarch of Norms Applicable to International
Investments, in INTERNATIONAL LAW AND ITS SOURCES (Wybo P. Heere ed., 1989) (claiming
that nonbinding OECD guidelines, though not binding law, "do produce some legal effects all
the same": "[a] country having voted in favor of the adoption of such rules could no longer
maintain that behavior in conformity with these rules would be contrary to international
law"); David W. Johnston, Comment, Cuba's Quarantineof AIDS Victims: A Violation of
HumanRights?, 15 B.C. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 189, 195 (1992) ("To the extent that a single
resolution has any bearing on international law, it is that it gives a state the right to act in
ways consistentwith that resolution. Actions states take in accordance with such resolutions,
therefore, cannot be legally challenged.").
420. See 1967 Cooperation Recommendation, supra note 68.
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toriality. The 1978 Restrictive Business Practices Recommendation
urged adopting "appropriate national rules" to pursue extraterritorial investigation and discovery, consistent not only with
national laws and established policies, but also "with established
rules of international law and taking international comity into
account." 421 As amended in

1995, the Revised Cooperation

Recommendation "recognis[ed]" for the first time "the need for
Member Countriesto give effect to the principlesof internationallaw
and comity and to use moderation and self-restraint in the interest
of co-operation on the field of anticompetitive practices."422 The
change in tenor also recognizes, indirectly, the role played by the
recommendations themselves in establishing that custom.
Leading members of the OECD confirmed the legalization of
antitrust comity, albeit with occasional expressions of uncertainty
as to its universality. The European Union, unsurprisingly, has
been in the vanguard.4 3 In 1991, Sir Leon Brittan (then Vice
President of the European Communities) acknowledged the
difficulty of identifying a discrete principle of comity and determining whether it had "yet hardened into a rule of international
law,"4 24 but concluded that "in any case, the Commission does

consider itself obliged to have regard to comity when exercising its
jurisdiction in competition cases with a foreign element"42 -- based
on respect for the OECD recommendation and attendant relationships. Six years later, the Commissioner responsible for competition
policy agreed that "we believe [comity] to be an established part of
international law and know [it] to be part of the EU/US Agreement
of 1991," thus constituting "a rule which governs our international
relations," even while noting the contrary estimation by the D.C.
Circuit in Laker Airways.426
421. 1978 Restrictive Business Practices Recommendation, supra note 407, 1.2.
422. 1995 Cooperation Recommendation, supranote 48, Preamble (emphasis added).
423. Griffin, supra note 271, at 167.
424. BRITTAN, supra note 274, at 16. The quoted passage referred in particular to noninterference, but Sir Brittan subsequently noted the resemblance to comity, which he
described as "more a principle than a rule." Id.
425. Id.
426. Karel Van Miert, InternationalCooperationin the FieldofCompetition:A View from
the EC, 1997 ANN. PRoc. FORDHAM CORP. L. INST. CONF.: INT'L ANTITRUST L. & POL'Y 13,20
(Barry E. Hawk ed., 1998); see also Jonathan Faull, Antitrust and Trade Policy-Round
Table, 25th Annual Fordham Corporate Law Institute Conference (Oct. 22-23, 1998), at
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It is the U.S. political branches, rather than the courts, that have
been the most equivocal about any universal principle of comity.
Official discourse has variously suggested that comity has an
obligatory character, 427 lies between law and pure discretion,"'
or even that it arises from the absence of law.429 But respect has
been somewhat more even in the antitrust context, and comity's
evolutionary potential has never been contested.3 0 U.S. officials
sometimes indicated adherence to comity principles in an
undifferentiated fashion,'431 even stating baldly that comity, at least
http://europa.eu.intceomm/competitionspeeches/text/sp1998_048-en.html ("The Commission
complies scrupulously with the rule of negative or traditional comity. The European
Community has concluded a special positive comity agreement with the USA, believing it to
be an essential instrument in a world of economic interdependence and a robust alternative
to extraterritorial extravagance."); Georgios Kiriazis, Positive Comity inEU/ US Cooperation
in CompetitionMatters, EC COMPETITION POLO'NEWSLEITER, Oct. 1998, at 11 ("More than
an 'aspiration' or a 'matter of grace,' comity is a rule increasingly applied to bilateral
competition relations.") (quoting United States v. Nippon Paper Indus. Co., 109 F.3d 1 (1st
Cir. 1997)), available at http'J/europa.eu.int/comnm/competition/publicationscpn; Stephen
Ryan, Positive Comity, EC COMPETITION POL' NEWSLETIER, Oct. 2000, at 33 ("The notion
of comity, whereby one jurisdiction may take into account the interests of another
jurisdiction in the application of its laws, is well-established in international law. In pursuit
of this principle, a jurisdiction may elect to exercise restraint or moderation in its law
enforcement activity, out of deference to the important interests, and sometimes conflicting
laws, of another jurisdiction."), available at http//europa.eu.intcomm/competition/
publications/cpn.
427. See, e.g., Small, supra note 52, at 292 (indicating that attempts to exercise
extraterritorial jurisdiction should "avoid interference with the territorial sovereign in
certain predominantly domestic situations, such as local labor regulation," seemingly as an
exceptional "binding legal constraint"); id. at 292-93.
428. Id. at 291 ("As defined by long-standing precedent, [comity] is between pure
discretion and hard law, a guide to practice from which legal rules may arise.") (citation
omitted).
429. Id. at 301 ("Comity is the conceptual tool for managing potential conflict in the area
where law does not provide an exclusive jurisdiction.")
430. Id. at 292 (describing comity as "a guide to practice from which legal rules may
arise").
431. Lee Marks, State DepartmentPerspectiveson Antitrust Enforcement Abroad, 12 J.
INT'LL. &ECON. 153,154 (1978) ("The State Department emphasizes to foreign governments
that comity is a two-way street. The U.S. must take their interests into account in making
enforcement decisions and expects foreign governments to reciprocate."); Letter from James
R. Atwood, Deputy Legal Advisor of the U.S. Department of State, to Michael Gadbaw,
Assistant General Counsel, Office of the Special Trade Representative (Nov. 19, 1979), in
1979 DIGEST OF UNITED STATES PRACTICE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 821 [hereinafter 1979

DIGEST] (explaining that "the principle of comity should be given due weight in cases
involving extraterritorial enforcement" of antitrust law); U.S. Associate Attorney General
Egan, Address Before the International Bar Association (Nov. 3, 1977), quoted in Warren
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as reflected in the Restatement (Second), "is the law of the United
States" and "in keeping with the requirements of international
law." 2 The federal agencies also occasionally declined to proceed

Pengilley, ExtraterritorialEffects of UnitedStates Commercialand AntitrustLegislation'A
View from "Down Under," 16 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 833, 872 (1983) (stating that "an
unyielding and unresponsive antitrust policy, heedless of considerations of comity, could
seriously disrupt United States foreign policy"); Davis R. Robinson, U.S. Economic
Regulation: Conflicts of Jurisdiction, Address at Columbia University's Parker School of
Foreign and Comparative Law (June 30, 1982), in 2 CUMULATIVE DIGEST, supra note 269, at
1316,1321 (citingreliance ofthe State Department on Timberlane-typeprinciples in internal
legal analyses, consultations with other agencies and with Congress, and litigation).
432. Davis R. Robinson, Address Before the Association of the New York City Bar
Association (Feb. 14, 1984), in 2 CUMULATIVE DIGEST, supranote 269, at 1329-30; see also
Energy Antimonopoly Act of 1979: Hearingson S. 1246 Before the Comm. on the Judiciary,
96th Cong. 712-16 (1979), reprintedin TransnationalCorporations,ForeignInvestment,and
Tax Law, 1979 DIGEST, supra note 431, at 1405, 1406-07 (testimony of James R. Atwood,
Acting Legal Advisor of the U.S. Department of State) (explaining that where U.S. and
foreign interests in regulating conduct are both significant, "international law establishes
standards for reconciling conflicts ofjurisdiction and directs that each state should consider
moderating the exercise of its jurisdiction [in light of relevant factors] ....
The international
legal obligation is not necessarily to give precedence or deference to another state's interests,
but rather to consider those interests in good faith and, where appropriate in light of all
circumstances, to temper the exercise of enforcement jurisdiction."); S. REP. No. 96-444, at
69-73 (1979), reprinted in 1979 Digest, supra note 431, at 1401, 1404 (explaining that
proposed legislation limiting acquisitions by major petroleum-producing companies would
minimize impact on foreign acquisitions, and unnecessary conflicts with foreign nations,
through "[eixpress regard for international law and comity ...[s]ince both the agency
enforcing this Act, the Department ofJustice, and the courts adjudicating it will consider and
honor the law of nations and the principles of comity"); accordLetter from J. Brian Atwood,
Assistant Secretary of State for Congressional Relations, to Senator Edward M. Kennedy
(Sept. 27, 1979), in 1979 DIGEST, supra note 431, at 1410, 1412; Griffin B. Bell, Address
Before the American Bar Association (Aug. 8, 1977), in 1977 DIGEST OF UNITED STATES
PRACTICE IN INTERNATIONAL LAw 500-01 (representation by then-Attorney General that
"[w]here conflicts arise between sovereigns, the sovereigns have an obligation to resolve the
conflicts with restraint, cooperation, and good will. That is the essence of comity.... [it] is
more than a legal principle."); John H.Shenefield, Address to the International Law Section,
American Bar Association (Aug. 9, 1978), in 1978 DIGEST OF UNITED STATES PRACTICE IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW 1346, 1348 (observation by then-Assistant Attorney General for
Antitrust that while "international law normally does not" contravene the exercise of U.S.
effects jurisdiction, "considerations of comity may require U.S. forbearance in particular
antitrust matters," and endorsing the "'jurisdictional rule of reason" approach taken in
Timberlane).
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criminally on comity grounds.4 33
Other treatments, however, began less promisingly. The 1977
International Guidelines remarked that comity and other defenses
were often claimed "much more broadly" than appropriate in light
of the government's responsibility for'enhancing U.S. competitiveness and anticipated Hartford Fire in regarding comity and
proper enforcement policy to be nearly coterminous with effects
jurisdiction. ' The 1988 Guidelines seconded this vision of effects
jurisdiction, and further anticipated HartfordFire in describing the
limits to that jurisdiction in a fashion resembling the "true
conflicts" approach.43 5
Rather than celebrating Hartford Fire's confirmation of this
approach, as'might be predicted by a unilateral interests
analysis, 436 the 1995 Guidelines instead indicated a broader
understanding of comity's obligatory character. The new guidelines
directly stated that "[tihe Agencies also take full account of comity
factors beyond whether there is a conflict with foreign law,"
including a more nuanced appraisal of the parties' latitude under
foreign law.43 7 Most important, the guidelines recognized something
433. WALLER, supranote 45, §§ 6.14-6.15 (citingfailure to seek indictments againstforeign
uranium producers in 1978 and in LakerAirways controversy in i984).
434. 1977 International Guidelines, supra note 48, at E-1 to E-3 ("[C]onsiderations of
jurisdiction, enforcement policy, and comity often, but not always, lead to the same
conclusion: the U.S. antitrust laws should be applied to an overseas transaction when there
is a substantial and foreseeable effect on the United States commerce; and, consistent with
these ends, it should avoid unnecessary interference with the sovereign interests of foreign
nations."). The Guidelines' illustrations indicated that comity "may" direct resolving an
"unresolvable and direct conflict between the laws of two countries impos[ing] substantial
hardship upon the affected parties" in favor of the nation with the greater interest, but
appeared to regard U.S. antitrust policy, particularly instantiated by a per se violation, as
trumping any possible counterweight. Id.at E-15 (case K); id. at E-16 n.99 (case L, crossreferencing case K). Those illustrations were relied upon by the New Mexico Supreme Court
in rejecting an act-of-state defense against a private state-law antitrust suit. United Nuclear
Corp. v. General Atomic Co., 629 P.2d 231, 265 n.50 (N.M. 1980) (finding cases to "have a
direct bearing on the allegations").
435. 1988 International Guidelines, supranote 48, § 5 n.170.
436. Guzman, supranote 10, at 1533 (concluding that whatever its global welfare effects,
"[firom the point of view ofthe United States,HartfordFireis welfare enhancing," and thus
"the United States would not want a negotiated agreement to govern this case").
437. 1995 International Guidelines, supranote 48, § 3.2 ("In deciding whether or not to
challenge an alleged antitrust violation, the Agencies would, as part of a comity analysis,
consider whether one country encourages a certain course of conduct, leaves parties free to
choose among different strategies, or prohibits some of those strategies."). Explaining the
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that both the Restatement (Third)and HartfordFire had missed:
the notion of antitrustcomity. To the laundry list of reasonableness
considerations, the agencies added the effect of U.S. enforcement
efforts on foreign enforcement (and the relative efficacy of such
foreign efforts), and attributed their inclusion to the U.S.-E.C.
cooperation agreement.43 The guidelines particularly identified
foreign antitrust enforcement as a reason the agencies might stay
their hands,3 9 and further indicated an amenability to exploring
positive comity."0
The resulting principle of antitrust comity was very elementary.
Nations exercising antitrust authority over foreign parties or
relating to activities taking place in foreign nations are to consider
moderating the exercise of their authority in order to accommodate
that nation's legitimate interests, including by considering the
prospect that the other nation might redress any harm by
exercising its own antitrust jurisdiction. Nations should also give
full consideration to requests that they investigate and regulate
restrictive business practices having adverse effects on other
nations. Finally, in order to facilitate these ends, antitrust
Guidelines' relationship with HartfordFire,then-Deputy Assistant Attorney General Diane
Wood explained that:
[T]here is nothing inconsistent in the commitment to comity, on the one hand,
and the fact that the U.S. agencies retain the responsibility and the right to
bring appropriate actions in U.S. courts when the necessary effects are
occurring in the U.S. market and U.S. enforcement action appears to be
necessary, on the other.
Diane P. Wood, Effective Enforcement of Antitrust Law for International Transactions,
Address Before Business Development Associates, Inc. (March 15, 1995), available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/speeches/950315dw.htm.
438. 1995 International Guidelines, supra note 48, § 3.2 (indicating relevance of"(7) the
extent to which the enforcement activities of another country with respect to the same
persons, including remedies resulting from those activities, may be affected; and (8) the
effectiveness of foreign enforcement as compared to U.S. enforcement action").
439. Id. § 3.2 ("In addition, the Agencies take into account the effect of their enforcement
activities on related enforcement activities of a foreign antitrust authority. For example, the
Agencies would consider whether their activities would interfere with or reinforce the
objectives of the foreign proceeding, including any remedies contemplated or obtained by the
foreign antitrust authority.").
440. Id. ("The Agencies also will consider whether the objectives sought to be obtained by
the assertion of U.S. law would be achieved in a particular instance by foreign enforcement.
In lieu of bringing an enforcement action, the Agencies may consult with interested foreign
sovereigns through appropriate diplomatic channels to attempt to eliminate anticompetitive
effects in the United States.").
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authorities should provide notice and share information to the
extent consistent with their domestic laws and interests. The result
is reasonableness as a procedural requirement, echoing Judge
Fitzmaurice's instruction in his Barcelona Traction opinion that
even lacking "hard and fast" limits to national jurisdiction in areas
like antitrust, international law does entail "an obligation to
exercise moderation and restraint as to the extent of the
jurisdiction assumed byits courts in cases having a foreign element,
and to avoid undue encroachment on a jurisdiction more properly
appertaining to, or more appropriately exercisable by, another
State."441
Antitrust comity, thus conceived, resolves some of the more
objectionable features of substantive reasonableness. First, by
including the consideration of foreign enforcement efforts, the
guidelines reduced the risk of creating an "unregulated middle,"
because deference would be due at least in part to the possibility
that foreign antitrust authorities would step in. Second, any
enforcement forbearance was not compelled-only the consideration
of forbearance was-and was thus wholly dynamic, permitting the
Justice Department or FTC to initiate proceedings in the event they
disagreed with foreign evaluations. Third, as previously explained,
it was to be left to the agencies to decide whether to intercede or
refrain, and a decision by one of the agencies to seek enforcement
was not to be second-guessed by the courts." 2
Antitrust comitymayhave been overlooked, however, because its
footprint as special custom is relatively small. Most obviously,
any principle was confined to antitrust, and did not extend easily
to areas less amenable to agreement on the acceptability of
441. Barcelona Traction, Light & Power Co., Ltd. (Belg. v. Spain), 1970 I.C.J. 4,105 (Feb.
5) (separate opinion of Judge Fitzmaurice); see also Peter D. Durack, Extraterritorial
Application of United States Law, Address to the American Bar Association (Aug. 12,1981),
in LOWF, supranote 275, at 90, 95 (claim, by then-Attorney General of Australia, that while
"the process of negotiation and persuasion involved in intergovernmental consultation will
[not] necessarily resolve all conflicts ... it may," and "the principle of sovereignty and the
notion of equality of sovereigns implicit in that principle require that such negotiations take
place"); Meessen, supra note 252, at 62; Robinson, supra note 431, at 1321 (explaining that
what balancing "can do is help to ensure that decisions which implicate significant foreign
concerns follow an informed and careful evaluation and weighing of the relevant U.S. and
foreign interests!).
442. See supra text accompanying notes 225-26, 270-76.
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extraterritoriality or less susceptible to complimentary regulatory
solutions.44' Antitrust comity may well be restricted in its adherents
as well. The 1995 International Guidelines indicate that the United
States subscribes to the comity principles in the OECD instruments
at least with respect to other members, so that in its view no
bilateral agreement would be necessaryto effectuate the underlying
comity principles.' Whether the norm extends beyond the OECD
and, even more acutely, whether it is sufficiently common even
among other members to influence the interpretation of the
Sherman Act, are questions deserving careful consideration.
At least within its core constituency, however, antitrust comity
appears to be quite resilient, in no small part because of the
diminished demands it imposes. After the European Commission
prohibited the GE/Honeywell merger-involving, not incidentally,

443. Extraterritorial sanctions, for example, raise distinctproblems, because the domestic
effects they seek to redress-for example, harms inflicted by Cuba on the United States and
its citizens-are not attributable to the third parties and countries they end up regulating.
Andreas F. Lowenfeld, Congress and Cuba: The Helms Burton Act, 90 AM. J. INT'L L. 419,
431-32 (1996).
444. 1995 International Guidelines, supranote 48, § 2.92 (explaining that "[tihe Agencies
have agreed with respect to member countries of the OECD to consider the legitimate
interests of other nations in accordance with relevant OECD recommendations"); id. § 2.92
n.50 ("The Agencies follow recommended OECD practices with respect to all member
countries."); id, § 3.2 n.73 (noting that the agencies "have agreed to consider the legitimate
interests of other nations in accordance with the recommendations of the OECD and various
bilateral agreements"); see also ANTITRUST DIV. MANUAL, supra note 122, at ch. VII, 27
(including, among agreements requiring the notification of foreign governments, the 1995
Revised Recommendation); cf Small, supranote 52, at 294 (notwithstanding vagueness and
ambiguity of 1984 OECD understanding, "by signing onto the OECD consensus, the United
States Government politically committed itselfto a substantial part ofthe extraterritoriality
management approach adopted by the Department ofState following the pipeline crisis"); id.
at 296 ([T~he Administration was able to maintain a clear position in the OECD that comity,
including interest balancing, is appropriate and required in the political branches of
government.").
The recommendations themselves, for example, appear to have been regarded as a
sufficient basis for bilateral notification and policy coordination. George P. Schultz, Address
Before the South Carolina Bar Association (May 5, 1984), in 2 CUMULATIVE DIGEST, supra
note 269, at 1328 (citing 490 antitrust consultations under OECD recommendations since
1967); e.g., Communications and Transportation,1976 DIGEST OF UNITED STATES PRACTICE
IN INTERNATIONAL LAw 565 (describing notification to and coordination with Belgium,
France, the Federal Republic of Germany, the Netherlands, Sweden, and the United
Kingdom "in keeping with agreements within the [OECD] on antitrust cooperation); James
F. RiI1,A Frameworkfor Cooperation:The Status of InternationalAntitrustEnforcement, 18
WHirIERL.REv. 321,323-24(1997) (describingU.S. coordinationwith the United Kingdom).
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two U.S.-based companies -- based on antitrust theories that
had little appeal to U.S. authorities, many took the view that the
case demonstrated the weakness of present mechanisms for
cooperation, 44 or at best presented further evidence that unilateral
acts were necessary to give them a jump start." 7 It is important
to note, however, that the authorities also cooperated through
the entire process, and viewed the discrepant results as being
substantive in nature-suggesting a limitation in convergence
rather than the absence of any commitment to cooperate.' Indeed,
as in the Boeing/McDonnell Douglas case before it, 9 the continued
cooperation by the antitrust authorities during and after the
controversy, and even the resistance of the Commission to external
political pressure, may best be read as reinforcing a modest legal
principle.

445. The fact was much emphasized in U.S. commentary, causing the European
Commissioner for Competition matters to repeatedly stress the irrelevance of nationality.
See, e.g., Mario Monti, The Future for Competition Policy in the European Union, Extracts
from a Speech Before Merchant Taylor's Hall (July 9, 2001) (Speech/01/340), available at
http://europa.eLintrapid/startcgi/guesten.ksh.
446. See supra notes 8,38 (citing authorities). Two counselors for GE and Honeywell had
a partial but entirely representative view:
In the aftermath of GE/Honeywell, and absent either complete substantive
convergence or more willingness to take international comity into account,
there is too great a danger that trans-Atlantic merger review will cease being
a facilitator of efficient globalization and become an impediment. U.S. and EC
regulators might conclude that they were no longer working toward common
goals and stop cooperating; political pressure to retaliate could build; and
merger review might degenerate into a game of tit-for-tat in which each
jurisdiction protests that the other is killing deals for political, rather than
policy, reasons. One need only observe the tension in trans-Atlantic trade
relations-with all the accusations ofprotectionism and retaliatory tariffs--to
see where that could lead.
Kolasky & Greenfield, supranote 38.
447. See Jaret Seiberg, Monti, U.S. RegulatorsHope to Align Policies, THE DAILY DEAL,
Sept. 25, 2001, available at http-//www.thedeal.com/cgi-bin/gx.cgi/AppLogic+
FTContentServer?pagename=FutureTense/Apps/Xcelerate/lRender&c=TDDArticle&cid
=TDDBOKSFISC; Monti, supranote 445; Statement byAssistant Attorney General Charles
A. James, supra note 8.
448. Statement by Assistant Attorney General Charles A. James, supranote 8.
449. YouriDevuyst, TransatlanticCompetitionRelations,
inTRANSATLANTICGOVERNANCE
IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMY 127, 142-45 (Mark A. Pollack & Gregory C. Schaffer eds., 2001).
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B. Antitrust Comity Under U.S. Law
Despite the relative clarity lent to antitrust comity by the OECD
recommendations and their implementation, the lack of a more
definitive statement of custom leaves important aspects uncertain.
One question is whether OECD members are obliged to heed comity
with respect to nonmembers, absent a bilateral agreement to the
same effect. If, for example, the Justice Department were asked by
Russia to consider its views before filing an action against a
Russian company, would it be obliged to do so? The European
Community, if its antitrust officials are to be believed, would be,
but U.S. representations have been far less clear.4"
The impediment, inthe U.S. view, may be the lack of reciprocity.
The Restatement (Third)took pains to distinguish between reasonableness and reciprocity, lest reasonableness be confused with
"discretion and courtesy."4 51 At stake was the integrity of a principle
supposed to apply universally, one that could not be made to
depend on another country's posture. That principle, too, was not
one confined to state interests and state control, but instead was
one that involved personal interests demanding judicial supervision.5 2
450. The Guidelines are equivocal, though they do suggest that the OECD
recommendations themselves will be followed solely with respect to member nations. See
1995 International Guidelines, supra note 48; accord 1988 International Guidelines, supra
note 48, § 5 ("The Department has in fact committed itself to consider the legitimate
interests of other nations in accordance with recommendations of the ...(OECD) and with
bilateral agreements with several foreign governments."); Varney, supranote 107 ("Both the
Commission and the Department follow OECD recommended practices with respect to all
member countries."). On the other hand, the Guidelines' illustrative example, while alluding
to "obligations under various international agreements," suggests that comity will be
considered regardless of a foreign country's identity. 1995 International Guidelines, supra
note 48, § 3.2 illus. 1. This enforces the impression that the same principles, if not the
recommendations per se, apply in every case. E.g., Varney, supranote 107 ("The Guidelines
also list the comity factors we consider and emphasize that we consider all relevant factors
in every case.").
451. RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 17, § 403 cmt. a. The Restatement (Third)
acknowledged, however, that a regulating state's perception of the outcome were the tables
turned might be "useful" in balancing under section 403(2). Id. § 403 cmt. a & reporters' note
5. It also commended consideration of "the extent to which another state may have an
interest in regulating the activity." Id. § 403(2)(g).
452. Id. § 403 reporters' note 5 (suggesting that "[a] condition of reciprocity is not among
the criteria set forth in this section, since a determination as to whether an exercise of
jurisdiction is reasonable must take account of the interests of the persons affected as well
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Antitrust comity entails a different approach, and one plainly
more amenable to requiring reciprocal commitments. The cooperation recommendations and bilateral agreements squarely rely
on them. The underlying principle, moreover, involves a particular
complementarity: not only should the other nation be able to make
similar requests for assistance, but it also should be capable, at
least in theory, of offsetting regulatory oversight. Traditional
comity, in other words, involves coordination not only with
regulatory impulses antithetical to antitrust-such as might find
expression in diplomatic protests, or blocking and clawback
legislation-but also with other antitrust regulators and positive
comity, in the expectation that nations will cooperate toward
moderated antitrust enforcement.
This emphasis on regulatory reciprocity makes it unlikely that
antitrust comity applies to all nations, particularly given the
potential gulf between the relatively similar policies of OECD
members and the divergent approaches taken by many third world
countries.4 5 The views taken by both the U.S. executive branch 45 '
and Congress" suggest that it would be premature for U.S. courts
to interpose a comity-based defense, beyond that recognized in
as the interests or practices of other states").
453. AB.A. Report, supranote 1, at 50-59 (distinguishing between "soft harmonization"
among OECD nations and the "very large differences between restrictive business practice
(RBP) laws ofnations that fear the power of multinationals and the competition laws ofthe
OECD countries"); see also Rill, supra note 444, at 328 ("Since the OECD's membership
consists of nations with the mostfully developed competition laws and extensive enforcement
experience, the OECD will need to play a primary role in the advancement ofinternational
cooperation on antitrust enforcement issues.").
454. The guidelines consider not just "true conflicts" in the HartfordFire sense, but also
"the extent to which the enforcement activities of another country with respect to the same
persons, including remedies resulting from those activities, may be affected," and the relative
effectiveness of such efforts. 1995 International Guidelines, supranote 48, § 3.2.
455. 15 U.S.C. § 6211(2)(A)-(B), (F) (2000) (conditioning negotiation of "antitrust mutual
assistance agreements" on assurances that foreign authorities will provide comparable
assistance, provide at least as much protection of confidential information, and return
evidence received following the conclusion of an investigation); H.R. REP. No. 103-772, at 7
(1994), reprintedin 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3647, 3648 (describing "specifications ... designed
primarilyto require that the arrangementbe reciprocal-that the foreign antitrust authority
provide similr antitrust investigatory assistance in return-and that sensitive business
information be kept strictly confidential and be used only for specified law enforcement
purposes"). Neither the IAEAA nor the FTIAA, nor their legislative histories, spoke directly
to the question ofwhether comity as defined by Timberlane was appropriate. See supratext
accompanying notes 49, 85-89.
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HartfordFire,on behalf ofnations other than those belonging to the
OECD or involved in bilateral agreements. 4" The federal agencies
may, of course, choose to moderate their own actions on such
grounds, just as they may enter into bilateral agreements
(including, as appropriate, IAEAA agreements) or participate in the
broadening of the custom through regional or other associations.
Even within the OECD,there is room for dispute as to whether
every member shares the views espoused by the United States
and the EU Member States.4 5 7 Some have been slower to concede
the legitimacy of extraterritoriality or to accept the virtues of
cooperation. Japan, for example, unequivocally (and unsuccessfully)
opposed the extraterritorial criminal enforcement of the Sherman
Act as late as 1997,' but subsequently amended its competition
456. As explained below, the judicial role with respect to any nation may be minimal.
457. The United Kingdom is somewhat difficult to lump with the rest of the EU, given its
history of hostility toward effects jurisdiction and its broad view of comity. UK Others
Acerbic on InternationalGuides, FTC WATCH, Feb. 13, 1995, at 3, 4 (describing critical
comments of U.K. government on draft 1995 International Guidelines, including regarding
extraterritorial jurisdiction, the narrow view of comity, and concerns that the agencies'
interest in "the effectiveness of foreign enforcement to be weighed in comity analysis"
suggests that they would be 'increasingly prepared to consider unilateral action on the basis
of the perceived inadequacy of the remedies available in a particular jurisdiction"). But see
Diane P. Wood, The 1995 Antitrust Enforcement Guidelines for International Operations:
An Introduction, Address Before the Spring Meeting of the ABA Antitrust Section (Apr. 5,
1995) (describing revisions to draft Guidelines intended to expand potential for exercising
comity), available at http:/www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/speeches950405dw.htm. Until quite
recently, however, the U.K. has had a relatively lax national enforcement policy, and might
be expected to freeride on the expansion of EU jurisdiction. It has not, in any event,
consistently opposed extraterritoriality as of late. In 1994, for example, Japan protested the
settlement of a civil enforcement action brought by the Department of Justice against a
Britishcompany, Pilkington P.L.C., predicated on overseas activities allegedly affecting U.S.
export trade. A British diplomat, on the other hand, reportedly stated that '[w]e've noted the
settlement, but it's really a matter for the Department of Justice and Pilkington.'" Keith
Bradsher, U.S. Sues British in Antitrust Case, N.Y. TIMES, May27, 1994, at Al.
458. Compare Reply Brief of Appellant United States of America at 4, United States v.
Nippon Paper Indus. Co., 109 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 1997) (No. 96-2001) (quoting contention in
amicus brief submitted by the Japanese government that 'the extraterritorial application of
the Sherman Act not only is invalid under international law but also runs counter to the
spirit of international comity"), and Appellant's Brief at 4, United States v. Nippon Paper
Indus. Co., 109 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 1997) (No. 96-2001) (quoting amicus briefto the effect that
"lilt is clear that the Sherman Act is properly construed as lacking extraterritorial reach in
general"), with id. at 19 ("But Japan concedes that some concurrent jurisdiction between
States isvalid and admits that the assertion of jurisdiction over foreign nationals for acts
engaged in abroad may be proper if there is a'direct and substantial connection between the
State asserting jurisdiction' and the foreign acts.").
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signed an

antitrust cooperation agreement with the United States, 46 ' and
opened discussions with the European Union. 46 1 Australia, too, has
a history of protesting U.S. extraterritoriality, though it has not
found that incompatible with cooperation agreements. Other
nations, like New Zealand, have limited experience with international enforcement which one could evaluate;4 2 some, like
Taiwan and the Republic of Korea, may have had independent
antitrust authorities for too short a period." s
The possibility that other OECD members may have materially
different views cannot be dismissed easily, especially given the
voluntary nature of the original recommendations, and the fact
that OECD members continue to sign bilateral agreements may
suggest that they regard the recommendations as insufficient by
459. Mitsuo Matsushita, United States-Japan Trade Issues and a Possible Bilateral
AntitrustAgreementBetween the UnitedStates and Japan,16 ARIZ. J. INTVL & COMP. L. 249,
250(1999).
460. See supra text accompanying note 76.
461. See supra text accompanying note 79.
462. New Zealand does, however, share an integrated competition policy with Australia,
and is a member of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum-together with
Australia, Brunei Darussalam, Canada, Chile, People's Republic of China, Hong Kong,
Indonesia, Japan, Republic of Korea, Malaysia, Mexico, New Zealand, Papua New Guinea,
Peru, Republic of the Philippines, Russia, Singapore, Chinese Taipei, Thailand, the United
States, and Vietnam-which in 1999 pledged to "[dlevelop effective means of co-operation
between APEC economy regulatory agencies, including competition authorities." APEC
Principles to Enhance Competition and Regulatory Reform, 1 10 (adopted Sept. 13, 1999),
availableat httpA/www.usinfo.state.govregionallea/apec/leader99.htm
463. Each is less than ten years old. Merit E. Janow,AssessingAPEC'sRole in Economic
Integrationin the Asia-PacificRegion, 17 NW. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 947, 991 (1997). Officials of
the Republic of Korea were among those critical of the draft 1995 International Guidelines.
U1, Others Acerbic on InternationalGuides, supra note 457, at 4 (quoting submission
arguing that draft Guidelines "'claim a degree of U.S. jurisdiction over foreign commercial
activity that is far in excess of internationally-acceptable norms and likely to generate a
variety of jurisdictional conflicts with foreign sovereigns," and concluding that "the
extraterritorial application of antitrust laws should not be based on unilateral compulsion
or self-proclaimed authority but rather on international agreements or other international
standardsto be established through extensive multilateral discussions which incorporate the
views of all countries, time-consuming as this course of action might be"). But see Wood,
supranote 457 (noting revisions to draft); but cf A. Douglas Melamed, Antitrust at the Turn
of the Century, Address Before the Fourth International Symposium on Competition Policy,
Seoul, Korea (Dec. 7, 1999) (describing "the commitment of the Korean Fair Trade
Commission and the Korean Government to promoting sound and effective competition law,
not only within Korea, but internationally as well"), availableat http'/www.usdoj.gov/atr/
publictspeeches/5232.htm.

746
themselves

WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
64

[Vol. 43:627

At the same time, ironically enough, their hesitancy

respecting antitrust comity may be due precisely to excessive claims
regarding comity's universality and its intrusiveness. 65 Much as in
HartfordFre,associating comity claims with ajudicially prescribed
assessment of the permissible reach of jurisdiction, rather than
with the intergovernmental preconditions for its exercise, may have
been fatal.
Such matters deserve clarification, and surely the proliferating
fora for international antitrust-including the OECD's own
Competition Law and Policy Committee, and the new International
Competition Network-might take an important step forward by
confirming the norm's existence and terms. In the interim, the
methodology of local international law suggests that the Sherman
Act ought be read as reflecting a principle of antitrust comity, at
least to the extent of favoring OECD members and other partners
in bilateral agreements. First, antitrust comity would not in any
case bind the United States with respect to uncharted subjectsmatter or manifestly uncertain partners. Second, judicial recognition of any such principle, should that be occasioned, would not
need to be definitive, and thus could avoid judicial gainsaying of
any considered and plausible position that the political branches
might take. Third, as explained in the next section, antitrust comity
is largely unintrusive with respect to federal enforcement actions,
though it may play a more substantial role with respect to other
enforcement mechanisms.
464. Butthe mere fact ofconcurrent agreements is not dispositive-few rules ofcustomary
international law would not benefit from concrete reiteration-absent any reason to suspect
that additional agreements have not been pursued in order to avoid broader recognition of
the principle. The more likely explanation, in the present case, is the relative paucity of
occasions on which such agreements would be employed.
465. In the Wood Pulp case, for example, the Advocate General rejected the British
Government's argument that the Commission had failed to adequately take comity into
account by advertingto general skepticism about the "concept ofinternationalcomity." Wood
Pulp, supra note 60, 1988 E.C.R. at 5227 ("[Tlhere is no rule of international law which is
capable of being relied upon against the criterion of the direct, substantial and foreseeable
effect. Nor does the concept of international comity, in view of its uncertain scope, militate
against that criterion either."). The Court of Justice, on the other hand, considered the issue
to have been asked and answered by its holding that jurisdiction might theoretically be

exercised. Id, at 5244 ("As regards the argument relating to disregard of international
comity, it suffices to observe that it amounts to calling in question the Community's
jurisdiction to apply its competition rules to conduct such as that found to exist in this case
and that, as such, that argument has already been rejected.").
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Hartford Fire remains an important obstacle to any such
construction, but it should not be considered fatal. HartfordFire's
comity analysis secured a narrow 5-4 majority-including two
Justices who have since retired-and surely could be reconsidered,
though stare decisis is particularly prized in statutory cases.4 66
It might also be distinguished. The majority professed to leave
for another day the issue of comity's influence on prescriptive
jurisdiction, seemingly preserving the possibility of arguing that
comity bears on the proper construction of the Sherman Act.6 The
Court also arguably deferred the question of comity's function in
different sorts of conflicts, 6 ' allowing litigants to distinguish
466. E.g., Square D Co. v. Niagara Frontier Tariff Bureau, Inc., 476 U.S. 409, 424 (1986)
(concluding that stare decisis is especially influential in matters of statutory construction,
where Congress would have been free to alter judgment); Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431
U.S. 720, 736 (1977) ("We must bear in mind that considerations of stare decisis weigh
heavily in the area of statutory construction....").
467. Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764, 795 (quoting concession at oral
argument by counsel for the London reinsurers); id.at 796 n.22 ("The parties do not question
prescriptive jurisdiction, however, and for good reason: it is well established that Congress
has exercised such jurisdiction under the Sherman Act.") (citing BORN &WESTIN, supranote
372, at 542 n.5); id at 797 n.24 (proposing that Justice Scalia's "contention [that comity
pertains to prescriptive jurisdiction] is inconsistent with the general understanding that the
Sherman Act covers foreign conduct producing a substantial intended effect in the United
States, and that concerns of comity come into play, if at all, only after a court has determined
that the acts complained of are subject to Sherman Act jurisdiction.... In any event, the
parties conceded jurisdiction at oral argument and we see no need to address this contention
here.") (citation omitted).
The Courts emphasis on waiver may give hope to future litigants, Dam, supra note 130,
at 306; Andreas F. Lowenfeld, JurisdictionalIssues Before NationalCourts:The Insurance
Antitrust Case, in EXTRATERRITORIAL JURISDICTION IN THEORY AND PRACTICE, supra note
265, at 1, 12 (comments of Gary Born). But its comment that the issue was dropped "with
good reason" surely diminishes the argument's promise. The Court's citation to the Born
treatise in support of that point is simply confusing: the treatise observed that prescriptive
and subject matter jurisdiction under the Sherman Act were simultaneously granted (and
presumably coextensive), but said nothing about the extent of either. BORN & WESTIN, supra
note 372, at 542 & n.5; see also GARY B. BORN, INTERNATIONAL CIVIL LITIGATION IN UNITED
STATES COURTS 605 (3d ed. 1996) (challenging Justice Souter's reading ofthe book's previous
edition).
468. HartfordFire, 509 U.S. at 799 (describing absence of conflict "for these purposes,"
having recited London reinsurers' argument that U.S. law would penalize conduct lawful
under comprehensive U.K regulatory scheme); id. at 799 n.25 (responding to dissent's
argument concerning the proper order of inquiry under section 403, and the need to apply
the reasonableness test, by claiming that "whatever the order of cart and horse, conflict in
this sense"-i.e., "true" conflict between laws that could not simultaneously obeyed-"is the
only substantial issue before the Court").
One might also construe the majority's statement that"[w]e have no need in this litigation
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sharper conflicts posing greater risk to the national interest-and,
potentially, weaker conflicts, like a relatively subtle disagreement
over antitrust policy, that may be more easily resolved than the
choice between antitrust regulation and immunity presented in
4 69
HartfordFire.
In any case, Hartford Fire failed (like the Restatement (Third)
before it) to appreciate that international law might warrant
treating pure antitrust conflicts differently. The Court also failed to
contemplate that different treatment might be accorded the
different agents of antitrust. As the next section explains, the key
instigators ofHartfordFire-stateattorneys general-may actually
have merited the most searching scrutiny for their compliance with
international norms. But the Court's inattention to that nuanceand to related variables, such as the national government's
judgment regarding comity-certainly undermine the decision's
authority, and justify a more careful assessment.
C. Local Authority Under Local InternationalLaw
Antitrust comity has become accepted, one might suspect, largely
because it imposes so few absolute limitations on the nations
subscribing to it, raising the question whether it is too "soft" a norm
to address other considerations that might inform a decision to refrain from the exercise of
jurisdiction," id at 799, as raising the prospect that future claims involving some less direct
American interest might be treated differently, Dam, supranote 130, at 307; see also Spencer
Weber Waller, From the Ashes ofHartfordFire:The UnansweredQuestionsof Comity, 1998
ANN. PROC. FORDHAM CORP. L. INST. CONF.: IN7'L ANTITRUST L. & POLIcY 33, 38 (Barry E.
Hawk ed., 1999) (describing a "plausible, but optimistic reading" of HartfordFire under
which "litigants are free to make comity arguments relying on the other factors outlined in
the cases and the Restatements, but may not rely upon the conflict between national policies,
unless the conflict rises to the level of outright compulsion"). Equally plausibly, the majority
was warning that a "true"conflict would not invariably warrant declining jurisdiction, since
other factors favoring jurisdiction might come into play. Brief for the United States as
Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondents at 10,HartfordFire(Nos. 91-1111,91-1128) ("In any
event, the court of appeals correctly concluded that other relevant factors support the
exercise ofjurisdiction and outweigh any possible conflict.").
469. See Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Plaintiff United States'
Opposition to Defendants' Motion to Dismiss at 20 n.18, United States v. LSL
Biotechnologies, Inc. (D. Ariz. 2001) (No. CV-00-529-TUC-RCC) (characterizingHartfordFire
as holding that "a court cannot decline jurisdiction on the ground that the conduct in
question is lawful in a foreign state, or even strongly encouraged"), available at
http'//www.usdoj.gov/atr/cases/f7300/7382.htm.
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to be considered law. Softer norms, like those setting procedural
expectations, surely contribute to the formation of further, more
binding agreements." But in order to be regarded as law themselves, it should be possible to determine the existence of a breach
and possible remedy. 471' As explained below, antitrust comity
satisfies these criteria, but the details very much depend on the
enforcement agent in question.
1. FederalEnforcement of FederalLaw
With respect to national governments, antitrust comity's
constraints are decidedly less stringent than those asserted by the
Restatement (Third). Comity-based defenses to a U.S. enforcement
action would ordinarily be resolved entirely bythe relevant agency's
submission that it had consulted with the interested foreign
government-or, for that matter, by a submission from the foreign
government to the same effect. 2 It should equally be sufficient
for the United States to indicate that it independently considered
the foreign government's legitimate interests, at least where
circumstances were such as to make consultation infeasible.
Perhaps the only credible basis for a defense would be evidence that
a foreign government had in fact requested that enforcement
restraint be considered, but its request was entirely rebuffed; even
then it would be permissible for the government to reach the same
470. Cf Chinkin, supra note 402, at 862 (describing soft law as "pre-eminently suitable"
for "avoiding the need for adjudication by providing a framework for negotiation and other
non-adjudicative forms of dispute resolution by creating expectations as to the frame of
reference for the conduct of negotiations").
471. Cf id at 859 (arguing that "[ilf claims that soft law principles have become hard law
are to be accepted, it must be possible both to determine breach and the legal outcome of any
claim of breach).
472. When the consultations occur may be of little moment. In one civil case recently
brought by the Justice Department, a defendant argued that contract actions it had filed in
Israel against the alleged victim of its anticompetitive conduct warranted dismissal on
comity grounds. In addition to arguing that dismissal on comity grounds was inappropriate
in any U.S. enforcement action, the Department observed that:
In this instance, there is no reason to believe that the Government of Israel
opposes the United States' decision to prosecute despite any potential issues of
comity. In fact, the Israel Antitrust Authority has explicitly supported this U.S.
antitrust enforcement action and is holding its own investigation of the
[allegedly anticompetitive contract] in abeyance pending outcome of this case.
Memorandum of Points and Authorities, LSL Biotechnologies, supra note 469, at 19 n.17.

750

WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 43:627

conclusion following consideration.47 3 Putting issues of standing to
the side,4 74 the incentive even to raise a comity defense may well be
lacking.
This lack of utility in domestic litigation, however, does not
deprive antitrust comity of its meaning as international law. Some
elements of antitrust comity, such as the respect afforded requests
for positive comity, are unlikely to ever form the basis for litigation,
yet may have keen intergovernmental relevance. Where another
nation's interests were wholly disregarded-where diplomatic
dialogue reveals a refusal to consider a patently legitimate interest
or request for assistance, or total abdication of responsibility for
antitrust policy in favor of other sovereign interests-that refusal
might be the basis for a claim or demarche, either on a purely
bilateral basis or within an institution like the OECD. 475 A failure
to cooperate would also form the basis for a defense to any antitrust
nonviolation claim under GATT article XXIII(1)(b), should such a
thing exist. 47' However feeble this may seem compared to the
reasonableness norm, that norm's purported decisiveness in
government actions invited considerable dissent from its supposed
adherents in the international community, and it was, in any event,
ineffective in securing court-directed dismissals.
2. PrivateEnforcement of FederalLaw
It maybe more productive to consider the application of antitrust
comity to parties essentially overlooked by regulatory comity-and
by Hartford Fire. Under the reasonableness approach, private
plaintiffs were subject to the same standard as the government, an

473. Cf SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194, 200-01 (1947) (upholding authority of

administrative agency to reach same conclusion following remand for reconsideration).
474. Breard v. Greene, 523 U.S. 371, 376.(1998) (assuming that the Vienna Convention on

Consular Relations of 1963 "arguably confers on an individual the right to consular
assistance following arrest"); id. at 377-78 (questioning whether Paraguay had standing
under the Vienna Convention to object to criminal conviction and sentence due to failure to
provide consular notification).
475. See supra text accompanying note 147 (discussing availability of OECD mediation
procedure).
476. WTO, Report of the Panel, Japan-MeasuresAffectingConsumer PhotographicFilm
and Paper,WT/DS44/R (Mar. 31, 1998) (rejecting nonviolation claim absent showing of
relationship between governmental measures and antitrust injury).
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approach that flowed naturally from the supposition that custom
constrained all exercises of subject matter jurisdiction by American
courts. Whatever its defects, that approach offered the reassurance
that judges would sometimes constrain private plaintiffs; even if
that did not satisfy foreign demands for more direct government
responsibility, it might at least reduce the frequency of disputes. 7
The potential significance of such a limit should not be discounted.
Many of the most controversial antitrust cases have arisen from
private litigation, including the uranium antitrust litigation and the
Laker Airways dispute," 8 and the interest of private plaintiffs in
international matters continues unabated. 7 s
As we have seen, however, the reasonableness norm is difficult
to support as a matter of international law, and differs from the
emerging prescription in several material respects. Unlike reasonableness, antitrust comity appears to be a procedural principle
requiring intergovernmental consideration, rather than a substantive inquiry into certain specified factors with a command that
they be balanced. That principle does not, in any event, entail any
absolute limitation on government antitrust actions.
Private attorneys general are obviously unlikely to internalize
antitrust comity. Because they are less likely to be long-term,
repeat players in international antitrust circles, they will be
inclined to sacrifice the potential benefits of reciprocity and
cooperation in order to maximize their immediate return.' Given
a sufficient financial stake in U.S. remedies, private plaintiffs are
unlikely to be satisfied by the possibility of foreign intervention on
their behalf; foreign antitrust authorities are less likely to alter
their otherwise-preferred course in order to assist them, which
further diminishes any practical restraint. The result is a serious
prospect that private plaintiffs will initiate and maintain cases that
the government would not, and so risk undermining any gains due
477. Kestenbaum & Olson, supra note 27, at 589 n.5 (citing U.S. officials); i at 589 n.6
(citing continuing concerns by foreign observers).
478. See supratext accompanying notes 54-55 (noting controversies), 196-204 (describing
Laker Airways); see also infra note 494 (noting intergovernmental dispute in the uranium
antitrust litigation).
479. See supra text accompanying notes 124-26.
480. KennethA. Oye, ExplainingCooperationUnderAnarchy:Hypotheses andStrategies,
in COOPERATION UNDER ANARCHY 18-20 (Kenneth A. Oye ed., 1986) (explaining that
cooperation is most likely to arise in repeated interactions among a small number of players).
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to antitrust
comity 4 8 1 -particularly given the irritant of treble
48 2
damages.
The question remains, however, whether any of this actually
violates the norm itself, particularly as might be reflected in the

interpretation of U.S. antitrust law. Private antitrust actions
arguably implicate the federal government's international commitments, either by virtue of the federal courts' involvement or as
a matter of government responsibility for exercising due diligence
in preventing injurious acts.' a Yet the very incongruity of private
actions suggests that they are not addressed by the international
norm at all-not, it should be stressed, because of the inherently
sovereign nature of international obligations," 4 but because of the
481. Joel Davidow, Recent Developments in the ExtraterritorialApplication of U.S.
Antitrust Law, WORLD COPETITIONL. &ECON. REV., March 1997, at 5, 13-14 (arguing that
private actions are significant in clarifying law concerning extraterritoriality); Pengilley,
supra note 431, at 882 (noting that experience suggests that "private litigation, not
government enforcement, may be the chief concern," and that bilateral arrangements will
be of limited utility absent U.S. intervention in private suits).
482. See Buxbaum, supra note 27, at 252-53.
483. The actions of personnel not legally empowered to exercise governmental authority
are not ordinarily regarded as actions of the state giving rise to international liability. Draft
Articles on State Responsibility (Second Reading), supra note 383, art. 5 (attributing to a
state the conduct of persons empowered to exercise state authority); id. art. 8 (attributing
to a state conduct by persons "in fact acting on the instructions of, or under the direction or
control of, that state in carrying out the conduct"). But cf Draft Articles on State
Responsibility (First Reading), supranote 383, art. 8 (attributing conduct by persons "in fact
acting on behalf of [the] State"); id. art. 11(1) ("The conduct of a person or a group of persons
not acting on behalf of the State shall not be considered as an act of the State under
international law."). Actions of courts in enforcing the rights ofprivate parties, however, may
provide a separate basis for state liability. BROWNLIE, supranote 32, at 452. States may also
be held responsible for their failure to take reasonable steps to prevent certain kinds of
harm. See IOPPENHEI'VSINTERNATIONALLAWsupra note 375, § 166. American antitrust law
thus presents, in theory, the delicate question of whether the state may be held liable either
for sponsoring or failing to prevent judicially enforced actions initiated by private parties in
lieu of, or in conjunction with, government enforcement. As noted above, though, matters
may differ if international law regards the private activities in question as differentiable in
character.
484. These are points of considerable and even growing controversy, ever since the D.C.
Circuit's opinions in Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774 (D.C. Cir. 1984). E.g.,
id. at 776 (Edwards, J., concurring) (indicating doubt that "the law of nations imposes the
same responsibility or liability on non-state actors... as it does on states and persons acting
under color ofstate law"); id. at 780 n.4 (concluding that, at least in most cases, international
law "provides no substantive right to be free from the private acts of individuals, and persons
harmed by such acts have no right, under the law of nations, to assert in federal court").
Generally speaking, international law does not impose duties on individuals, with the
important exception of matters like war crimes and genocide. E.g., Kadicv. Karadzic, 70F.3d
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intergovernmental focus of antitrust comity. One might well argue,
of course, that the interference of private actions touching on
foreign matters warrants a prophylactic rule, such as resuscitating
reasonableness, detrebling claims against foreign defendants,
permitting follow-on private actions only, or even the invariable
dismissal of private actions." 5 Each has distinct drawbacks, and
all save reasonableness depend upon an increasingly tenuous
distinction between foreign and domestic matters. 8 6
More important, permitting courts to decide which matters are
sufficiently foreign to warrant caution, and to choose the best
means of tempering private suits touching on that realm, would
betray the separation of powers virtues of local international law.
Assuming the resulting rules were facially compatible with the
terms of the antitrust statutes, their implication would distend the
CharmingBetsy canon: one may perhaps presume Congress desires
to avoid international infringements, and to leave the courts free to
yield to custom, but permitting the courts to elect among limits to
statutory causes of action casts them much more as common law
principals than as agents of Congress.4"' Any rule requiring that
courts selectively abstain from certain cases creates still greater
232, 239-40 (2d Cir. 1995); BROWNLIE, supra note 32, at 36. But see Paust, supra note 322,
at 203-10 (vigorously disputing theses of Tel-Oren).
485. Among the many such suggestions, the most comprehensive were amendments
sponsored by Senator DeConcini in the mid-1980s, which would have codified the
reasonableness approach and, in addition, permitted both detrebling and dismissal at the
Attorney General's behest. 131 CONG. REc. 35,103 (1985) (reporting and explaining amended
S. 397).
486. E.g., Cira, supra note 268, at 277-78 (arguing that Congress should reconsider
automatic trebling of damages in all cases, owing largely to the need in context of cases with
foreign aspects and the difficulty of segregating such cases).
487. The argument may, of course, be presented directly to Congress, as in the State
Department's strong invocation of international law objections to the private civil remedies
in the Libertad Bill. 141 CONG. REC. S15,106 (daily ed. Oct. 12, 1995) (submission by U.S.
Department of State) ("As a general rule, even when conduct has a 'substantial effect' in the
territory of a state, international law also requires a state to apply its laws to extraterritorial conduct only when doing so would be reasonable in view of certain customary
factors."); id. at S15,107 ("International law also requires a state assessing the
reasonableness of an exercise of prescriptive jurisdiction to balance its interest against those
of other states, and refrain from asserting jurisdiction when the interests of other states are
greater."). A critical element of the administration's objections, moreover, turned on the
prospect of unregulated private suits, id. at S15,108, thereby implicating the common
distinction between the enforcement of international jurisdictional limits on the federal
government and on private actors, see supra text accompanying note 269.
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tension."' The alternative, barring all private actions of a certain
class, simply worsens the distension of the statute's terms, and is
all the more questionable in light of the growing acceptance
in
89
principle of private actions in international antitrust.
Similar problems also afflict any attempt to simulate the
intergovernmental character of antitrust comity, though there the
issue is much closer. The federal government might, for example,
be asked to espouse private claims to foreign governments,490 4or
91
even to assume control over them on a parens patriae basis;
private plaintiffs could, at a minimum, be asked to exhaust such
possibilities before filing. Alternatively, the government might be
encouraged to submit its views on the compatibility of particular
suits with comity. 492 But neither variant does a good job of imitating
antitrust comity, and they are objectionable on other grounds as
well. Each invites political pressure the political branches usually
prefer to avoid, and the unpredictability of government intervention
will likely provide little succor either to litigants or foreign govern-

488. For similar objections to the reasonableness norm, see generally Grippando, supra
note 204; Rahl, supranote 204; Michael Sennett & Andrew I. Gavil, Antitrust Jurisdiction,
ExtraterritorialConduct and Interest Balancing,19 INTL LAW. 1185 (1985).
489. E.g., OECD Joint Group on Trade and Competition, Remedies Available to Private
PartiesUnder CompetitionLaws at 8, Doc. Com/Daffe/CLPfrD(2000)24/flnal (July 14, 2000)
(urging availability of private remedies through competition agencies or suits on transparent
and nondiscriminatory basis, tempered by the need to avoid undue interference with the
basic mission of the competition agency to enforce the competition law on behalf of all
citizens and to protect against the filing of "baseless or vexatious" private petitions or
lawsuits), availableat http:/wwwl.oecd-org/daf/clpltrade-competition/private.pdf.
490. Dames & Moore v. Began, 453 U.S. 654, 688 (1981) (describing constitutional
authority of the president to settle claims under certain circumstances); cf National Oil
Corp. v. Libyan Sun Oil Co., 733 F. Supp. 800,811-13 (D. Del. 1990) (emphasizing limitations
of presidential authority). For a pre-Dames& Moore discussion, see Jesse W. Hill & Steven
M. Lucas, Note, The Nature and Extent of Executive Power to Espouse the International
Claims of United States Nationals, 7 VAND. J. TRANSNATL L. 95, 104-05 (1973).
491. Cira, supra note 268, at273 (notingpossibility, butconcludingthatdifficulties inlinedrawing would be prohibitive).
492. Kestenbaum & Olson, supra note 27, at 594 (arguing in favor of regular amicus
participation "in cases which present substantial issues of the exercise of antitrust
jurisdiction over conduct abroad and/or foreign entities, and in which there are significant
conflicting foreign interests"); see also supra note 485 (noting proposed DeConcini
amendments).
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ments.4 93 Foreign governments might represent their own interests,
but that too has proven unrewarding.4 94
Whether any of these solutions are warranted as a matter of
federal common law, executive branch authority, or legislative

edict are different questions; much might be said in their favor.
493. Cira, supra note 268, at 270-71, 273-74 (noting that "[tihe Executive Branch has
attempted to minimize its intervention in private litigation," but urging enhanced
participation); Kestenbaum & Olson, supranote 27, at 590-91 (noting problems created by
inability of Justice Department to intervene regularly and predictably at the trial stage);
Robinson, supranote 268, at 1153 (arguing that compelling U.S. government participation
in private cases "could well exacerbate the dispute and impede its resolution or at least its
management by negotiation).
Testifying in another context about espousal, Judge Sofaer suggested that State
Department espousal of claims by U.S. victims of foreign crimes is undependable because
Department"is likely to be influenced, not only by the merits of the case, but by [its] concern
for offending a foreign state and creating a potential irritant in its dealings with that state."
The ForeignSovereign Immunities Act: Hearingon S. 825 Before the Subcomm. on Courts
and Administrative Practiceof the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 103d Cong. 83 (1994)
(statement of Abraham D. Sofaer). If espousal is to be effective, it also raises separation of
powers concerns. First Nat'l City Bank v. Banco Nacional de Cuba, 406 U.S. 759, 772-73
(1972) (Douglas, J., concurring) (warning that deferring to so-called Bernstein letters
invoking act-of-state doctrine would render the Court "a mere errand boy for the Executive
Branch which may choose to pick some people's chestnuts from the fire, but not others"); id.
at 773 (Powell, J., concurring) (noting discomfort "with a doctrine which would require the
judiciary to receive the Executive's permission before invokingitsjurisdiction"); id. at 776-77
(Brennan, J., dissenting) (explainingthat six Justices definitively rejected the exception); see
also Bradley, Chevron Deference, supra note 34, at 718-21 (describing, with approval,
subsequentjudicial practice departing from any emphasis on executive branch submissions);
cf Dames & Moore, 453 U.S. at 687-88 & n.13 (noting that presidential espousal authority
is limited by congressional authority to enact legislation requiring renegotiation).
494. The most pronounced debacle was the Uranium Antitrust Litigation: the United
States declined to file, but encouraged foreign governments to file amici briefs, only to have
the court lambaste them for shilling for their nationals. In re Uranium Antitrust Litig., 617
F.2d 1248, 1256 (7th Cir. 1980) (expressing "shockgl" that governments of defaulting
defendants "have subserviently presented for them their case against the exercise of
jurisdiction"); Letter from Roberts B. Owen, Legal Adviser of the Department of State, to
John H. Shenefield, Associate Attorney General (Mar. 17,1980), reprintedin 74 AM. J. IlTL
L. 665 (1980) (letter, later transmitted to the Seventh Circuit, asking that the court be
informed that foreign governments had filed amicus briefs at promptingof U.S. government);
Letter from John H. Shenefield, Associate Attorney General, to Hon. Prentice H. Marshall
(May 6, 1980), reprintedin [1969-1983 Transfer Binder-Current Comment] Trade Reg. Rep.
(CCH) [ 50,416, at 55,928 (1980) (letter, following remand, urging balancing of U.S. and
foreign interests). More commonly, foreign government participation is simply ineffective.
In addition to the Uranium Antitrust Litigation, in which the governments of Canada,
Australia, and the United Kingdom participated, Canada and the United Kingdom filed
briefs objecting to U.S. jurisdiction in Hartford Fire, and the government of Japan did
likewise in Nippon Paper,to no avail.
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It is more difficult, however, to justify them as a matter of
customary international law. As discussed further below, however,
the apparent omission of private attorneys general is not only
consistent with the positive description of antitrust comity, but also
ameliorates some of its potential drawbacks.
3. State Enforcement of FederalLaw
State attorneys general suing under the federal antitrust laws
are often described as private plaintiffs,495 and it may be wondered
why they would be treated any differently. Like private actors,
states are not ordinarily the subjects of international obligations,
nor are they addressed by the sources giving rise to the specific
norm of antitrust comity. Two differences may be relevant. First,
precisely because they are more public-oriented, states may prove
even more disruptive to antitrust comity. Second, unlike private
behavior, conduct by state governments is generally attributed to
the United States under international and foreign relations law; for
related reasons, states are legally incapacitated from engaging in
effective self-regulation, warranting different treatment in the
domestic implementation of antitrust comity.
a. The PotentialRisk to Comity
State antitrust enforcers are often drawn to precisely the sort of
matters in which they offer the greatest added value: that is, local
matters unlikely to be scrutinized by federal officials or privateparty plaintiffs. 4" But attempts to confine the states to those
matters, or even to distinguish between federal and local matters,
495. E.g., RESTATEMENT(THIR), supra note 17, § 415 cmt. g; Dam, supranote 130, at 290,
321, 325. But cf Dam, supranote 130, at 327 (regarding state participants in HartfordFire
as essentially private parties, but noting that instead of engaging in direct regulation of

insurance, "the states used the Federal judiciary, in effect, to exercise regulatory power over
foreign commerce"); Lowenfeld, supra note 220, at 48 (describing states suing in parens
patriaecapacity as "intermediate group of plaintiffs").
496. E.g., Joseph F. Brodley, Antitrust Standing in Private Merger Cases: Reconciling
PrivateIncentives and PublicEnforcement Goals, 94 MICH. L. REV. 1, 41 (1995) (contending
that "[tihe states have been very selective in their [merger] enforcement efforts,

concentrating on cases having local consumer impact in a few highly visible consumer
markets or adverse employment effects on vital local industries").
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failed long ago, and the borders were largely erased in the 1980s.
Spurred by an infusion of federal funds and a decline in federal
enforcement, 497 state enforcement activities increased dramatically, including as to interstate matters. 49 Desiring to coordinate
efforts and husband resources, 99 the states formed the Multistate
Antitrust Task Force of the National Association of Attorneys
General (NAAG) to coordinate multistate investigations and
497. The Crime Control Act of 1976 provided moneys to fund state antitrust enforcement
programs, Pub. L. No. 94-503, § 309,90 Stat. 2407,2415 (1976), and the Hart-Scott-Rodino
treble damages actions, as well
Antitrust Improvements Act authorized stateparenspatriae
as allowing certain investigative assistance by the Department of Justice, Hart-Scott-Rodino
Antitrust Improvements Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-435, § 301, 90 Stat. 1383, 1394 (1976)
(codified at 15 U.S.C. § 15c-h (2000)). See generally Flexner & Racanelli, supranote 122, at
507-08.
498. By one estimate, the number of state-initiated actions increased by over 350%
between 1979 and 1988. Thomas Greene et al., State Antitrust Law and Enforcement, in 2
38THANNUALANTITRUSTLAW INSTITUTE 645,651 (1997); see also Flexner & Racanelli, supra
note 122, at 508-09; Jonathan Rose, State Antitrust Enforcement, Mergers, and Politics, 41
WAYNE L. REV. 71, 73-81 (1994) (describing revival of state antitrust enforcement); 60
Minutes with the HonorableMichael F. Brockmeyer, Chief,Antitrust Division, Office of the
Attorney General,Maryland, 59ANTITRUSTL.J. 25,32 (1990) (identifying additional factors).
As Professor Kovacic has noted, the offsetting rise in state enforcement should not have
surprised federal officials: state activities had begun to pick up in the 1970s, and such cycles
were a firm part of U.S. antitrust history. William E. Kovacic, The Sherman Act: The First
Century - Comments and Observations,59 ANTITRUST L.J. 119, 124-25 (1990).
499. Robert Abrams,Developments inStateAntitrustEnforcement,62 N.Y.U. L.REv. 989,
991 (1987) (emphasizing that coordinated, often unanimous, state action is "indicative both
of a recognition at the state level of the need for stronger enforcement to protect our
competitive economy, and of a conscious effort to act in a consistent, unified manner so that
business does not find itself moving from the evil offederal nonenforcement to the evil offifty
different state antitrust enforcement policies"); Lloyd Constantine, Current Antitrust
Enforcement Initiatives by State Attorneys General, 56 ANTITRUST L.J. 111, 120 (1987)
(explaining that states "were not willing to come into [merger policy] and substitute no
enforcement on the federal level with balkanized, disjointed enforcement on the state level").
Federal officials concerned about state efforts were less than entirely satisfied. E.g., 60
Minutes with CharlesF. Rule, AssistantAttorney General,Antitrust Division, 58 ANTITRUST
L.J. 377, 381 (1989) (commenting on "disturbing" trend in which "some state attorneys
general, more interested in headlines than in sound law enforcement, have begun to use
antitrust enforcement as a means of advancing their political careers"); 60 Minutes with
Daniel Oliver, Chairman, Federal Trade Commission, 57 ANTITRUST L.J. 235, 242 (1988)
(describing the National Association of Attorneys General as a "group of antitrust
counterrevolutionaries" that "seeks to undo our progress through a process that poses a
serious threat not only to consumers, butto our basic constitutional scheme as well"); see also
Report of the ABA Antitrust Law Section Task Force on the Antitrust Division of the U.S.
Department of Justice, 58 ANTITRUST L.J. 735, 745 (1989) (urging enhanced federal
involvement to "ameliorate the trend toward the balkanization of antitrust policy and help
to restore major enforcement policy-making to the national level where it belongs").
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litigation 5 ° and issue joint guidelines."0 ' By 1990, according to one
analysis, "the sovereign states, acting voluntarily through the
Antitrust Committee and the Antitrust Task Force of NAAG,
function 50 as
a de facto third national antitrust enforcement
2
agency."
This is hyperbole, of course; the states lack the unity, expertise,
and resources of the federal agencies. 0 ' But their authority under
federal antitrust law indeed has a public dimension with evident
international implications. States have the privilege of representing
natural residents, 0 ' and enjoy substantially enhanced standing to
challenge mergers, 50 5 arguably the most significant and problematic
500. For a description of the Task Force's operation, see ANTITRUST LAW DEVELOPAMTS
(FOURTH), supra note 122, at 734-35; for examples ofits efforts, see id. at 735-38. The states
also continued to cooperate informally. Stephen Paul Mahinka & Kathleen M. Sanzo,
Multistate Antitrust and Consumer Protection Investigations: Practical Concerns, 63
ANTrRUST L.J. 213, 216-19 (1994) (citing examples).
501. NAAG Vertical Restraints Guidelines, reprintedin 4 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) 1 13,400
(1995); 1993 NAAG Horizontal Merger Guidelines, reprintedin 4 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH)
13,406 (1993).
502. Robert Abrams & Lloyd Constantine, DualAntitrust Enforcement in the 1990s, in
REVITALaiNG ANTrTRUST IN ITS SECOND CENTURY 484, 487 (Harry First et al. eds., 1991).
503. ANTrTRUST Div. MANUAL, supra note 122, at VII-9 & VII-18; Richard A. Posner,
Antitrust in theNew Economy, 68 ANTITRUST L.J. 925,940-41 (2001). This may be, however,
itself the source of coordination problems, and reduce the added value of state enforcement.
Id. at 940 (suggesting that "[sitates do not have the resources to do more than free ride on
federal antitrust litigation, complicating its resolution").
504. Actinginparenspatriaecapacity, states may seekinjunctive reliefbased onpotential
injury to the state's economy, a potentially significant weight in the balance. Georgia v.
Pennsylvania R.R. Co., 324 U.S. 439, 450 (1945); In re Insurance Antitrust Litig., 938 F.2d
919, 927 (9th Cir. 1991) ("The state's interest in preventing harm to its citizens by antitrust
violations is, indeed, a prime instance of the interest that the parenspatriaecan vindicate
by obtaining damages and/or an injunction."), affd in part and rev'd in part sub nom.
Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764 (1993); cf Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co., 405
U.S. 251, 257-60 (1972) (distinguishing between state actions for injunctive relief and those
seeking damages based on economic injury).
Such actions may be aggregated without some of the burdens of private class actions.
ANTITRUST LAW DEVELOPMENTS (FOURTH), supra note 122, at 734. Parenspatriace actions

may also sometimes establish injury and estimate aggregate damages by means not open to
private plaintiffs. 15 U.S.C. § 15d (2000); ANTITRUST LAW DEVELOPMENTS (FOURTH), supra
note 122, at 733-34. Even with respect to its suits as a "person," a state may bring a class
action on behalf ofits political subdivisions, perhaps even without the customary attention
to procedure for joinder and certification. Id. at 729-30.
505. David A. Zimmerman, Comment, Why State Attorneys General Should Have a
Limited Role in Enforcing the FederalAntitrust Law of Mergers,48 EMORY L.J. 337,341-44
(1999) (reviewing comparative standing challenges, and concluding that "in most cases
merging parties need not worry about private suits challenging the transaction. However,
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context for international cooperation. 6 Although state officials lack
the overriding profit motives of private plaintiffs, they are by the
same token relatively free to pursue judgments without financial
incentive,"° and enjoy their own immunity from antitrust claims. 50 8
Such authority will increasingly be exercised with respect to
international matters, broadly construed. Like interstate commerce
before it, globalization is effective at reducing the significance of
borders, and state attorneys general may legitimately perceive that
foreign conduct has local effect; in addition, their involvement with
local or interstate matters will increasingly touch on matters of
interest to foreign sovereigns, perhaps by dint of these
governments' own extraterritorial authority." 9
One may fairly assume that state enforcers pay some heed to
international comity,5 10 but their participation makes it more
difficult to observe just the same. The problem is not just that state
enforcement will catch additional anticompetitive transactions or

the parties to the proposed transaction do need to worry about a challenge from a state
attorney general who maybe using very different criteria than the FTC and DOJ to evaluate
the merger."); RoundtableDiscussionwith Enforcement Officials, 63 ANTITRUSTL.J. 951,977
(1995) (remarks of California State Sen. Tom Campbell) ("Given the standing problems for
private actors in mergers, it is basically going to be a state attorney general or the feds, and
that's where I had the worry about balksnization or one AG going off on her or his own.").
506. E.g., ICPAC FINAL REPORT, supra note 1, ch. 2; Dieter Wolf, InternationalMergers,
in TOWARDS WTO COMPETITION RULES: KEY ISsUES AND COMMENTS ON THE WTO REPORT
(1998) ON TRADE AND COMPETITION, supra note 101, at 205-07 (arguing international
mergers may be more serious than cartels, and yet receive far less critical attention).
507. E.g.,RoundtableConference with Enforcement Officials, 66 ANTITRUSTL.J. 805, 816
(1998) [hereinafter 1997 Roundtable] (remarks of Rep. Tom Campbell) (describing relative
lack of financial disincentive for state antitrust actions).
508. Though states are "persons! for purposes of enforcing antitrust laws, they are not
persons capable of violating the Sherman Act. Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341 (1943). States
are also entitled to assume responsibility for certain activities by exempting them through
application of the state action doctrine. This doctrine permits states, unlike ordinary
plaintiffs, to elect-at least in a limited number of cases-not only between suing and not
suing, but between federal antitrust law and its regulatory alternatives. Cf B. Guy Peters,
UnitedStates Competition PolicyInstitutions:StructuralConstraintsand Opportunities,in
COMPARATIVE COTI

ONPOLICY: NATIONAL INSTITUTIONS INAGLOBALMARKEIT40,

52(G.

Bruce Doern & Stephen Wilks eds., 1996) (claiming that "[tihe states have been acting to
limit competition at least as often as they have acted to promote it").
509. See supratext accompanying notes 60-67.
510. 60 Minutes with Robert M. Langer,Chair,NationalAssociationofAttorneys General
Multi State Task Force, 61 ANTITRUST L.J. 211, 223 (1992) [hereinafter 60 Minutes with
Robert M. Langer] (stressing consideration of comity by state officials).
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conduct; 1 reduced barriers to competition presumably benefit
foreign companies and consumers as well, and one might discount
any interest in protecting foreign companies from the application of
federal antitrust law. The additional scrutiny, however, comes at a
price. State enforcement is criticized domestically for imposing
additional administrative costs and delay, and for undermining
legal certainty by creating divergent or inconsistent legal standards.5 " Such problems are only magnified for multinationals that
must increasingly comply with foreign antitrust regimes as well.51s
Variations between the federal and state interpretations of federal
law (as well as state-by-state differences) mean that after Hartford
Fire, transnational businesses will be compelled not only to conform
to the most restrictive national regime, but also to "the levels set by
the most restrictive state interpretation of federal law."" 4
Apart from these cumulative and incremental concerns, the
distinctive nature of state enforcement policies also makes heeding
legitimate foreign interests more difficult. The states' sharpest
critics accuse them of being motivated by treble damages" 5 or even
craven political opportunism.1 6 Viewed more benignly, states are
511. But cf Wise, supra note 123, at 32 (noting that "state enforcers have tried to block
some mergers that the federal government did not challenge, and they have brought actions
against vertical restraints that the federal enforcers probably would not have challenged').
512. Peters, supra note 508, at 52 ("[State] officials have begun to file cases of potential
national significance in state courts, a practice that could fragment national policy and make
the environment of business very uncertain."); Robert Bell, States Should Stay Out of
NationalMergers, ANTITRUST, Spring 1989, at 37, 39 (arguing that "[tihe upshot of dual
enforcement is to permit a single state or group of states to make judgments about
transactions that affectthe national economy .... State enforcement imposes direct costs and
delay on transactions state attorneys general challenge, and additional uncertainty (and
therefore indirect costs) on all transactions.").
513. Wise, supranote 123, at 63; see alsosupratext accompanyingnote 5 (notingburdens).
514. Ernest Gellhorn, States'Rightsin Regulation ofLocal Conduct,2 ANTITRUSTREP. 6
(1989). For some commentators, it follows that states may engage in a "race to the bottom"
to establish the most restrictive federal and state-law requirements. Flexner & Racanelli,
supranote 122, at 532.
515. The clearest financial incentive, to be sure, is to achieve damages on behalf of the
state's residents, rather than for the state government itself. 1999 Roundtable, supra note
139, at 466-67 (remarks of Thomas Greene) (defending redundancy of federal and state
authority by noting that "the major difference is the fact that we are going for damages and
relief for the actual victims of the conduct"). Some states do, however, enjoy the benefit of
"revolving fund" provisions that enable attorneys general to retain damages they recover.
Flexner & Racanelli, supra note 122, at 511.
516. See Peters, supra note 508, at 52 (arguing that increase in state enforcement "is in

20011

LOCAL LAW OF GLOBAL ANTITRUST

761

certainly attuned to public policy considerations other than
consumer welfare, such as local employment and local competitors."11 Even where this happens to coincide with foreign
enforcement philosophies, state promotion of such values is unlikely
to spill over to foreignjurisdictions, and neither are any innovations
state-based experimentation may generate in the administration of
U.S. antitrust law; foreign parties, for their part, may feel
particularly vulnerable to the more subjective elements of state
antitrust analysis.51 s Finally, even where state and foreign
enforcers agree that particular conduct or a particular transaction
poses antitrust
concerns, conflicts may arise over state cherry19
picking.
part a function of the populist appeal of this activity and the political capital it can build for
state attorneys general (elective officials in almost all states)"); Posner, supranote 503, at
940-41 (charging that the states are "too subject to influence by interest groups that may
represent a potential antitrust defendants competitors"); cf Lande, supranote 138, at 1065
(citing authorities); id. at 1067-68 (noting difficulty in documenting instances of parochial
merger enforcement). But see Jesse W. Markham, Jr., 20 Davids vs. Goliath,INTELL. PROP.
MAG., June 1998, LEXIS, NEWS Library, By Individual Publication/Intellectual Property
Magazine File (defending state attorneys general from allegations of political motivation).
517. Brodley, supra note 496, at 41-42 (noting preoccupation of state antitrust enforcers
with labor, employment, consumer, and tax issues, and motivation to focus on local rather
than national benefits); Ginsburg & Angstreich, supranote 5, at 228 ("At bottom, the states
are more likely to be concerned with a merger's local impact upon jobs, and may also be
influenced by concern for a local competitor, neither consideration enters into the calculus
at the national level.").
518. There is some evidence that antitrust enforcement reacts to the threat posed by
foreign competition. See William F. Shughart H et al., Antitrust Enforcement and Foreign
Competition, in THE CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES OF ANTLTRUST. THE PUBLIC-CHOICE
PERSPIcTIVE 179 (Fred S. McChesney & William F. Shughart II eds., 1995); see also
Guzman, supranote 10 (describing selfish interests of national participants in international
antitrust); cf supra note 294 (observing antidemocratic nature of extraterritoriality). It
seems plausible to suppose that the less direct the connection between a party and a
regulatory jurisdiction, the less likely the jurisdiction is to perceive any offsetting benefits
from the party's economic activity-and the more likely it will be to intervene, particularly
when a local competitor is at stake. Posner, supranote 503, at 941 ("A situation in which the
benefits of government action are concentrated in one state and the costs in other states is
a recipe for irresponsible state action.").
519. E.g., Stephen Labaton, Fromthe Pipelineto the Courtroom:Gapon BPAmoco-ARCO
DealIs Wide, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 4, 2000, at C1,C13 (noting that in BP Amoco/Arco merger,
"[t]o satisfy the states, the two oil companies have offered a variety of benefits-what one
lawyer has called 'grease'-that have nothing to do with antitrust issues," including
"pledg[ing] to spend at least $15 million to clean up 'orphan' environmental sites caused by
other companies," giving "$2 million annually, in perpetuity, to the University of Alaska...
raisling] their charitable contributions in California by more than 25 percent, to at least $100
million over the next decade," and pledging to California's governor to "continue ARCO's
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The Hartford Fire case hints at some of the problems. The
lawsuit arose after local governments, experiencing difficulties in
obtaining liability coverage, complained to their state attorneys
general, who filed suit when the federal government declined to
take action.520 According to the states, the federal government's
inaction was due to its flawed analysis ofthe prospects for collusion
in the insurance industry. 21 To the foreign insurers and their
governments, on the other hand, the states' intervention was
politically tinged, and observers considered the lawsuit as one part
of the tort reform movement.5 22 The result, in any event, was that
the domestic and foreign insurers paid the states $36 million to
settle the claims after the Supreme Court decision, including the
costs of the states' legal action.5"
Particularly in the wake of HartfordFire,state authority seems
likely to make national compliance with antitrust comity more
difficult. Cooperative investigations and information sharing may
pose some difficulties.5 2 ' Conflicts seem more likely regarding
program of providing gasoline at lower prices than competitors"); see also Paul Merolli,
CaliforniaPlans Probe of Super-Major Mergers, OIL DAILY, Nov. 23, 1999 (reporting BP
concessions to California to early-phase out of gasoline additive andto retain Arco's discount
gasoline pricing strategy); id. (describing reported Exxon concessions to California, including
divestiture of refinery and 300 retail gasoline stations).
520. Henry J. Reske, Was It Collusion or Just GoodBusiness?: The Liability Insurance
Crisis Revisited, A.B.A. JOURNAL, May 1993, at 76; Lawrence M. Fisher, States and
InsuranceIndustry Battlingon Liability Coverage,N.Y. TIRES, Mar. 23, 1988, at Al.
521. Michael F. Brockmeyer, State Antitrust Enforcement, 57 ANTITRUST L.J. 169, 170
(1988) ("The Justice Department declined even to investigate this industry, purportedly
because the Federal Trade Commission, during a brief investigation, failed to uncover any
evidence of collusion and because 'collusion is highly unlikely' in unconcentrated industries
like the property and casualty insurance industry.") (quoting Letter from Assistant Attorney
General Douglas H. Ginsburg to Jay Angoff (Apr. 22, 1986)).
522. Reske, supranote 520.
523. NAAGANTITRUSTREP., SeptJOct. 1994, at 1.
524. To the extent that states possess information, they do not appear bound to share it
with foreign authorities; at the same time, they may have access to information obtained by
U.S. officials. This was an evident difficulty under "soft" bilateral cooperation agreements,
which did not purport to change existing U.S. law. See Dennis A. Yao & Joseph G. Krauss,
Prospects for Harmonization of United States and European Union Antitrust Laws
Concerning International Strategic Alliances, in INTERNATIONAL HARMONIZATION OF
COMPETITION LAWS 427, 451 n.124 (Chin Jui Cheng et al. eds., 1995) (noting that federalstate agreements to share information "might have some impact on what information is
shared under the 1991 US-EC Bilateral- for example, if the European Commission provides
information to either of the US agencies, can (or will) that information be then transmitted
to individual state agencies?");see also supra text accompanying notes 82-89. It may or may
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enforcement and remedial matters. Because states have different
visions ofthe public interest and different constituencies, they may
find it difficult to coordinate with the federal government and its
foreign counterparts-even assuming that they can cooperate
among themselves."a The conflict is inherent. States tend to
not persist under the IAEAA. By its terms, the Act permits the disclosure of confidential
information received from the federal agencies (and, reciprocally, from foreign authorities)
so long as it is "essential to a significant law enforcement objective," subject to careful review
ofanyrequests and the express consent ofthe authorityprovidingthe information. 15 U.S.C.
§ 6211(2)(E)(ii) (2000); e.g., 1999 U.SJAustralia Agreement, supranote 72, art. VII(c). Even
with an IAEAA agreement in place, foreign authorities may have cause for concern. See
Laraine L. Laudati & Todd J. Friedbacher, Trading Secrets-The InternationalAntitrust
Enforcement AssistanceAct, 16 J. INTL L. BUS. 478, 482 (1996) (arguing that "the IAEAA
does not relieve the DOJ/FTC of other obligations to reveal information," as it "leaves open
some avenues for discretionary release of information to other parties, including state
attorneys general"); id. at 485-86 (noting that federal agencies might retain the right to
refuse requests for information provided by a foreign partner); ICPAC Hearing (April 22,
1999) (testimony of Philip Proger, Chair, Antitrust Section, American Bar Association)
("While the existence of private litigation and multiple sovereigns does not make mandated
confidential disclosure impossible, it does complicate the process."), available at
httpA/www.usdoj.gov/atricpac/2601.htm. The United States, for its part, is concerned that
the European Commission will share information with the Member States. E.g., ICPAC
FINAL REPORT, supra note 1, at 192.
Most confidentiality problems will probably be relieved by waivers, which presumably
facilitated the investigation into the MCIIWorldCom merger by the Justice Department,
European Commission, and ten U.S. states. Press Release, U.S. Department of Justice,
Justice Department Clears WorldCom/MCI Merger After MCI Agrees to Sell Its Internet
Business (July 15, 1998), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/
press_releases/1998/1829.htm. Butthe availability ofwaivers does not do awaywiththe costs
of information sharing for foreign parties and governments. While some argue that the
United States shouldmake every effort to secure permission to share transaction information
with cooperating states, their observation that"itwould seem peculiar" for companies to balk
at granting permission, Ginsburg & Angstreich, supra note 5, at 234 & n.67, simply
illustrates its coercive nature. The MCI/WorldCom case, moreover, illustrated some ofthe
more unfortunate features of state involvement. Over half of the states with merger
authority quickly approved, but Virginia and South Carolina announced their reservations
at conference facilities provided by GTE, a competitor of the merged entities and a
disappointed suitor. Mike Mills, MCI-WorldCom DealReview Requested, WASH. POST, Mar.
13, 1998, at F3; Rebecca Sykes, Attorneys General Urge Scrutiny of MCI-WorldCom Merger
Plan,INFOWORLD DAILYNEWS, March 12,1998, Lexis, News Library, NewsGroup file.
525. In some cases, like the Microsoft or MCI/WorldCom matters, state disagreement
simply means that some drop out of further proceedings-potentially at a cost. See supra
note 524; see also Viveca Novak, The Company Courtsthe AG.s, TIME, Nov. 22, 1999, at 66
(noting that South Carolina dropped offthe lawsuit after Microsoft helped fund a new group,
the Republican Attorneys General Association, and afterward Microsoft donated money to
the South Carolina attorney general's reelection campaign). But that is not invariably so. In
the BP/Amoco merger, California, Oregon, and Washington sued to enjoin the deal, while
Alaska intervened on the private parties' behalf. David Pike, CaliforniaJoinsFrayBy Filing
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enhance the total stability of U.S. enforcement policy over time,
thus making it more predictable for foreign firms and antitrust
authorities alike.52 But this is of diminished benefit in
international matters, as the proliferation of foreign antitrust
authorities, and expanded notions of foreign antitrust jurisdiction,
make it likely that global practices and transactions will be caught
by more than one national authority. More to the point, this
internalcomplementarity, which tends to ensure a constant level of
American antitrust enforcement, diminishes the ability of the U.S.
government to ensure external complementarity, such as by
suspending antitrust enforcement in deference to foreign
authorities tendering a request for traditional comity. 27 Even if
that has not measurably slowed bilateral agreements and the
development of a comity principle, it may retard deeper efforts at

Suit to Fight Proposed BP-Arco Deal, OIL DAILY, Feb. 9, 2000, available at 2000 WL
10340919. In contrast to the California attorney general, who is separately elected, the
Alaskan attorney general was appointed by the governor, who favored the deal given
negotiated concessions-much more than did the state legislature. BP Amoco Acquisition
Continues to Concern Antitrust Regulators, HOUSTON CHRON., Nov. 13, 1999, available at
1999 WL 28707789.
526. This is demonstrated most dramatically by the surge in enforcement efforts during
the 1990s, when federal efforts were flagging. See supra text accompanying note 498
(describing complementary trends); cf John C. Coffee, Jr., Rescuing the PrivateAttorney
General:Why the Model of the Lawyer asBounty Hunter is Not Working, 42 MD. L. REV. 215,
227 (1983) (claiming that private antitrust enforcement helps to ensure "stability of legal
norms by preventing abrupt transitions in enforcement policy that have not been sanctioned
by the legislature"). But cf Posner, supranote 503, at 940 (suggesting that states commonly
pursue actions following or overlapping with federal enforcement).
527. ICPAC Hearings, Mar. 17, 1999, at 24-25 (testimony of William E. Kovacic) ('The
specific problem... is how to achieve international consistency and harmonization when there
are major possibilities for divergence within a single country's competition policy system,
broadly defined. If you can't define with a certain amount of precision and confidence a
national competition policy, it makes it difficult to achieve harmonywith other countries, and
indeed limits the ability to achieve predictability in the decisions made by foreign parties
undertaking
transactions
in
a single country."),
available at
http'J/www.usdoj.gov/atr/icpac/2495.pdf; Guzman, supra note 10, at 1541 (arguing that
division of U.S. enforcement authority "makes it difficult for the United States government
to bind itself to any particular enforcement strategy").
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cooperation, 2 ' and even endanger continued observance of already
precarious norms.
b. Resolving Comity's Local Application
Notwithstanding these concerns, it remains difficult to
distinguish categorically between private and state antitrust
enforcement based on their respective impacts. The number of state
actions is relatively small,52 9 and state attorneys general are
certainly more likely-whatever else may be said of them-to take
some version of the public interest into account, presumably
including international comity." 0 In neither case can the U.S.
government guarantee that requests from foreign authorities will
be heeded.
One might yet find some basis in the international law of
antitrust comity for distinguishing the states, but it would be
slender. Unlike private plaintiffs, states have not been singled
out for distinct treatment in any bilateral cooperation,5 3 1 and the
inference that they are directly subject to the terms of those
agreements seems weak. The failure to address their function
directly is unsurprising. The U.S. system of antitrust enforcement
is unique in the degree to which it permits redundant enforcement
of national law by subnational authorities, let alone in the degree

528. E.g., ICPAC Hearing, supra note 524 (testimony of Donald I. Baker) ("As I
understand it, we've had some trouble getting people interested in IAEAA agreements and
so forth. It seems to me that one of the possibilities is that we could include in an
international treatynegotiation the possibility of trumpingthe states on merger enforcement
decisions. So we're saying to Germany or somebody like this, if you have one of these new
modern antitrust agreements, one of the things we'll give you is the treaty will say there
won't be any local enforcement, non-federal enforcement, and under the Migratory Bird case
(Missouriv. Holland), the federal government can trump the states."); Guzman, supra note
10, at 1541; Wood, supra note 10, at 306-07.
529. 1997 Roundtable, supra note 507, at 815-16 (remarks of Kevin J. O'Connor, Ass't
Att'yGen., State ofWis., and Chair, NAAG Multistate Antitrust TaskForce) (estimatingthat
eighty percent ofantitrust cases are brought by private parties, rather than government(s)).
530. See supra note 503 (citing representations by state officials that they heed comity);
cf Dam, supranote 130, at 327 (distinguishing"purely private parties" from federal officials,
as public officials have no fees incentive, and are subject to ethics, financial disclosure, and
congressional review).
531. See supra note 127 (noting treatment of private plaintiffs in 1982 U.SJAustralia
Agreement).
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to which it permits them to reach international matters." 2 Even
within the transnational European enforcement scheme,
Commission supremacy over transnational matters is maintained
53 4
33
by pre-emptive jurisdictional rules, relatively clear protocols,
and constitutional principle.5 5 The Commission itself is advocating
devolutionary reforms, but at pains to maintain the principles of
uniformity and supremacy, and criticisms of the proposal suggest
that still greater precautions may be in order.3 6 Particularly where
adherence to an international agreement is at issue, Commission
efforts at implementation-including cooperation with foreign
authorities-appear to preclude interference by any national
competition authority.3 7
532. AB.A. Report, supra note 1, at 27 (noting practice in Canada and Mexico).
533. Article 9(1) of Council Regulation 17 provides that, subject to review by the Court of
Justice, "the Commission shall have sole power to declare Article 85 (1) inapplicable
pursuant to Article 85 (3) of the Treaty." Council Regulation No. 17 of 6 February 1962, art.
9, 1959-1962 O.J. SPEC. ED. 89. Article 9(3) further implies that once the Commission has
initiated any relevant procedure, national competition authorities are ousted ofjurisdiction
to apply articles 85(1) or 86. As noted below, the consequences once the Commission has
finally acted are somewhat less clear. See infra note 535.
The Merger Regulation likewise establishes exclusive jurisdiction. Council Regulation
(EEC) No. 4064189 of December 21, 1989 on the Control of Concentration Between
Undertakings, art. 21(1), 1989 O.J. (L 395)1 (establishing exclusive Commission jurisdiction
under the regulation); id. art. 21(2) (providing that "[nlo Member State shall apply its
national legislation on competition to any consideration that has a Community dimension,"
subject to limited exceptions).
534. Commission Notice on Cooperation Between National Competition Authorities and
the Commission, 1997 O.J. (C 313) 3 [hereinafter Commission Notice]. For EC competition
law to apply, the activity or transaction in question must have an appreciable effect on
interstate trade, see id. 27-28, at 6-7; within that class of cases, the Commission proposes
that national competition authorities scrutinize only those cases involving effects "feltmainly
in their territory and which appear upon preliminary examination unlikely to qualify for
exemption under Article 85(3)[,]J " id. 26, at 6, in the ordinary course leaving to the
Commission "cases involving businesses whose relevant activities are carried on in more
than one Member State." Id. 24, at 6.
535. As noted in the Notice on Cooperation with National Competition Authorities, the
Commission takes the position that where it has individually exempted an arrangement, or
excused it under a so-called block regulation, national competition authorities are not at
liberty to condemn it through the application of stricter national law (or, for that matter,
stricter interpretations of Community law). Commission Notice, supranote 534, 19 17-19,
at 5. The issuance of a comfort letter, which does not even bind the Commission itself, is to
be given weight dependent on its terms. Id.
17, 20-22, at 5-6.
536. Seegenerally European Commission, White Paper on the Modernisation ofthe Rules
Implementing Articles 85 and 86 of the EC Treaty 35-36 (Programme No. 99/027, Apr. 28,
1999).
537. IANMAcLEODETAL.,THEEXTERNALREiATIONsOFTHEEUROPEANCOMMUNITIES 129
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The key to understanding the states' unique role, instead,
involves their standing under more general precepts of international law-as determined in large part by the U.S. Constitution.
International law is ordinarily agnostic as to a nation's legal order,
and accordingly leaves to U.S. law the question of whether states
may exercise national regulatory jurisdiction. 538 But the federal
government retains ultimate responsibility for state compliance
with international law unless it has specifically been discharged.5 39
The federal agencies cannot, in short, shirk their responsibility for
abiding by comity through the simple expedient of relegating
enforcement responsibility to the states.
That the federal government retains responsibility is not, as it
develops, due to some immutable characteristic of international
law-subnational governments do occasionally enjoy the authority
to conduct international relations--but instead stems from the

U.S. Constitution, which purposefully deprives the states of any
authority to conduct foreign relations.5" The scope of this exclusive
(1996); see also Waller, supranote 79, at 369 (arguing that cooperation by Commission with
foreign authority under valid cooperation agreement enforcement "may preempt any
inconsistent legislation of the Member States, including any inconsistent national blocking
legislation).
538. RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 17, § 402 cmt. k.
539. Draft Articles on State Responsibility (Second Reading), supranote 383, art. 5 ("The
conduct of a person or entity which is not an organ of the State... but which is empowered
by the law of that State to exercise elements of the governmental authority shall be
considered an act ofthe State under international law, provided the person or entity is acting
in that capacity in the particular instance."); id. art. 7 ("The conduct of an organ of a State
or of a person or entity empowered to exercise elements of the governmental authority shall
be considered an act of the State under international law ifthe organ, person or entity acts
in that capacity, even ifit exceeds its authority or contravenes instructions."); RESTATEMENT
(THIRD), supra note 17, § 207 cmts. a, d, & reporters' note 3; id. § 402 cmt. k; id. § 321 cmt.
b; IVAN BERNIER, INTERNATIONALLEGAL ASPECTS OFFEDERALISM 83 (1973); IAN BROWNLIE,
PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 451 (5th ed. 1998).
540. E.g., BERNIER, supranote 539, at 105-06 ("As far as federal states are concerned, the
decisive factor [in determining sovereign responsibility], in each particular instance, appears
to be the federal constitution itself.").
541. RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supranote 17, § 201 cmt. g ("A State of the United States is
not a state under international law since under the Constitution of the United States foreign
relations are the exclusive responsibility of the Federal Government."); e.g., Hines v.
Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 63 (1941) ("The Federal Government, representing as it does the
collective interests ofthe forty-eight states, is entrusted with full and exclusive responsibility
for the conduct of affairs with foreign sovereignties.... [Tihe interest of the cities, counties
and states, no less than the interest of the people ofthe whole nation, imperatively requires
that federal power in the field affecting foreign relations be left entirely free from local
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federal authority is controversial.5 42 It has been intimated, for
example, that state activities are barred whenever they adversely
affect foreign relations,5 43 though that principle has routinely been
ignored. 5" It is particularly difficult to imagine its application to
interference."); United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324, 331 (1937) ("[Iln respect of our
foreign relations generally, state lines disappear. As to such purpose the State ... does not
exist."); Edward T. Swaine, NegotiatingFederalism: State Bargainingand the Dormant
Treaty Power, 49 DUKE L.J. 1127, 1221 n.331 (2000) (citing additional cases). See generally
LouIs HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 150 (2d ed. 1996)
("At the end of the twentieth century as at the end of the eighteenth, as regards U.S. foreign
relations, the states'do not exist."); LAURENCETRIBE,AMERICANCONSTITUTIONALLAW § 4-6,
at 230 (2d ed. 1988) ("[Sltate action, whether or not consistent with current federal foreign
policy, that distorts the allocation of responsibility to the national government for the
conduct of American diplomacy is void .... "); Jack L. Goldsmith, Federal Courts, Foreign
Affairs, and Federalism,83 VA. L. REV. 1617, 1632 (1997) (noting "a remarkable consensus
about the legitimacy of the federal common law of foreign relations"); Harold G. Maier,
Preemptionof State Law: A Recommended Analysis, 83 AM. J. INT'L L. 832, 832-33 (1989)
("The consensus today is that the central Government alone may directly exercise power in
foreign affairs. Most current controversy about the foreign affairs power concerns its
distribution among the federal branches, not whether it resides in the nation rather than the
states.").
542. E.g., Curtis A. Bradley& JackL. Goldsmith, Customary InternationalLaw asFederal
Common Law:A Critiqueof theModern Position,110 HARV. L. REV. 815,860-70 (1997); Jack
L. Goldsmith, The New Formalism in United States ForeignRelations Law, 70 U. COw. L.
REv. 1395, 1410-24 (1999); Goldsmith, supranote 541passim;AM. Weisburd, State Courts,
FederalCourts, and InternationalCases, 20 YALE J. INT'L L. 1, 20-27 (1995).
543. This is one permissible reading ofZschernig v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429 (1968), in which
the Supreme Court struck down an Oregon intestacy statute as applied by the state supreme
court to limit an East German citizen's right to inherit personal property as an "intrusion by
the State into the field of foreign affairs which the Constitution entrusts to the President and
the Congress." Id. at 432; see also id. at 441 (highlighting the need to avoid interfering with
"the power of the central government to deal with [foreign relations]"). The grounds were
unclear, but the decision might also be read as turning on Oregon's attempted arrogation of
foreign affairs authority, e.g., id. at 437-38 ("As one reads the Oregon decisions, it seems that
foreign policy attitudes, the freezing or thawing of the 'cold war,' and the like are the real
desiderata. Yet they of course are matters for the Federal Government, not for local probate
courts."); id. at 439 (explaining that the purpose of one provision of the Oregon statute "was
to serve as 'an inducement to foreign nations to so frame the inheritance laws of their
respective countries in a manner which would insure to Oregonians the same opportunities
to inherit and take personal property abroad that they enjoy in the state ofOregon") (citation
omitted), or the statute's effects, id. at 441 (identifying Oregon law as having a "direct impact
upon foreign relations"); id. at 440 ("It seems inescapable that the type of probate law that
Oregon enforces affects international relations in a persistent and subtle way.").
544. Zschernig was handicapped from the onset by its uneasy coexistence with Clark u.
Allen, 331 U.S. 503 (1947)-which had upheld a similar statute and whichZschernig did not
pretend to overrule-and has been ignored in a variety of cases since then. E.g., Crosby v.
National Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363 (2000) (striking down Massachusetts
procurement law limiting purchases from companies doingbusiness with Burma (Myanmar)
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state invocation of Sherman Act jurisdiction: unlike typical state
activities touching on foreign affairs, state attorneys general
prosecuting international matters are acting in a fashion facially
licensed by Congress, making their function objectionable less in
federalism terms than as a matter of the separation of powers."
The core of the problem, rather, lies in the inability of states to
practice antitrust comity in their own stead. Private plaintiffs (and
defendants) may freely negotiate with foreign antitrust authorities,
assuming that no one resuscitates the Logan Act.546 But states
cannot do likewise. Relevant constitutional text,57 case law,548 and
political practices 49 indicate that state bargaining with foreign
on statutory preemption grounds); Barclays Bank PLC v. Franchise Tax Bd., 512 U.S. 298,
303 (1994) (holding that the Constitution permits application of California's corporate
franchise tax to a multinational banking enterprise). Some suspect, accordingly, that it
effectively has been overruled. Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, The Abiding
Relevance ofFederalismto U.S. ForeignRelations, 92 AM. J. INT'L L. 675, 678 n.23 (1998);
Peter J. Spiro, ForeignRelations Federalism,70 U. COLO. L. REV. 1223, 1266 (1999). But cf
Edward T. Swaine, Crosby asForeignRelationsLaw, 41 VA. J.INT'L L. 481 (2001) (arguing
that Crosby conceals subtle inclination toward national monopoly on foreign relations).
545. Cf United Nuclear Corp. v. General Atomic Co., 629 P.2d 231, 266-67 (N.M. 1980)
(rejecting Zschernig challenge to private action seeking to enforce New Mexico Antitrust Act
againstAmerican corporation, notwithstanding sovereign interests of Canadian government,
given that state laws were consistent with federal laws, did not single out foreign
government for criticism, and fell within legitimate interests of state government).
546. Act of Jan. 30,1799, ch. 1,1 Stat. 613 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 953 (1994))
(criminaliing conduct by unauthorized U.S. citizens designed to influence foreign
governments or officials relative to disputes or controversies with the United States, or to
defeat its measures).
547. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cL 2 (conferring the treaty power on the president and the
Senate); id. art. I, § 10, cl. 1 (prohibiting states from entering into any treaty, alliance, or
confederation); see also id. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 (entrusting president to "nominate, and by and
with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, [to] appoint Ambassadors [and] other public
Ministers and Consuls"); id. art. U1,§ 3 (authorizing president to. "receive Ambassadors and
other public Ministers"). But see infra text accompanying notes 551-57 (discussing state
authority to enter into compacts).
548. Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 150 (1996) (Souter, J., dissenting) (citing the
embassy prohibition as an example of how "even the Articles of Confederation" diminished
state independence and sovereignty); Holmes v. Jennison, 39 U.S. (14 Pet.) 540, 575-76
(1840) ("It was one of the main objects of the Constitution to make us, so far as regarded our
foreign relations, one people, and one nation; and to cut off all communications between
foreign governments, and the several state authorities."); Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9
Wheat.) 1, 11 (1824) ("By the confederation ... [n]o state ... could send or receive an

embassy-, nor make any treaty; nor enter into any compact with another State, or with a
foreign power, nor lay duties, interfering with treaties which had been entered into by
Congress.").
549. Swaine, supranote 541, at 1211-36.
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powers is constitutionally preempted.55 There are, to be sure,
exceptions, as suggested by the authority of states to enter into
compacts with foreign powers; 55 ' state diplomacy may be permitted,
for example, where it is unlikely to impact the national interest
or the authority of the other states.552 This makes it plausible, for
example, that information sharing would not ordinarily be implicated.553 But the coordination of investigations and enforcement
actions, as we have seen, runs a substantially greatei risk of
compromising the collective interest. 5 "As a constitutional matter,
moreover, attempts to ameliorate the risk of conflicting state
activities through NAAG coordination simply enhances the risk of
undermining or displacing federal authority.5"

550. As I argue elsewhere, this dormant treaty power further excludes ostensibly
unilateral state activity that is in fact contingent upon the actions of foreign powers. See id.
But one need not go so far in order to conclude that direct, state-to-nation bargaining over
the exercise of state antitrust authority is constitutionally problematic.
551. While states are expressly prohibited from "enter[ing] into any Treaty, Alliance, or
Confederation," U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1, they are permitted to enter, with permission
of Congress, into an "Agreement or Compact" with a foreign power, id. cl. 3. Thus, even ifwe
conclude that the states are precluded from negotiating toward the former class of pacts, it
is less clear-though ultimately, I believe, the better view-that they are precluded from
taking independent preparatory steps toward the latter. See Swaine, supranote 541, at 119498.
552. This test is spelled out at greater length in Swaine, supranote 541, at 1269-74; see
alsoRESTATEMENT (THIRD), supranote 17, § 201 reporters' note 9 (contending that under the
Constitution, states may make agreements of limited kinds with foreign powers with
congressional consent, or without such consent if the agreements do not "impinge upon the
authority or the foreign relations of the United States," and may not "exchange ambassadors
and engage generally in relations with a foreign government").
553. This assumes, of course, that confidentiality restrictions can be overcome or avoided,
and that foreign antitrust authorities regard a disclosure to one state attorney general as
precedent for like disclosures (or at least not militating against them)-rather than
considering there to be some cumulative ceiling.
554. See supra text accompanying notes 510-28.
555. Such activity requires congressional consent, if it is permissible at all. Virginia v.
Tennessee, 148 U.S. 503, 520-21 (1893) (requiring consent for compacts "encroach[ing] ...
upon the full and free exercise of Federal authority"); Waterfront Comm'n v. Constr. &
Marine Equip. Co., 928 F. Supp. 1388, 1401-02 (D.N.J. 1996) (holding that the state
Waterfront Commission Act requires consent because "[w]aterfront governance is closely
related to interstate and foreign commerce, and unquestionably impinges on the supremacy
of the federal government"). Cf Note, To Form a More Perfect Union?: Federalism and
Informal Interstate Cooperation, 102 HARV. L. REV. 842, 858-59 (1989) (arguing that NAAG
guidelines promote interstate cooperation on domestic matters in a fashion consistent with
the Compact Clause).
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The more plausible defense of state antitrust authority, instead,
is that it has been sanctioned by federal law. Antitrust comity, it
should be recalled, is a species of customary international law, and
custom may be overridden.556 As a matter of constitutional law, too,
otherwise suspect state foreign relations activities should be
regarded as permissible where congressionally licensed, or where
authorized by the president
pursuant to delegated or independent
55 7
constitutional authority.

The question then becomes what federal law provides. The
arguments under CharmingBetsy for limiting the potential reach
of federal antitrust authority are redoubled under Ashwander in
light of the constitutional defects of state participation in antitrust
comity. 558 Even were one inclined to favor the presumption against

preempting state authorities, 59 the underlying values tend to
backfire in the instant context. The privileges and immunities the
states enjoy within a federal system make them, if anything, less
acceptable participants under international law: if a state can
defend itself against injunctive relief by a foreign nation on
Eleventh Amendment grounds, the only domestic recourse
for
560
compelling compliance with antitrust comity would vanish.
556. See supratext accompanying notes 307, 339.
557. Swaine, supra note 544, at 1274-77.
558. Ashwander v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 288, 346-47 (1936) (Brandeis, J.,
concurring) (articulating rules for avoiding constitutional questions); see also Rust v.
Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173,191 (1991) ("This canon is followed out of respect for Congress, which
we assume legislates in the light ofconstitutional limitations.") (citation omitted); accord id.
at 223-24 (O'Connor, J., dissenting); Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Florida Gulf Coast Bldg.
& Constr. Trades Council, 485 U.S. 568, 575 (1988) (given that members of Congress are
bound by and swear an oath to the Constitution, the Court will not "lightly assume that
Congress intended to infringe constitutionally protected liberties or usurp power
constitutionally forbidden it"). But see, e.g., Frederick Schauer, Ashwander Revisited, 1995
SUP. CT. REV. 71, 72-74 (criticizingAshwander approach to statutory construction as no less
intrusive than judicial review of constitutionality).
559. Jack Goldsmith, Statutory ForeignAffairsPreemption,2000 Sup. CT. REv. 175, 17677 (arguing that presumptions favoring and disfavoring preemption in foreign affairs are
irreconcilable and should be discarded).
560. Breard v. Greene, 523 U.S. 371, 377 (1998) (suggesting that Paraguay's suit "might
not succeed" in light of Eleventh Amendment immunity). As Professor Vtzquez has
suggested, Breard might be explained based upon a distinction between prospective and
retrospective relief, at least ifother cases are put to one side. Carlos Manuel Vlzquez, Night
and Day: Coeur d'Alene, Breard, and the Unraveling of the Prospective-Retrospective
Distinctionin Eleventh Amendment Doctrine,87 GEO. L.J. 1, 66-72 (1998). If so, it may be
distinguishable from actions involving antitrust comity, which by their nature seek redress
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For these reasons, the case for constraining state enforcement of
federal antitrust law in light of antitrust comity is more persuasive
than for private attorneys general. Devising the appropriate
solution remains difficult. As with private attorneys general,
barring state enforcement in international matters outright would
be problematic. Congress typically avoids preempting state enforcement,5 6 ' making it unappealing to read it as broadly doing so in the
international context.162 Any such approach would also place
enormous and ungovernable stress on our ability to segregate
international matters, when one of the signal virtues of the reasonableness approach was the diminished emphasis it placed on
extraterritoriality as the touchstone for regulatory conflicts.56
The methodology for local international law suggests that
progress may be made by capturing the conflict more precisely, and
by recalling that decisive judicial solutions are not the only
recourse. Antitrust comity requires at a minimum that the United
States possess the capacity to consider foreign authorities'
legitimate interests while enforcing its antitrust law, including by
considering forgoing antitrust enforcement altogether; state
standing to enforce that same law, however, deprives the federal
agencies of any sovereign authority to provide any such guarantee.
A positive step, then, would be to establish a mechanism for
ensuring that the states do in fact consider such interests-such as
by briefing the relevant state attorneys general concerning the
requests, preferably according to a formal routine like those

for continuing violations. See supra text accompanying notes 472-73.
561. SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, ANTITRUST FEDERALISM
THE ROLE OF STATE LAw 13 (1988).

562. Cf Ginsburg & Anstreich, supra note 5, at 228. Precluding state, but not federal,
enforcement poses the risk of inconsistent interpretations, though that is not necessarily
fatal. Cf United States v. Nippon Paper Indus. Co., 109 F.3d 1, 10 (1997) (explaining that,
while "[i]t is, of course, generally true that, as a principle of statutory interpretation, the
same language should be read the same way in all contexts to which the language applies,"
but noting that the basis might exist for treating civil and criminal antitrust enforcement
differently) (citing Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337, 343-44 (1997)) (depending on
context, statutory term may have different meanings in different sections of single statute);
3 NoRMANJ. SINGER, SUTHERLAND STATUTORYCONSTRUCTION § 60.04 (5th ed. 1992) (statutes
with both remedial and penal provisions may be construed liberally in remedial context and
strictly in penal context).
563. See supra text accompanying note 315.
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established for federal-state coordination in domestic matters.56 '
Although foreign governments may not relish the prospect of
disclosing their interests in such a way, even via an intermediary,
it may be a small price for improving the chances that their
legitimate interests will be respected.
Ensuring the adequacy of state consideration raises a more
difficult question, in part because international law and domestic
law start to diverge. For foreign governments, the division of
enforcement authority will likely remain troublesome to the extent
it materially undermines U.S. compliance. 565 And having the federal
agencies interpose post hoc objections in cases where antitrust
comity has not been observed is unlikely to be enough, as the
experience with such filings in private actions would suggest. 6 In
purely domestic matters, at least, the federal agencies claim only
the power to cajole their state counterparts, 56 7 and even lack
deference in construing the jurisdictional reach of U.S. antitrust
law.56 The agencies would surely argue for a more privileged
position in international matters, 69 but it is far from clear that they
564. E.g., Protocol for Coordination in Merger Investigations Between the Federal
Enforcement Agencies and State Attorneys General (Mar. 11, 1998), reprinted in 4 Trade
Reg. Rep. (CCH) 1 13,420 (1998) [hereinafter Merger Protocol] (providing for consultation
between federal and state officials regarding simultaneous merger investigations).
565. State deviation from the federal government's preferred position, without more, is
not delictual; so long as the state complies with the international norm, the only basis for
complaint would be internal and constitutional in nature.
566. See supra text accompanying note 493; see also text accompanying note 494
(describing failure of self-representation by foreign governments).
567. E.g., Merger Protocol, supra note 564, § IV (noting that while "[t]o achieve the full
benefits ofcooperation it is imperative that federal and state antitrust enforcement agencies
collaborate closely with respect to the settlement process. ... [Each federal and state
governmental entity is fully sovereign and independent....").
568. Adams Fruit Co. v. Barrett, 494 U.S. 638, 649 (1990) ("A precondition to deference
under Chevron is a congressional delegation of administrative authority."); see also Bradley,
Chevron Deference, supranote 34, at 670-71 & n.81. But cf United States v. Kinder, 64 F.3d
757, 771 (2d Cir. 1995) (Leval, J., dissenting) (citing Merger Guidelines as example of
instance in which courts "borrow" agency guidelines, even though Chevron deference is not
warranted).
569. The Justice Department, at least, takes the position that it is entitled to deference
in considering the question of its own compliance with international comity. See supratext
accompanying note 250. In the antitrust context, in particular, the executive branch could
claim that its inherent authority is enhanced by the bilateral agreements to which the
United States is a party, as well as its negotiating authority under the IAEAAL But these
arguments are by no means decisive. The bilateral agreements were not intended to have
legal force domestically, see supratext accompanying notes 84, 103, and would in any event
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could overcome both state standing to enforce the law and judicial
authorityto resolve controversies surrounding the law's application.
The better solution, on balance, would be to involve the states in
the actual mechanics of antitrust comity through the design of a
federal-state international protocol. 70 In furtherance of their own
duties under international law, the federal agencies would request
that the states inform them of any state actions potentially
touching on the legitimate interests of nations owed antitrust
comity. 17 ' The states would also be obligated to comply in good faith
with federal requests to abstain from or modify their enforcement
decisions where the national interest, and international obligations,
were served. Either function would be promoted by an agreed set of
criteria for identifying potentially relevant international matters.'
States may resist capitulating to federal requests, particularly in
furtherance of foreign interests, but there is some reason to think
that any objections would be subdued. The obligation to participate
in such a scheme is derived from international law, and one may
assume that those same states pledging at present to observe
international comity would be willing to abide by its more modest
antitrust variant as well. 573 Cooperation may also benefit the states.
Just as national governments are encouraged to cooperate by the
prospect that their own, legitimate interests will receive greater
be retarded by the uncertain legal effect of executive agreements, see Swaine, supranote 541,
at 1157-58 & nn. 108-09 (reviewing case law and conflicting commentaries). IAEAA
authority, on the other hand, is essentially dormant.
570. Cf Lande, supranote 138, at 1072-94 (proposing"Federalism Guidelines"to dealwith
domestic conflicts); Robert M. Langer, Should the Antitrust Division, the FTC, and State
Attorneys GeneralFormallyAllocatetheMarketforAntitrustEnforement?,ANTITRUSTREP.,
Oct. 1998, at 2, 4 (proposing further federal-state protocol).
571. This would reciprocate the Attorney General's obligation to notify states respecting
potential damage claims they may pursue. 15 U.S.C. § 15f (2000); see ANTITRUST DIV.
MANUAL, supranote 122, at VII-10 (construing statute to require notification to relate solely
to potential state damages actions, and noting that in determining whether to notify, "the
Division considers, among other relevant factors, the factual circumstances of the alleged
violation, and the posture of the state as a potential damage claimant under existing law,
and the likely effect of the alleged violation on cognizable state interests").
572. Provisionally, including those matters involving significant foreign conduct, mergers
involving parties incorporated abroad, substantial foreign discovery or remedies involving
foreign conduct, or cases in which foreign antitrust authorities are actively or potentially
involved.
573. See supra text accompanying notes 510-28 (noting state representations that they
heed comity, as well as limitations on their ability to do so independently); ef supranote 377
(noting consensus that obeying international law is far more common than its violation).
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attention, state attorneys general may properly be informed that
the espousal of their interests-whether in the form of diplomatic
requests for deference to their actions in appropriate cases, or
assistance in their efforts through the exercise of positive comityis contingent upon their acquiescence in comity's constraints as
well.5 7 More bluntly, state acquiescence in a cooperative scheme
may avoid adding fuel to recurring calls for a broader legislative
retrenchment of their prerogatives, 7 5 or even indirect commandeering of their cooperation through conditional preemption or
leveraging of the
federal funds presently provided for state
57 6
antitrust efforts.
Although the essentially voluntary nature of this arrangement
is a far cry from the more authoritative reasonableness norm,
it closely resembles the underlying international norm-which
574. States might also be encouraged to cooperate by providing them with a more active
role in a limited class ofmatters, such as in cases involving U.S. activity or assets localized
to a particular state, or where the principal grievant is a state or local governmental
purchaser of goods or services. In such cases, state personnel might be appointed to assist
Justice Department or FTC personnel; as in federal/state criminalprotocol, such procedures
would reflect the combination of local interest and lack of genuine local authority.
575. For proposed reforms, see Lande, supra note 138, at 1061 (citing conclusion ofABA
Antitrust Section that '[ilt is probably fair to conclude that a strong majority ofthe antitrust
bar and academic community favors exclusive federal merger enforcement except for purely
local intrastate mergers') (quoting Comments of the ABA Section of Antitrust Law with
Respect to the Amended Proposal for a Council Regulation (EEC) on the Control of
ConcentrationsBetween Undertakings,59 ANTrrRUST L.J. 245, 255 (1990) (alteration in
original)); Posner, supranote 503, at 940 (suggesting that states should be "stripped oftheir
authority to bring antitrust suits, federal or state, except under circumstances in which a
private firm would be able to sue, as where the state is suing firms that are fixing the prices
of goods or services that they sell to the state"); Zimmerman, supra note 505, at 366
(proposing legislation that ureaffirms the federal policyregarding mergers and requires state
attorneys general to make enforcement decisions based on this federal policy," and
permitting the agencies to withdraw funds from recalcitrant states); see also supra note 485
(discussing DeConcini proposals).
576. See Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 917-18 (1997) (holding unconstitutional
statutory direction of state enforcement, but distinguishing conditional programs); id. at 960
(Stevens, J., dissenting) (noting that majority holding preserves exceptions by which
Congress can "require the States to implement its programs as a condition of federal
spending, in order to avoid the threat of unilateral federal action in the area, or as a part of
a program that affects States and private parties alike") (citations omitted). The fact that
only state evaluation of foreign antitrust concerns would be required, too, may be
redemptive. Id. at 925-26 (interpreting FERC v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742 (1982), as
construing the relevant statute to "contain only the 'command' that state agencies 'consider'
federal standards, and ... only as a precondition to continued state regulation of an
otherwise pre-empted field").
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addresses national governments with a similar respect for their
sovereign authority over enforcement decisions, and entices them
to participate by subordinating the strongest objections to
extraterritorial jurisdiction. By replicating international antitrust
comity on the domestic level, with the federal government as the
intermediary, states may have an incentive to contribute to the
enrichment, rather than the curtailment, of emerging international
law.
Involving states in antitrust comity may, I recognize, have the
unintended effect ofemboldeningthem to assert greater jurisdiction
over international matters. But they already perceive themselves
as having that authority, 77 and estranging them from any official
involvement may simply mean that their decisions are less
informed and less sensitive to international considerations. Foreign
antitrust authorities, similarly, may resent any requests from the
states for assistance that might be conveyed, or prefer to avoid
considering suspending their own activities in deference to the
states. 8 At the same time, excluding the states entirely might
cause those authorities to lose the ability to call upon the states to
assist in their own investigations, and diminish their assurance
that American antitrust enforcement will be suspended as a
reflection of traditional comity.
Failing to engage the states in the enterprise of comity, finally,
may simply lead to self-help. The still developing Microsoft matter
could prove illustrative. As the U.S. litigation moves into end
game, to what appears to be the incomplete satisfaction of the
state plaintiffs, the European Commission's investigation is just
(re)awakening-and focusing on products and practices of keen
interest to some states. 9 According to current speculation, the new
EC objections are likely to bolster the interest of the state attorneys
general in attacking the same practices stateside-and potentially
even to pressure the Justice Department into doing likewise."'
577. See supra note 139.
578. To the extent that foreign antitrust authorities like the European Commission have
particular objections to state involvement, they could be discussed in the context of the
ongoing fine-tuning of antitrust comity. See Seiberg, supra note 151.
579. See supra text accompanying notes 28-30.
580. Peter Spiegel, Brussels'Microsoft Probe Moves Closer to US, FIN. TIMES, Aug. 31,
2001, at 4.
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Regardless of the Department's policy preferences on that
particular issue, it is presumably in the U.S. interest to coordinate
with Europe-whether by combining forces against the putative
offenses, or demurring and seeking to reconcile the European
proceedings with U.S. remedies in the original matter-instead of
choosing a more reactive approach, and permitting the development
of new and potentially divisive discourses on the subnational and
international planes.
4. Coda:StateAntitrustLaw andthe LessonsforAntitrust Comity
States also have considerable authority by virtue of state
antitrust laws, and considering the relationship between that
authority and the federal enforcement of antitrust law demonstrates the inevitably precarious nature of jurisdictional
restraints-domestic or foreign. State law claims usually wind up
in federal court,5 ' seemingly positioning the federal judiciary to
rationalize antitrust comity,5 82 but congruity in a federal system
may be more difficult to ensure than that. If customary international law is directly binding federal law, equivalent to treaties
and statutes, then states must of course conform their state laws to
it." If, on the other hand, custom merely influences the interpretation of the federal antitrust statutes, it arguably has little
purchase on state law, no matter where it is applied.
At the very least, the consensus on CharmingBetsy fractures on
this question.'" One may still infer preemptive limits from federal
581. ANTITRUST Div. MANUAL, supranote 122, at VII-8 (explaining "the practice of most
state attorneys general to file cases in federal court with pendent state antitrust claims" as
stemming from a desire to take advantage of federal court expertise); accord Edward A.
Cavanagh, New York Antitrust Bureau PursuesMandate To Represent State Interests In
FosteringCompetitiveEnvironment,72 N.Y. ST. B.J., Jan. 2000, at 38,38-39 (explaining why
New York state enforcers prefer federal to state court).
582. Cf Wood, supranote 27, at 416 (arguing that, in contrast to systems emphasizing
administrative authority, "[tlhe multiplicity of authorized enforcers of [American antitrust]
law ... has made the federal judiciary the only locus for the definitive coordination of
substantive antitrust policy"); 1997Roundtable,supranote 507, at 815 (remarks ofKevin J.
O'Connor).
583. See supra text accompanying notes 336-38 (noting division ofauthority).
584. Only the internationalist conception clearly supports extension of Charming Betsy
to state law. See Bradley & Goldsmith, Federal Courts,supra note 21, at 2273 (suggesting
that canons like CharmingBetsy "do not raise the same federalism concerns as the modem
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law, particularly in the service of international norms,"s but the
Supreme Court lately envisions a more limited role for federal
courts in generating such rules.8 6 Where state antitrust law differs
from federal law, at least-and does not differ so distinctly as to
raise preemption issues-local international law may fail to
authoritatively constraint state law enforcement not constrained of
its own accord. 87
The history of state antitrust law reminds us, however, how
illusory jurisdictional limits may prove, and provides a useful
account concerning the potential for judicial enforcement of
international norms. Federal enactments have traditionally posed
little preemptive constraint."8 Over half the existing states had
position because they presumably are not binding on state courts (or federal courts sitting
in diversity) in their application of state law"); Bradley, The Charming Betsy Canon, supra
note 34, at 533-36; see also Lea Brilmayer, Federalism,StateAuthority, and the Preemptive
PowerofInternationalLaw,1994 SUP.CT. REV. 295,334 n.14 ("If all that is involved is using
CharmingBetsy to interpret state statutes, then the Supreme Court probably has no basis
for requiring the states to go along."). But see Steinhardt, supra note 347, at 1114 n.45
(arguing that "the supremacy clause of the Constitution and the federal interest in relatively
uniform interpretations of international law should support a CharmingBetsynorm in these
local contexts"). Other rationales may conceivably be mustered-state legislatures may, as
an empirical matter, take international law into account, and federal and state courts may
have cause to respect a separation of powers with regard to state legislatures-but none are
immediately obvious. Bradley, The Charming Betsy Canon,supra note 34, at 534-35 (noting
doubts as to the applicability of these warrants in the state-law context).
585. See Brilmayer, supra note 584, at 332-36 (arguing that "[flederal legislative silence
should be understood as hostile to state efforts to violate international legal norms"); cf
Bradford R. Clark, FederalCommon Law: A StructuralReinterpretation,144 U. PA. L. REV.
1245, 1292-311 & 1298 n.252 (1996); Alfred Hill, The Law-Making Power of the Federal
Courts:ConstitutionalPreemption,67 COLUM. L.REV. 1024,1048 (1967); Thomas W. Merrill,
The Common Law Powers of Federal Courts, 52 U. Cml. L. REv.1, 36-39, 54-59 (1985)
(describing the principle of preemptive lawmaking as a potentialwarrant for federal common
law); id. at 56 n.238 (identifying the federal common law of international relations as a
possible example of preemptive lawmaking).
586. Cf Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428,438 (2000) (reasoning that application
of Mirandarule to prosecution in state courts demonstrates its constitutional nature, since
"[i]t
is beyond dispute that we do not hold a supervisory power over the courts ofthe several
States... [and that] [w]ith respect to proceedings in state courts, our 'authority is limited to
enforcing the commands of the United States Constitution" (quotingMu!Minv. Virginia, 500
U.S. 415,422 (1991)) (citations omitted); cf Merrill, supranote 585 (distinguishing between
federal common law that is binding on states in all respects, and that which is binding only
on federal courts to the extent that they are construing federal rights and duties).
587. Some state statutes direct courts to construe the statutes in parallel to their federal
counterparts, and some state courts have adopted the practice on their own initiative.
LIFLAND, supra note 132, § 1.06, at 1-25 to 1-26.
588. Thomas Greene et al., State Antitrust Law and Enforcement, in 2 39TH ANNUAL
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antitrust laws when the Sherman Act was adopted,589 Congress
appears to have desired to supplement those laws,59 and the
Supreme Court employs the presumption against preemption in
areas traditionally regulated by the states. 591
The Sherman Act originally was adopted, however, largely out of
the perception that the states lacked constitutionalauthority to
regulate interstate or foreign commerce.5

92

At the time, even

nondiscriminatory state antitrust legislation was reviewed for
consistency with the territorial limits on state authority imposed by
the Commerce Clause 93 and with due process limits on legislative
ANTITRUST LAW INSTITuTE 677 (PLI Corp. Law & Practice Course Handbook Series No. B-

1050, 1998) (citing LAURENCE TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONALLAW 479-96 (2d ed. 1988)).
589. California v. ARC Am. Corp., 490 U.S. 93, 101 (1989) (citing Mosk, State Antitrust
EnforcementandCoordinationwith FederalEnforcement, 21A.B.A. ANTITRUSTSEC-TION 358,
363 (1962)).
590. See, e.g., 21 CONG. REC. 2457 (1890) (remarks of Sen. Sherman) (declaring that
proposed legislation would "supplement the enforcement of... statute law by the courts of
the several States").
591. ARCAm. Corp., 490 U.S. at 101 (upholding state antitrust law containing so-called
IllinoisBrick repealer, thus permitting state law to afford damages for indirect purchasers
that was not available under federal law); see also Exxon Corp. v. Governor of Maryland, 437
U.S. 117 (1978) (upholding state-law restrictions on price discrimination by oil companies
that was permissible under Robinson-Patman Act). Given this context, it is perhaps
unsurprising that few state laws have been stricken on the basis of preemption. Other
federal legislation has, however, been held to preempt state antitrust statutes. E.g., Alliance
Shippers, Inc. v. S. Pac. Transp. Co., 858 F.2d 567,569-70 (9th Cir. 1988) (holding California
antitrust statute preempted in part by federal Staggers Railway Act).
592. 21 CONG. REC. 2457 (1890) (remarks of Sen. Sherman) ("Ifthe combination is confined
to a State, the State should apply the remedy-, if it is interstate and controls any production
in many States, Congress must apply the remedy"); id. at 2462 (remarks of Sen. Sherman)
(observing that federal law would regulate "combinations [which] strike directly at [that]
commerce over which Congress alone has jurisdiction"); id at 2567 (remarks of Sen. Hoar)
(I suppose that, so far as this is a regulation of the commerce between this country and a
foreign country or between two different States ofthis country, the jurisdiction of Congress
is conclusive over it; the States can not touch it."). See generallyJOHNJ. FLYNN, FEDERALISM
AND STATE ANTITRUST REGUATION (1984). As Professor May has noted, not all subscribed
to Senator Sherman's views on the relative scope of federal and state power. James May,
AntitrustPracticeand Procedurein the FormativeEra The Constitutionaland Conceptual
Reach of State Antitrust Law, 1880-1918, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 495, 509 & n.85 (1987). Prior
state enforcement actions in fact extended to multistate matters, id. at 501, and states
persisted in asserting regulatory authority beyond theirborders through a variety of means,
id. at 509-42. But see Hovenkamp, supranote 138, at 379 (claiming that"Senator Sherman's
perception of the relationship between state and federal power was correct in 1890, but has
lost its vitality today") (citation omitted).
593. E.g., Hadley Dean Plate Glass Co. v. Highland Glass Co., 143 F. 242 (8th Cir. 1906);
J.R. Watkins Med. Co. v. Holloway, 168 S.W. 290 (Mo. 1914); People v. N. River Sugar Ref.
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jurisdiction. 94 In short, as Professor Hovenkamp has observed, 9 5
the Supreme Court's contemporaneous view likely resembled
Justice Holmes's opinion on the extraterritorial application of the
Sherman Act: namely, that it would be "startling" to evaluate the
legality of an act by any standard other than that of the place where
it was committed. 9 Territorial limits protected against unjustified
encroachments by a state against other states and their citizens,
while Commerce Clause limits served to preserve a domain for
regulation, if at all, on a federal plane.597
Just as judicial attempts to restrict federal authority to interstate
matters faded as the century wore on,598 so did the limits on state
authority. The Supreme Court has never squarely held that state
antitrust statutes may apply freely to interstate commerce,5 99 and
state courts developed interpretive practices designed to avoid
potential conflicts, 00 but there has been little attempt to hold any
Co., 24 N.E. 834 (N.Y. 1890); In re Grice, 79 F. 627 (N.D. Tex. 1897), rev'd on other grounds
sub nom., Baker v. Grice, 169 U.S. 284 (1898); see also FLYNN, supra note 592, at 56-108;
Hovenkamp, supra note 138; May, supranote 592, at 517-21.
594. E.g., In re Grice, 79 F. at 627 (declaring unconstitutional Texas antitrust statute
providing, in relevant part, for criminal prosecution ofpersons not present within state); see
also Home Ins. Co. v. Dick, 281 U.S. 397, 410 (1930) (cautioning that Texas could not
regulate "contracts which are neither made nor are to be performed in Texas"); Allgeyer v.
Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578 (1897); State v. Lancashire Fire Ins. Co., 51 S.W. 633 (Ark. 1899);
Department of Fin. Insts. v. Gen. Fin. Corp., 86 N.E.2d 444 (Ind. 1949). For discussion, see
FLYNN, supranote 592, at 48-53; Hovenkamp, supranote 138; May, supranote 592, at 51721. State laws were also subject to equal protection challenges, see FLYNN, supranote 593,
at 24-40, and allegations that they discriminated against interstate commerce, id. at 96-108,
in accordance with the prevailing legal standards.
595. Hovenkamp, supra note 138, at 380-82.
596. American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347, 355 (1909).
597. For a similar distinction within modem case law, see Hovenkamp, supra note 138,
at 388, 390-404. As Professor Hovenkamp observes, legislative jurisdiction is also limited by
the Full Faith and Credit Clause, but that standard is closely comparable to the constraints
imposed by due process. Id. at 391 n.83.
598. E.g., Summit Health, Ltd. v. Pinhas, 500 U.S. 322 (1991) (conspiracy to bar
ophthalmologist from practice in greater Los Angeles satisfied interstate commerce
requirement under Sherman Act); Abrams, supranote 499, at 990 (1987) (complaining that
the federal antitrust enforcers ignored national mergers, and instead concentrated on "local
cases involving horizontal restraints").
599. ANTITRUSTLAWDEELOPMENTS(FOURTH),supra note 122, at 745; Hovenkamp, supra
note 138, at 387; see Malcolm R. Pfunder, ConstitutionalLimitations on State Antitrust
Enforcement, 58 ANTITRUST L.J. 207,213 (1989) (observing that"it is very difficult to predict
whether [state action seeking broad extraterritorial relief] would survive Dormant Commerce
Clause challenge").
600. LIFLAND, supranote 132, § 1.06, at 1-25 to 1-27 & nn.16-16.1 (citing cases).
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line.6"' Despite a continued insistence on substantial contacts
between a regulating state and an out-of-state activity over which
it seeks control, 0 2 due process limits on the territorial reach of
states have likewise eroded. 0 3
The solution, instead, has been enlightened self-restraint,
encouraged by the federal government. In the area of criminal
antitrust, for example, a relatively meager program to deputize
state attorneys general to assist in federal criminal prosecutions. 4
evolved into a more significant protocol providing for the occasional
transfer to states of responsibility for potential offenses having a
"particularly local impact."6"' The NAAG's efforts at coordinating
state enforcement in important areas like merger control has also
attempted to maintain some consistency with federal enforcement," 6 and federal and state officials subsequently agreed on a
601. Compare Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624 (1982) (plurality) (holding
unconstitutional an Illinois statute imposing preregistration requirement on tender offers
in light of extraterritorial effect), with CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of Am., 481 U.S. 69
(1987) (distinguishing andupholding similar Indiana statute against identical challenge); see
also Texas v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 697 S.W.2d 677, 682 (Tex. Ct. App. 1985), appeal
dismissed, 478 U.S. 1029 (1986) (findingno Commerce Clause obstacles barring Texas from
challenging the acquisition of assets).
602. Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302, 320 (1981) (legislative jurisdiction).
603. E.g., Hovenkamp, supra note 138, at 382.
604. ANTITRUST LAW DEVELOPMENIS (FOURTH), supra note 122, at 741; see also Abrams
& Constantine, supra note 502, at 504 (describing cross-deputization program as "largely
symbolic and ofvery limited utility," amountingto "'show and tell' field-training exercise[s]").
605. ANTITRUST LAW DEVELOPMENTS (FOURTH), supra note 122, at 741; see also U.S.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, PROTOCOL FOR INCREASED STATE PROSECUTION OF CRIMINAL
ANTITRUST OFFENSES, reprintedin 70 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 1755, at 362

(Mar. 28, 1996).
606. The NAAG's initial merger guidelines were amended somewhat to reflect changes in
the federal guidelines. 1987 NAAG Horizontal Merger Guidelines, reprintedin 4 Trade Reg.
Rep. (CCH)
13,405, at 21,181 (1988), amended by 1993 NAAG Horizontal Merger
Guidelines, reprintedin 4 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) 13,406, at 21,193 (1993); see U.S. Dep't
of Justice & Federal Trade Commission, Horizontal Merger Guidelines (1984), reprintedin
4 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) 13,103, at 20,551 (1993). State officials were consulted during the
process of revising the federal guidelines, suspending work on their own guidelines in order
to participate more fully;, conversely, they shared their interim revisions to the state
guidelines with federal officials for theirinput. 6OMinutes withRobertM.Langer,supranote
139. For discussion of persistent differences between the federal and state philosophies, see
David W. Barnes, Federaland State Philosophiesin the Antitrust Law ofMergers, 56 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 263-64 (1988); Rose, supranote 498, at 81-114; Zimmerman, supra note 506,
at 351. For focus on the continuing differences between the post-1993 state guidelines and
the federal guidelines, see Rose, supranote 498, at 110-14.
The NAAG also developed and refined a Voluntary Pre-Merger Disclosure Compact
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protocol designed to facilitate joint investigations and settlement
discussions. 0 7 Federal and state officials also formed an Executive
Working Group for Antitrust to provide for broader coordination of
efforts.'
These efforts have scarcely obviated the need for a more formal
protocol on international matters, one encompassing state enforcement of both federal and state laws; some state representatives,
indeed, have indicated something like jealousy concerning the
working relationship between the federal agencies and foreign
authorities. 6°9 But the similarities to the course of international
cooperation are striking. While interstate enforcement of state law
was originally thought to exceed ironclad constitutional delimitations, and potentially to conflict with the Sherman Act, neither
argument won the day-just as statutory and international law
objections to extraterritoriality ultimately subsided. In their stead,
cooperative agreements have prevailed, without entirely resolving
the potential for conflict.
designed to encourage private parties to voluntarily provide confidential information to
signatory states in return for a commitment on the states' part to seek to procure
supplemental materials duringthe Hart-Scott-Rodino waiting period byvoluntaryproduction
rather than by resorting first to compulsory processes. NAAG Voluntary Pre-Merger
Disclosure Compact, reprinted in 4 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) 1 13,410, at 21,209 (1987).
Revisions to the Compact were approved in 1994, but it has been employed only infrequently.
Flexner & Racanelli, supra note 122, at 521.
607. ProtocolforCoordination in Merger Investigations Between the Federal Enforcement
Agencies and State Attorneys General, reprintedin 4 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) 13,420, at
21,213 (1998). It is the Justice Department's policy to cooperate with the states on "mergers
that affect local markets," at least"when practical." ANTITRUSTDIVISIONMANUAL, supranote
122, at VII-18. Given legal restrictions on the ability of federal agencies to share certain
confidential information provided in connection with mergers, both the federal-state merger
protocol and the state compact rely heavily on the consent of private parties to the sharing
ofconfidential information, consent encouraged by the parties' interestinreducing somewhat
the burden of multijurisdiction merger enforcement.
608. ANTITRUST LAW DEVELOPMENTS (FOURTH), supranote 122, at 740.
609. Report From Officialdom: 60 Minutes with Laurel A Price, Chair, National
Association OfAttorneys GeneralMultistateAntitrustTaskForce,63 ANTITRUSTL.J. 303,321
(1994) (remarks of Laurel Price) (replying, when asked whether states might expect
treatment equal to foreign nations with respect to access to confidential information, "I
expect I would advise them that the States ought to be treated a little bit better. ... I would
point out that greater access to federal investigatory materials is a position the States have
been urging for a long time. It should not come as a surprise to anyone in the Congress that
the States feel that they should have access to such materials at least as readily as foreign
governments.").
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The difference, facially, is that while domestic cooperation on
interstate matters is not legally binding, the theory of local
international law suggests that international cooperation, in the
form of antitrust comity, is. Even that difference may be somewhat
overstated. Where subnational cooperation is inconsistent with
domestic arrangements, it too has been regarded as sufficiently
concrete to warrant legal intervention.6 1 Just so, federal arrangements on the international plane may require the protection
afforded by custom against both national and subnational breach.
In the case of antitrust comity, at least, the domestic implementation of that custom as local international law requires the
national supervision of state restraint, if only as an alternative
to more decisive jurisdictional limits. If it is not forthcoming, the
United States may be forced to confront awkward questions
regarding the significance of subnational sovereignty in an
international system, 1 1 as well as the tenability of maintaining
interstate cooperation
that potentiallythreatens federal supremacy
61 2
in foreign affairs.
CONCLUSION
The most telling complaint against antitrust comity, and against
the theory of local international law it illustrates, is that (like
Oakland, reputedly) there's no there there. The solution it proposes
to the problems of international antitrust surely seems underwhelning. Comity may marginally improve cooperation and reduce
conflict, but it does not begin to grapple with the substantive and
procedural discrepancies among national rules, nor definitively
610. Cf Morales v. Trans World Airlines, 504 U.S. 374 (1992) (holding NAAG fare
advertising guidelines preempted under the Airline Deregulation Act of 1978).
611. U.S. and Canadian courts, at least, are ofthe view that state and provincial laws are
themselves entitled to no considerationundergeneral principles ofinternational comity.E.g.,
Central Wesleyan Coll. v. W.R. Grace & Co., 143 F.R.D. 628,644-46 (D.S.C. 1992) (refusing
to accord international comity to Quebec blocking statute); Lyons v. Bell Asbestos Mines,
Ltd., 119 F.ID. 384,386-90 (D.S.C. 1988) (same); Huntv. Lac d'Amiante du Qu6bec, [1993]
S.C.R. 289, 328 (Can.) (differentiating between defensibility of federal blocking legislation
with extraterritorial effect and simila provincial legislation, given that "the federal
Parliament is expressly permitted by our Constitution to legislate with internationally
extraterritorial effect").
612. Cf supra text accompanying notes 550-54 (discussing limitations on interstate
compacts).
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resolve the potential for conflict with actors less beholden by nature
to international niceties. The reasonableness norm, whatever its
shortcomings, at least proposed to restrict all antitrust enforcement, absolutely, based upon an independent examination of
relevant factors.
The absence of any more substantial implications is not
necessarily a theoretical flaw, because it may simply indicate that
nations do not regard it as being in their interests to go further. But
even the limitations of antitrust comity highlight a path for future
evolution. Complaints that comity falsely equates enforcement and
nonenforcement, and systematically encourages under regulation
by permitting parties to escape liability,61 may be overcome by
recognizing the less disciplined function of private and state
attorneys general. Those perceiving benefit in conflict as a spur for
cooperation,614 too, may take comfort in the fact that antitrust
comity, even if religiously observed, will not wholly derail the
possibility of international conflict, but may simply improve the
ability of the executive branch to determine the occasions for that
conflict.615
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, local international law
offers a concrete basis for the proliferation of related norms. Special
custom may spread to other nations, or other topics, which may
in turn reinforce antitrust principles. 616 Deepening, committed
cooperation may also expand comity's minima, requiring greater
transparency by national authorities regarding the process by
which they examine claims by private parties and their peers.617

613. Louise Weinberg, Against Comity, 80 GEO. L.J. 53, 70-76 (1991); see also Dodge,
supranote 39, at 153-58; Paul, supranote 22, at 79 (explaining how comity can undermine
public regulation).

614. Dodge, supranote 39, at 148, 158-68.
615. Id. at 159-63.
616. The European Community, for example, recently described the potentialbenefits that
would have accrued in the Commission's investigation of the French/West African
Shipowners Conference case had information sharing and comity principles been established
between the Commission and the twelve West African countries involved. See
Communication from the European Community and its Member States, WTO, Working
Group on the Interaction between Trade and Competition Policy, WT/WGTCP/W/160 (March
14,2001), availableat http://docsonline.wto.org/DDFDocuments/t/WT/WGTCP/W160.DOC.
617. Cf Sykes, supra note 294, at 95 (describing potential for transparency and due
process requirements related to national treatment norms).
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In the absence of genuine global antitrust convergence,
international antitrust and antitrust federalism have the potential
for considerable conflict-but they also have much to learn from
one another, including how to resolve those conflicts. Leaving
comity's development to the courts alone, it would appear, leaves
doctrine playing catch-up to practice, in both cases forcing the
judiciary to abandon territoriality for murkier waters. Regulatory
comity, on the other hand, has been relatively effective at
establishing principled bilateral relations in both the American
and international contexts, but has yet to connect them. The signal
advantage of international law is that it allows the courts to learn
from the regulatory experience, and accept its firmest commitments
as law. If the law can in turn enhance the observance of comity in
international cases, it may take a small step forward toward a
convergence adapted to both domestic and international interests,
and in the process highlight the potential for local international
law.

